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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
LEFT BEHIND: A FARMER’S FATE IN THE AGE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
by
Cristian Javier Melo
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Gail Hollander, Major Professor
Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and vulnerable
class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming from trade
liberalization places farmers in a race to the bottom that leads to displacement, poverty,
and environmental degradation. Scholars and activists have proposed that alternative
trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to reverse this trend by harnessing the power
of the markets to reward producers of goods with embedded superior cultural,
environmental, and social values. Alternative trade via certification schemes have
become a de facto prescription for any location where there is a need to conciliate
economic interest with conservation imperatives.
Partnerships among commodity production farmers, elite manufacturers and
wealthy northern consumers/activists do not necessarily have win-win outcomes.
Paradoxically, the partnerships of farmers with external agencies have unexpected results.
These partnerships develop into dependent relationships that become unsustainable in the
absence of further transfers of capital. The institutions born of these partnerships are
fragile. When these fledging institutions fail, farmers are left in the same situation that
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they were before the partnership, with only minor improvements to show after spending
considerable amounts of social and financial capital.
I hypothesize that these failures are born out of a belief in a universal
understanding of sustainability. A discursive emphasis on consensus, equity and mutual
benefit hides the fact that what for consumers it is a matter of choice, for producers is a
matter of survival. The growth in consumers’ demand for certified products creates a race
for farmers to meet these standards. My findings suggest that this race generates
economically perverse effects. First, producers enter into a certification treadmill.
Second, the local need for economic sustainability is ignored. Third, commodity based
alternative trade schemes increase the exposure of communities to global shocks. I
conclude by calling for a careful reassessment of sustainable development projects that
promote certification schemes. The designers and implementers of these programs must
include farmers’ agenda in the planning of these programs.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
My interest in the sustainable flavor of development dates back to 1995, when I
joined the Ecuadorian non-profit organization then known as Corporacion de
Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD). At the time, I was a surveyor/data
processor/analyst/extensionist/porter for the MDs hired for a USAID child-nutrition
project in the North of the Province of Esmeraldas, Ecuador. Biologists were cheaper
than Doctors, we had experience working in remote areas, and we could do statistics and
programming in a pinch. We could also weigh babies.
I remember the faces of those children today. One week, they were healthy and
growing. They were smiling, and making eye contact, and weighing them was like
herding cats: babies do not like to stay in one place when the world is so large and there
are so many things to do. I remember writing weights in a color-coded growth charts,
giving proud mother a smiley face sticker, dispensing a bottle of vitamins and minerals
(if available), and promising to get back in a month (or so). Sometimes the next month,
things were not so rosy. Disease and generic malnutrition take a toll on those babies. A
cold turns into pneumonia, diarrhea weakens them, malaria and typhoid double-whammy
kills them. The noisy, funny and happy baby of one visit became a sickly tired little
human being, struggling to get air into his or her lungs. Some of them got better. Some of
them lost the fight.
When a baby dies, the tradition of Esmeraldas’ Afro Ecuadorian is that women
mourners sing the baby farewell early in the morning. The combination of twilight, the
hypnotic sounds of percussion instruments, and women’s voices embedded with sadness
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generate a chant—a memory burned in my brain. While poverty in Esmeraldas has many
roots, I saw a correlation between the activities of logging companies and the frequency
of Arrullos. In Esmeraldas—as in other places— poverty and industrial-level timber and
hardwoods extraction go hand in hand. Once the forest is gone, there is no longer food on
the table.
After looking at the effects of poverty, I embraced sustainable development as the
only alternative to tame wild capitalism. I was involved in projects ranging from
Ecotourism to Ecocertification, all of them with the ultimate goal of fighting poverty and
increasing the welfare of people by engaging consumers who were willing to pay
premiums for environmentally and socially superior goods. I saw certification as a tool
for change. It provided a framework for cleaning banana production, while providing
workers with the guarantees and services above the minimum provided by Ecuadorian
Banana production bylaws. It was useful for regulating environmental impacts of tourism
in Galapagos, while addressing issues about the impact of human activity on the social
structure of the communities there. In addition, I saw that certification had the potential to
create a market for small-farmers’ shade-grown cocoa.
My involvement with this initiative started with a 1997 visit to the El Progreso
Association of Cocoa Producers, then a member of the Ecuadorian Federation of Cocoa
Producers. At the time, what I saw had an eerie resemblance to other areas. Small farmers
were losing their shaded Nacional farms, burdened as they were by the impacts of the
1997-1998 El Nino. Land consolidation and land cover change was proceeding at what I
saw was an alarming pace. Given that cocoa prices were at historical lows, some farmers
sold their shaded cocoa farms. The new owners converted the land to bananas. Farmers
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resorted to extracting whatever timber trees they had on their farms—just to see how
intermediaries pay them miserly values for princely hardwoods or for the scarce cocoa
extracted from their flooded plantations. Young people left their communities, to become
immigrants abroad. From a conservationist perspective, this was a nightmare scenario
given that shaded cocoa farms were the habitat of whatever remained of the biodiversity
of the region. From my own perspective, natural resources degradation, land
consolidation, displacement, and poverty came hand in hand.
As part of the CYD Rainforest Alliance certification department, and later as the
interim Co-director of this department, I saw certification as a tool to link environmental,
economic and social development. For example, the certification norms called for
phasing out fuel-wood-based cocoa-bean driers. LPG-based driers were too expensive for
individual farmers, so I directed a small research project to design and test a solar drier
made with greenhouse plastic and locally available materials. These solar driers were an
instantaneous hit. These solar driers allowed farmers to ferment and dry cocoa even under
a drizzle, a common occurrence at the time of harvest. Selling dried or semi-dried cocoa
increased family income, by reducing the margin of discount imposed by intermediaries.
By 2002, at the time I left Ecuador to continue my studies, the cocoa project was
full of promise. In the time it took me to earn my Master’s, three things happened that
suggested this initiative would come to full bloom. First, by late 2004 the Rainforest
Alliance certified farmers affiliated with FEDECADE were receiving a premium of 26%
over the market price (about $1900 per MT when the Ecuadorian FOB market price was
$1505 per MT). Second, there was a race to certify and to add certifications on top of one
another. The premiums and markets for Organic were said to be better than the premiums
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for Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa, thus FEDECADE was looking to add organic
certified cocoa to its products line. It also was looking for achieving Fair Trade
certification, which was portrayed as the ultimate certification tool for small farmers.
Third, CYD and Citigroup launched FEDECADE’s Cocoa Trust Fund, which was to
inject capital in FEDECADE’s commercialization system.
It took me three years to get back to FEDECADE. When I was conducting
preliminary research in December 2007, FEDECADE commercialization system had had
a record year. However, the profits margin for Rainforest Alliance, Organic and Fair
Trade certified cocoa were lower. Some farmers—who have been stalwarts of
certification efforts— had dropped out of the commercialization system after realizing
that “keeping the system working” was not worth the trouble. Furthermore, the cost of
establishing a CCN-51 plantation was lower and some of them spoke about the value of
combining CCN-51 with passion fruit, oranges, and other crops. The compelling
argument of a farmer was that “having more than one source of income was better.” I saw
a similar phenomenon in my visit to the Association of Organic Producers from Vinces
(APOV). The income of the APOV farmers was boosted by selling organic bananas from
banana trees grown within Nacional cocoa farms.
Thus, when I set out to gather the data for my dissertation, I did not expect the
FEDECADE commercialization system to come from a halt as it did in 2009. I did not
foresee a collapse of the organic market, or the downward premium spiral created as
more cocoa farmers became certified under Rainforest Alliance. The main goal of my
dissertation changed from a comparative assessment of the benefits of certification
schemes and community networking to an analysis of why certification-oriented projects
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have failed. I was able to change my perspective because of my exposure to readings on
critical literature of development, globalization, and neoliberalism, and combine them
with my previous scholarly work in Natural Resources Management. This work, a
snapshot in time, shows that change. In the writing of my dissertation, I have struggled to
show farmer’s perspectives and outcomes. In fact, certification— the implementation of
sustainable development initiatives—can generate improvements in the livelihoods of
farmers. However, these changes are not necessarily permanent, nor guaranteed. I see that
the path of sustainable development is painted in shades of gray. Farmers—successful
gamblers as they are—finally succeeded in teaching me to see the world of cocoa through
their eyes. Environmental sustainability is a worthwhile endeavor, but it must be
accompanied by economic development. Furthermore, economic development—at the
family level—is necessary for insuring social justice in a capitalistic society, given that
money provides welfare—and a certain protection against the rapacity of capitalism—in
the absence of a radical transformation of society.
My study starts by questioning the conventional wisdom that holds that
partnerships among commodity production farmers, elite manufacturers and wealthy
northern consumers/activists have win-win outcomes. Paradoxically, although alternative
trade offers communities opportunities to capitalize on the environmental benefits
afforded by traditional agricultural practices, the partnerships of farmers with external
agencies often have unexpected results. I hypothesize that these failures are born out of a
belief in a universal understanding of sustainability (Luke 2005). A discursive emphasis
on consensus, equity and mutual benefit (Ashman 2001) hides the fact that what for
consumers it is a matter of choice, for producers is a matter of survival (Moberg 2005).
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Thus, while consumers express choice, farmers have no choice but to join alternative
trade networks—and follow the mandates of these trading schemes—if they are to get
access to the benefits that come from international investment (Melo and Wolf 2007).
The growth in consumers’ demand for ecologically and socially labeled products creates
a race for farmers to meet these standards.
Furthermore, I argue that this race generates perverse effects. First, producers are
forced to enter into a global ‘certification treadmill.’ As described by Cochrane (1958)
for agricultural innovation, early adopters reap benefits out of introducing new practices
but as more and more latecomers join in, farmers’ face diminishing returns. To sustain
viability, farmers must race to adopt scheme after scheme, courting consumers as these
‘global citizens’ add layers of ‘desirability’ to their wish lists (Seyfang 2005). Second,
the race to meet consumers’ desires for ‘superior’ goods ignores the local need for
economic sustainability. The superiority of alternative goods depends on meeting the
ecological perceptions of consumers. Under the lure of premiums, farmers are induced to
forfeit changes that would have increased the profitability of their farms. Third, even
when successful, commodity based alternative trade schemes increase the exposure of
communities to global shocks. Capital investments and premiums for one commodity—
the alternative one—lead farmers to forfeit crop diversification strategies, colloquially
“putting all their eggs in one basket.” Nevertheless, as in the case with other
commodities, when the production of certified goods outpaces demand premiums
collapse.
The goal of this study is to spotlight some of the shortcomings of alternative
trade. I explore the tensions and contradictions between local needs and globalized ideals
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that play out in the context of sustainable development initiatives. For this, I present a
case study based in the Ecuadorian shade-grown cocoa known as Nacional, and generally
marketed as “Arriba.” Nacional is a genetically distinctive fine cacao variety with a
unique floral aroma and flavor given by a combination of farming practices, climate, soil
and luminosity that occurs exclusively in the shaded cacao farms of Ecuador’s coastal
lowlands (Motamayor et al. 2008; Deheuvels et al. 2004; Loor et al. 2009; Lerceteau et
al. 1997; Cambrai et al. 2010). The production of these highly appreciated beans is
declining, even in the face of substantial investments to develop alternative trade
networks that reward farmers that preserve this variety.
This study was designed to address the paradox of decreasing output in view of
increasing investment and interest. I examine how the agendas of farmers, chocolate
manufacturers, and development agencies come into play in the setting of Ecuadorian
Nacional cacao production. The study looks at places where certification
schemes/sustainable development projects have been implemented. By asking questions
about connectedness, comparing understandings of sustainability, and establishing the
local cost and benefits of sustainability alliances, I examine the reasons behind the
decline of Nacional cacao production even in cases where communities have received
support designed to stop this loss.
The present study has three lines of inquiry. The first is to study the connections
between local Nacional cacao producers and their global partners, as mediated, on the
one hand, by certification and labeling and, on the other, by the shape and structure of
each community’s ‘sustainability network’ (Halme 2001). The second is to establish the
differences between farmers’ and non-farmers’ (i.e., development agencies) discourse
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about the decline of Nacional production and possible solutions. The third is to compare
local understandings of the challenges and benefits of sustainability with those of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and other
institutions/actors involved in the Nacional cacao problematic.
My study describes the responses of communities to sustainability-informed
alliances, and under which social, environmental and economic tradeoffs these
partnerships operate. The results of this study show how sustainable development
practitioners have constructed romantic visions of farmers. I explore how this idealization
does not do justice to the complexity of a farmer’s socio-economic life.
My dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter I contains the Introduction,
Literature review, and Methods. The dissertation body is composed of Chapter II, III,
and IV. Each of these chapters is conceived as a publishable, independent journal article.
In Chapter V, I summarize my findings and present my concluding remarks.
I have three overarching aims. I address each aim in one of the main chapters of
the document. The first aim is to elicit what chocolate manufacturers think consumers are
looking for—what are the qualities that make alternative goods. Thus, in Chapter II I
present a case study of the demand side the commodity chain. To understand what values
are marketed to the consumers of chocolates, I studied the narratives printed on the
packaging material of chocolate bars that are marketed as made of a high percent (>50%)
of Arriba, Ecuadorian Nacional, or Ecuador's cocoa beans. My findings suggest that
market forces encourage manufacturers to make ever more environmentally and socially
progressive claims on their products. However, the link between progressive marketing
and benefits for the farmers is tenuous at best.
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The second aim is to understand how manufacturers’ perception of consumers
demand are transferred to cocoa farmers. In Chapter III, I present the results of the
analysis of the alliance between Ecuador’s Federation of Cacao Producers (Federacion
Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador, FEDECADE), its Ecuadorian NGO
counterpart (currently known as Fundacion Alianza CEIDE or CYD), and a
heterogeneous set of international donors. These projects spanned 10 years (1997-2008),
and nominally invested roughly US$ 1200 for each of the farmers involved (US$
1,436,738 per 1172 families) with the goal of creating an alternative commercialization
system for Nacional. The key strategy for achieving this goal was to increase farmers’
incomes by improving farmers’ access to the markets. This project was leveraged in the
unique “fine and flavored” quality of the Nacional beans, under the assumption that highend chocolate makers would be willing to pay a higher price for value-added beans. For
six years (2003 to 2008), the project delivered higher-than-average prices for certified
Nacional. However, in 2009 FEDECADE’s commercialization system ceased to operate.
In this Chapter, I address the reasons for this failure. I use data from interviews, and
information available in the archives of FEDECADE and CYD, to establish the factors
that determined the fate of the commercialization project. I found that the FEDECADE
project of developing alternative markets for its cocoa was in fact successful. However,
the success of the project also exposed FEDECADE to risks that lead to the ultimate
collapse of the initiative.
The third aim is to understand how farmers make their decisions about growing
cocoa and other crops. In Chapter IV, I use survey data to analyze the economics that lie
behind farmer’s choices. In this chapter I compare the income that small farmers derive
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from Nacional and CCN-51 cocoa plots. I frame the results comparing two farmer’s
associations, one of which (APOV) is actively selling certified organic and Rainforest
Alliance cocoa, and other where farmers are selling cocoa through local markets
(FEDECADE). I also include the income of crops grown with cocoa, as well as those that
are cultivated independently. I also analyze the role of farm employment in cocoa
farmers’ livelihood. Finally, I address the issues surrounding why a farmer selects a given
variety. My findings suggest that the arguments of non-farming actors such as NGOs and
IGOs do not truly reflect the complex choices and options that farmers face on a day-today basis, nor effectively address the economic tradeoffs of these views.
Literature review
Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and
vulnerable class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming
from trade liberalization places farmers in a “race to the bottom” that leads to
displacement, poverty, and environmental degradation (Porter 1999). Scholars and
activists have proposed that alternative trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to
reverse this trend by harnessing the power of the markets to reward producers of goods
with embedded superior cultural, environmental, and social values (Goodman and DuPuis
2002; Bryant and Goodman 2004; McMichael 2000). Policy makers— influenced by the
narrative of ‘sustainability through consumption’— attempt to solve allocation issues by
fomenting partnerships that encourage products that cater to the sensibilities of the
Northern activist consumers (Bryant and Goodman 2004). Proponents of these systems
argue that they offer a unique opportunity to harness the power of markets to protect the
social, cultural, economic and environmental benefits provided by traditional cropping
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systems. Alternative trade networks are visualized as institutional arrangements through
which the benefits generated by small-scale, low-input agricultural producers are
valorized (Moberg 2005; Gómez Tovar et al. 2005; Brown and Getz 2008). Consumers
get access to high-quality, traceable (safe) and ecologically/ethically superior goods;
manufacturers and dealers get access to an attractive niche–market, and producers are
compensated with economic premiums for the environmental and social services of their
crops (McMichael 2000; Murray and Raynolds 2000; Rice 2001; Ponte 2002; Raynolds
2002). Thus, alternative trade networks create ‘partnerships of virtue’ that challenge the
transnationally dominated global food system (McMichael 2000). These new
mechanisms of trade—mediated by certification labels that inform consumers that the
product carries attributes that set it apart from its counterparts—are thought of as
consensual partnerships of producer and consumers. Thus, the labels are symbols that
overcome the distance that separate producers and consumers since the late eighteenth
century development of worldwide trade (Polanyi 1941).
Alternative trade and third-party certifications have become a de facto
prescription for any location where there is a need to conciliate economic interest with
conservation imperatives. The wide adoption of this sustainable development tool is
understandable. Certification schemes allow their proponents to link capitalist logic and
economic self-interest to sustainability imperatives by creating niche markets for
products with higher environmental, social or geographical ratings (Goodman and
DuPuis 2002; Hayes, Lence, and Stoppa 2004; Bramley and Kirsten 2007; Taylor 2005).
The need for these private actions was born in an era in which globalization and
neoliberalism advanced an agenda of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of
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commerce that dismantled nation-states’ ability to regulate natural-resources-based
economic sectors (Barbier 2000; Barbier 2003; Barbier 2004; Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002;
McCarthy 2004). Considering the loss of faith in state-based regulation, scholars and
activists opted for developing environmental governance arrangements that increase
consumers’ awareness of linkages between consumption and the impacts of production.
These tools, which allow consumers to ‘vote with their wallets,’ convert the act of
shopping in an exercise into global ecological and ethical citizenship, thus feeding the
advancement of environmentally and socially progressive agendas (Clarke et al. 2007;
Seyfang 2005).
Conservation-oriented studies have shown that shade-grown cocoa—as other agro
forestry systems— provides a refuge for local biodiversity and critical ecosystem services
(Clough, Faust, and Tscharntke 2009; Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007; Franzen and Mulder
Borgerhoff 2007; Rappole, King, and Rivera 2003; Donald 2004; Gobbi 2000; Bisseleua,
Missoup, and Vidal 2009; Schroth and Harvey 2007; Dahlquist et al. 2007; Harvey et al.
2007). These studies show that the ecological benefits of cocoa plantations are lost if
these fields are converted to full-sun cocoa or other cropping systems such as bananas
(i.e., Clough, Faust, and Tscharntke 2009). Full-sun cocoa trees are said to be short lived
and dependent on fertilizers and irrigation; furthermore, farmers with full-sun holdings
are said to be more likely to use agrochemicals like herbicides and pesticides (Bentley,
Boa, and Stonehouse 2004; Donald 2004). However, the empirical evidence to sustain
some of these claims is lacking. For instance, when an Ecuadorian farmer reportedly said
that he believed that CCN-51— a local high-yield, full-sun, hybrid cocoa—“could live
for more than 50 years” the article’s author comments that “this would appear highly
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unlikely” without explaining the reasons behind the author’s belief (Bentley, Boa, and
Stonehouse 2004: 260).
Nevertheless, the agricultural yield of shade-grown cocoa is lower than that of
these full-sun systems (Franzen and Mulder Borgerhoff 2007; Donald 2004). In fact, in a
study in Cameroon, scientists found that “yield significantly decreased with increased
shade cover (Bisseleua, Missoup, and Vidal 2009). In Ecuador, there is a study that
shows that intensively-managed high-yield hybrid cocoa variety have yields of 4000 kg
of dry cocoa beans per ha year, compared to 900 kg per ha year for “fine [shade-grown]
cocoa under the best conditions” (Espinosa et al. 2006). In view of this marked
productivity difference, scientists routinely propose the use of certification schemes to
encourage farmers to preserve these low yield ecologically rich systems (SteffanDewenter et al. 2007; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004). Similarly, calls for
implementing certification programs are made in practically all the areas in all the tropics
where cocoa is raised (i.e., Indonesia (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007), Cameroon
(Bisseleua, Missoup, and Vidal 2009), Ecuador (Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004),
and Mexico (Greenberg, Bichier, and Cruz Angón 2000)).
There is an increasing body of critical literature that addresses the conceptual
failings of alternative trade as visualized by environmentally-oriented scientists.
Consumption-based efforts—such as certification— respond to Northern definitions of
sustainability. Generally speaking, the bodies that regulate certification have their
headquarters in the ‘North’ (for example, Rainforest Alliance headquarters are in New
York, Fairtrade Labeling Organization International’s main offices are in Berlin and
London), while the farms that receive certification are in the ‘South’ (Latin America,
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Africa and Asia). The fact of this geographical disparity between the locations of those
who create—and enforce— the standards and those who are subject to them has been
widely criticized, because it follows the same patterns as did previous colonial relations
(Gómez Tovar et al. 2005; Mutersbaugh 2002; Mutersbaugh 2005). It also has been
observed that while Northern consumers may be driven by “aesthetic” interests in the
tropical regions, they simultaneously constitute the livelihoods of those regions
inhabitants (Dickinson and Putz 1992 in Price 1994). Poor farmers in the tropics facing a
choice between economic opportunity and environmental protection will favor the former
(Price 1994).
Under the logic of prioritizing ecological values, the role of scientists and policy
makers—via certification courtship of Northern activists/consumers—is to educate
farmers about the environmental value of the ecosystem services provided by shaded
systems (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). The premiums for certified products produce
economic incentives that delay the conversion of shaded plantations to more profitable
agricultural systems (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). Steffan-Dewenter et al (2007) argue
that the deployment of agricultural intensification techniques—even if these are used to
minimize pressure over wild forest—is undesirable because it may lead to resources
concentration in the hands of families that are already above the regional norm (SteffanDewenter et al. 2007). For Steffan-Dewenter et al. (2007), concerns about ecological
services and tropical biodiversity take precedence over the local desires for economic
sustainability. Certification is seen as a policy tool to slow down economic
development—a political project to maintain equalitarian poverty in the tropics.
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Indeed, some authors have found that the institutional arrangements of
certification efforts institutional arrangements may perpetuate unequal relationships
(Mutersbaugh 2005; Mutersbaugh 2002). Certification requires that farmers set up and
maintain complex management systems because the burden of proof is in their hands
(Mutersbaugh 2002a). In fact, there is empirical evidence that shows that the
requirements of certification systems are so complex that a medium-sized developing
country firm was able to become certified only after receiving loans for US$ 80 million;
the same study shows that a farmers’ association was able to become certified only with
the assistance of several international NGOs and IGOs (Melo and Wolf 2007). It is
unlikely that independent small farmers could fulfill certification requirements in the
absence of transfers of human, social and financial capital (Melo and Wolf 2007).
Certification layering—the practice of labeling a product with two or more certification
labels—only increases the complexity of the management system, and leads to situations
where farmers perceive that the costs of certification outweigh economic gains (Gómez
Tovar et al. 2005; González and Nigh 2005; Mutersbaugh 2005; Mutersbaugh 2002).
Thus, farmers opt out of alterative trade networks in times when premiums are low
(Taylor, Murray, and Raynolds 2005). Finally, there is evidence that the premium for
certified goods does not imply a better income for producers. For example, in a survey of
farmers selling Fair Trade coffee Wilson (2010) found that all of them reported net
income losses and an increasing amount of outstanding debt.
Further criticism addresses the question of who reaps the profits of niche markets.
The complexity of the required environmental management system required to opt for
organic and other environmental certification schemes favors the economies of scale
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available to large corporations, which have access to the human and financial capital
needed for ‘conversion’ from conventional agriculture (Murray and Raynolds 2000). In
cases where corporations do not get involved in production, corporations may opt for
acquiring ‘alternative’ brands, which critics suggest leads to the erosion of the
‘alternative’ meaning (Off 2009). Also, there are concerns about a possible
commoditization of fair trade—products, born out the decision of Fairtrade Labeling
Organizations International (FLO) to grant certification to large plantations (Levi and
Linton 2003; Jaffee 2007). Low and Davenport (2005) voiced concerns over
appropriation of the fair trade brand. As certification becomes part of the mainstream,
large corporations engage in the use of labels without necessarily sharing the
transformative motive that was behind the ethical trade system when it was put in place
(Raynolds 2009). Certification stops being a partnership between committed producers,
manufacturers and consumers, to become a tool for commodity traceability (Raynolds
2009).
Methods
The narratives of chocolate: collection and analysis
From 2005 to 2009, I collected 39 chocolate bars from 27 sources/manufacturers.
For comparison purposes, this represents 37.5% of bars added from 2008 to May 2010 to
the Chocolate Census™ database of the C-Spot™, a web site designed to be the “ultra
consumer's guide for premium chocolate” (Mark Christian, email to author, 05/05/2010).
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Of the 39 bars, 35 were commercially available in the US at the time of
collection; 1 one was supplied by a chocolate reviewer [as a scanned image], and the
remaining three were cocoa producers’ organizations marketing bars sold or given away
at a farmer's meeting in Ecuador (see Table 1). By source, my sample encompasses bars
from Argentina (1), Austria (1), Ecuador (12), France (3), Germany (2), Italy (2),
Switzerland (1) and the United States (US) (5). In the US, the bars in my sample are
priced in the range of US$ 0.04 to US$ 0.15 per gram (US$ 1.1 to US$ 4.25 per oz). I did
not include 'super premium' bars (> US$0.7 per gram, ~US$20 per oz) (see Table 1).
For the analysis, I selected a sub-sample with one bar from each source (n=27).
For drafting this sub sample, first I selected bars with 70-80% of cocoa. Second, if a
manufacturer produced more than one bar on this percentage, I selected bars by origin (in
order: Los Ríos > Guayas > Manabí > Esmeraldas > El Oro) 2, for a sub sample of 27 bars
by source (see Table 1).
The full texts from each wrapper, excluding the “nutritional information” and “list
of ingredients,” were entered in a MS Excel worksheet. I also noted presence of
certification seals (either logos or text), health statements, and contact information. While
each bar shape, size and packaging ('wrapper') was clearly distinctive, all the packing has
a 'front' side and a 'back' side. I recorded them separately. I entered text inside (as printed
inside or in attached marketing inserts) as a different variable. I translated texts in other
languages to English. For analysis, I used the translated texts. General statistics about

1

Hersheys' Cacao Reserve Country of Origin line was discontinued by the end of 2008.

2

The order reflects “Arriba” historical range.
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bars were calculated using Microsoft Excel 2002(SP3). Text processing was completed
with QDA-Miner 3.2.3. Text statistics were conducted with WordStat 6.0, with an
exclusion list made of articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and brand names.
For qualitative analysis, I used text from the bars and evaluated them against the
framework I derived from my review of issues covering cocoa production. I contacted
(by email, in English) the makers of the bars in cases where clarification was needed. In
practice, the U.S.-based chocolate manufacturers answered my questions, while European
chocolate makers did not.
Field work
The study was conducted on Ecuador's western lowlands, from May to December
of 2009, in the provinces of Azuay, El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos, Manabí, Santa Elena, and
Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas (see Figure 1). This study gathered data from three
sources: a collection of cocoa-related publications and resources collected during fieldwork, in-depth interviews with farmers and farmers’ leaders in all the aforementioned
provinces and an open-answer survey applied to farmers residing in the provinces of
Azuay, Guayas and Los Ríos.
The first data source consists of approximately 100 brochures, reports and
handbooks on the general topic of Ecuadorian cocoa collected during field work; 277 MB
(~450 files) available in FEDECADE’s computers up to December of 2009; 194 MB
(~1000 files) of the Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD) cocoa project, and of 176
documents made publicly available by CYD at the social publishing website Scribb
[www.scribb.com].
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The brochures, reports and handbooks were published by organizations involved
with cocoa-development projects from 2000 to 2009. Among others, this repository
contains documents published by farmer’s organizations, cocoa exporters, local and
international non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations,
government agencies and private companies. These documents range from publicity
materials to documents dealing specifically with alternative trade networks. All these
documents are publicly available in Ecuador, although circulation may be restricted
because of limited number of copies. In addition, I was granted access to the personal
archives stored in the town of Jesus Maria in the residence of FEDECADE’s President,
Agr. Victor Chacon Salinas. Relevant files were scanned and converted to digital files.
The digital archives of FEDECADE and CYD represents the fraction of the
information produced by these two organizations that has been preserved in the face of
changing technology, frequent failure of electronic equipment, and lack of backups.
Finally, my collection of electronic material was complemented with online repositories,
such as the judicial magazine known as “Derecho Ecuador” which makes copies of the
Ecuadorian Official Registry freely available [http://www.derechoecuador.com/]. I used
Atlas.Ti.6.1.1. for the sorting and processing of all digital files.
Regarding the second data source, the in-depth interviews script was designed to
gather information about farmer organizations’ experiences with cocoa
commercialization, interactions with local and external agencies, and a general feeling
about the state of the industry from farmers’ perspective. The interviews were conducted
in Spanish, on the basis of participant willingness and time availability. I interviewed
farmers and leaders from 12 cooperatives, pre-cooperatives and associations.
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This study’s third data source consists of an open-answer survey given to 160
cocoa producers from Los Ríos, Guayas, and Azuay (see Appendix 1 for the Survey
instrument, Appendix 2 for the list of variables, and Appendix 3 for FIU Internal Review
Board Approval). These producers were included in the records of one of two farmers’
organizations working in these provinces. The first farmer organization, the “Federacion
Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador” (FEDECADE) is a federation (union of
associations and cooperatives) that has about 1100 members associated with 12 farmers’
groups located in the provinces of Azuay, Esmeraldas, El Oro and Guayas (see Figure 1).
The FEDECADE farmers hold up to three certifications (Fair Trade, Organic and
Rainforest Alliance). To achieve these certifications and develop its commercialization
system, from 1997 to 2008 FEDECADE received support from several international
agencies through an alliance with an Ecuadorian NGO called Conservacion y Desarrollo
(CYD) (Conservation and Development). However, at the time of the study
FEDECADE’s commercialization system was not operating, and the farmers I
interviewed were selling their cocoa at the local market.
The second farmer organization, the “Asociacion de Productores Organicos de
Vinces” (APOV), has approximately 240 members with farms in or in the outskirts of the
town of Vinces, Province of Los Ríos (Figure 1). At the time of the study, an APOV
farmer could hold two certifications (Organic and Rainforest Alliance). Contrary to
FEDECADE, the APOV had not received any investment from the IGOs-NGOs
conglomerate. Instead, it was created as a mutual benefit venture of cocoa farmer’s, local
intellectuals, Vinces’ Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of Guayaquil at
Vinces, an ex-NGO field agent/organic certification agent, and COFINA—a cocoa
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exporter that became involved in alternative trade markets via FEDECADE’s experience.
The APOV commercialization model does bypass local middlemen, but delivers cocoa to
the exporter COFINA. COFINA then allocates APOV’s Rainforest Alliance and Organic
Certified cocoa to clients willing to pay for this crop. The APOV is favored by its
symbiotic relationship with the Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of
Guayaquil at Vinces. First, the APOV is a tenant of this institute—thus sidestepping the
need for costly commercialization infrastructure. Second, the APOV farmers have access
to a continuous stream of young agronomists—some of which receive cacao training
from the APOV.
Both FEDECADE and APOV are established in areas that have been long
dedicated to agriculture: APOV’s Vinces was at the center of the late 1800’s and early
1900’s first Ecuadorian cocoa boom, and FEDECADE’s farms are located in areas
opened to the cultivation of cocoa and bananas in the early 1950’s and 1960’s.
The survey was conducted at each participant’s residence in the case of
FEDECADE members, and at the communal point-of-sale in the case of APOV’s. I
conducted the interviews in Spanish. In average, each interview took about 60-90
minutes. The survey consisted of four parts (see Appendix 1). The first, personal history,
is made of questions that establish age, gender and background of the farmers in the
sample. The second, land management, measures the amount of land managed, and the
level of fragmentation of this area. The third, cocoa and other crop production, asks
questions about the crops managed by each farmer (including questions about crop
variety, yield, and age of the crops); it also includes questions about farmer’s perception
about the benefits and liabilities of cocoa varietals. Finally, the commercialization and
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income section, asks questions about the income generated by cocoa under different
selling modalities, and asks for other economic activities that contribute to farmer’s
income. In addition, APOV supplied individual farmer’s cocoa sales (by variety, price
and amount) data from their commercialization records. All economic and transactional
data is presented in US dollars (US$), which has been the Ecuadorian legal tender since
2000. A detailed list of the variables collected can be found in Appendix 2.
Farmer’s were recruited in the sample depending on their willingness to
participate in the study, and on the basis of two criteria: a) de-facto management of the
land, b) being included in the rolls of associations registered with FEDECADE, or
membership with the APOV. The application of these two criteria yielded a sample of
100 farmers (out of 174 possible) registered with FEDECADE’s Nueva Union
Campesina, 6 de Julio, Camacho and La Florida Associations, and a sample of 60 farmers
(out of 223 possible) belonging to the APOV.
In addition to the data gathered from the surveys and previously existing
databases, I conducted in-depth interviews with farmers that had been or were currently
involved with their community’s cocoa commercialization team in the case of
associations affiliated to FEDECADE. This information was complemented with
interviews with FEDECADE and APOV representatives and staff, government and nonprofit organization officials, cocoa exporters, other farmer’s organizations representatives
and cocoa town-level middlemen. Both FEDECADE and APOV kindly granted the
researcher access to an anonymized version of their commercialization databases, and
other financial and economic information.
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Survey data analysis
A farmer’s on-farm gross product is reported as the standardized Farm Gross
Product in US$ per ha year (FGP ha/year), which is the sum of income for all possible
on-farm crops standardized by total farm area (see Figure 2). To estimate crop expenses
for cocoa Nacional and CCN-51, I rely on the Average Management Cost by Province
published in the Fine Cacao Management Cost Census 3 (CORPEI 2009). Data gathered
with the in-depth interviews with farmers were used to estimate management cost for
other crops (i.e., bananas, passion fruit or plantains). These estimates are used to calculate
a farmer’s Gross Agricultural Income (GAI), and the Farm Gross Income (FGI), which is
a farmer’s GAI divided by the area of his or her holdings (see Figure 2).
To establish the percentage of farmers whose agricultural income sets them below
poverty, I compared the GAI values with the values of the Ecuadorian national extreme
poverty level and the basic income level (INEC’s Canasta Familiar Vital and Canasta
Familiar Basica) (INEC 2010). The INEC CFV (Canasta Familiar Vital) is set based on
the survival income for a family of four; families that earn less than this amount are
classified as extremely poor. The CFB, which is set at a higher level of income, sets the
level below which a family of four is classified as poor. Given that GAI income data
presents a yearly estimate based in the prices for October and November of 2009, I used
the CFV and CFB for these months multiplied by 12 to get a comparable yearly statistic.
With these caveats, the CFV level is set at a monthly income of $370.25 for an annual

3

While the Census focused in Nacional, it also includes Management Costs for CCN-51
plots.
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value of $4443; the CFB level is a monthly income of $522.46 for an annual value of
$6269 (INEC 2010).
When appropriate, general statistics (i.e., mean, median, SD) were calculated
using Microsoft Excel 2002 (SP3). Linear regression and other tests were conducted
using Minitab 14. Survey text processing was done using QDA-Miner 3.2.3; interview
data mining and sorting was done using Atlas.Ti.6.1.1.
To establish the relationship between poverty, crop diversification and area of a
farmer’s holding, first I classified farmers in four groups each one set by one type of crop
diversification schemes I found during field work: Nacional-only, CCN-51-only, both
Nacional and CCN-51, cocoa (Nacional and CCN-51) and other crops. Second, I
performed linear regression analysis to establish the relationship of gross agricultural
income (GAI) as a function of the area held under that specific crop diversification
scheme. Then, I used the regression equations to find the area of a holding under each
diversification scheme— all other things being equal— that will generate an income that
sets that farmer above CFV or CFB by the type of cropping system
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Figure 1. Area of Study. Ecuador, the Western lowlands (Costa), APOV and FEDECADE associations and cooperatives.

(a) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP), where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is
the reported gate price for crop 1, and TFS is the total area of the farm.

26
(b) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Income, where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is the
reported gate price for crop 1; n stands for crop planted (1-4), and TFS is the total area of the farm.
Figure 3. Formulas to calculate (a) standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP in US$ ha/year) and (b) standardized Farm Gross
Income (in US$ ha year)

Table 1. Chocolate bars by brand, origin, % of cocoa, and country of origin of
manufacturer
Name, brand and % cocoa
Country of manufacturer
Amano Guayas 70%
USA
Amedei Ecuador 70%
Italy
Ashumira Shumiral (Azuay) n/d †
Ecuador
Askinosie San Jose del Tambo Nibble Bar 70%
USA
Cacaoyere Cumba (Esmeraldas) 71%; El Eno (Amazonia) Ecuador
63%; Las Naves (Bolivar) 82% and Puerto Quito
(Pichincha) 91%
Caoni Esmeraldas 55% and Los Ríos 77%
“
Chocolat Bonnat Equateur 75%
France
Chocolove XOXOX Ecuador 72%
USA
Corporacion Fortaleza del Valle Calceta (Manabí) 60%†
Ecuador
Dagoba Los Ríos 68%
USA
Domori Cacao Arriba 70% and Cacao Cult Ecuador 70%
Italy
E. Guittard Quevedo (Los Ríos) 65%
USA
Fino de Aroma 45%
Ecuador
Francois Pralus Equateur Fortissima 80% and Equateur
France
Trinitario 75%
Hachez Cocoa d'Arriba 77%
Germany
Hershey's Cacao Reserve Arriba 50%
USA
Hoja Verde 58%
Ecuador
Kallari 75%; 85% and Roberto’s Recipe 75%
Ecuador
Lindt Excellence Ecuador 75%
Switzerland
Nestle Dark 60%
Ecuador
Pacari Esmeraldas 60% and Manabí 65%
“
Republica del Cacao El Oro 67%; Los Ríos 75% and
“
Manabí 75%
Salgado Grand Cru Esmeraldas 70%
Argentina
UNOCACE Floral 75% †
Ecuador
Valrhona Alpaco Ecuador 66%
France
Vintage Plantations 90%
Ecuador
Zooter Labooko Single Machala (El Oro) 60%‡
Austria
All bars were commercially available at the time of collection unless marked: †
Promotional bar; ‡ Courtesy of Mark Christian (C-Spot).
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CHAPTER II.
LIVING FROM THE FUMES OF THE PAST: ECUADORIAN COCOA AND THE
BRAVE NEW WORLD OF CHOCOLATE BRANDING
Introduction and Background
Consumers in the global North have become increasingly aware that the
globalization-driven consolidation of agro-food monopolies has left them with less
freedom to choose between products, exposed them to health hazards, or made them
accomplices in a process of rural impoverishment (Niles and Jane 2008; McMichael
2000). It has been proposed that these trends can be reversed by engaging consumers in
shopping for products that embody superior values (Golding 2008; Shreck 2005; Slater
2004). Alternative trade is said to maximize the values at both ends of the commodity
chain: it is visualized as a system that rewards consumers—who receive guilt-free, valueadded goods—and producers—who receive premiums over the market price (LeClair
2002; Low and Davenport 2005). These networks bypass multinational-controlled
commodity chains, therefore using market-based tools to challenge the industrialized
food system (Murray and Raynolds 2000; Raynolds 2000). The global community
benefits from these relationships, because alternative trade actors become stewards of
non-transactional public goods such as ecosystem services (Pearce 2004; Bardhan 2006).
Thus, the act of consumption becomes an act of expressing global citizenship (Seyfang
2005).
Under this narrative, environmental, geographical, or social attributes distinguish
true elite products from the run-of-the-mill corporate product. Facing a cultural
phenomenon in which ‘standard’ has an ambiguous connotation, the manufacturers of
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specialty products—like wine, coffee or chocolate—face an increasing pressure to
position their brands within the alternative discourse (Golding 2008).
Bryant and Goodman (2004) suggest that all forms of market-driven sustainability
depend on the courtship of ‘do-gooder’ Northern activist consumers that are willing to
‘support’ poor —yet heroic —Southern farmers, to protect tropical—magical—
rainforests, or unique agrarian landscapes. In this chapter, I analyze the effects of this
trend on chocolate manufacturers branding. Chocolate’s reputation is intimately linked to
cocoa beans—a tropical crop with a globally significant (and somewhat ambiguous)
footprint (Franzen and Mulder Borgerhoff 2007). I conduct this research through a case
study of the packaging material of chocolate manufacturers who produce bars that are
marketed as made of a high percent (>50%) of Arriba, Ecuadorian Nacional, or Ecuador's
cocoa beans. My findings are that most manufacturers follow a minimalist approach
towards bean-to-bar philosophy, with minimal involvement with the producer side of the
commodity chain. This finding suggests that the rhetoric of alternative trade can be easily
adopted by manufacturers, without signifying a radical departure from previous practices.
Market forces encourage manufacturers to make ever more environmentally and socially
progressive claims on their products. The chapter proceeds as follow. First, the chapter
covers background information on the economic, social and environmental profile of
cocoa production worldwide, and on Ecuadorian cocoa specifically. Then, I present the
sample of chocolate bars, and the methods I used to evaluate these narratives. I then
present my results and discuss my findings in the context of policy significance.
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Issues of cocoa production
Reversing a previous trend towards consumption of mass-produced candy bars
(Byskov and Scheu, 1991), the segment of premium chocolates has been increasing.
Indeed, the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) states that “consumers have
embraced dark chocolate as an affordable luxury” (ICCO, 2008). Industry analysts
reported that sales of premium chocolate have grown an average of 11% per year, from
US$4.43 billion in the year of 2003 to US$6.95 billion in the year 2007 (Thomas 2008).
In their 2009 industry forecast, after noting that the market for dark chocolate grew 9%
during 2009 despite a worldwide economic recession, the experts affiliated with the U.S.based National Confectioners Association predicted that this trend will continue (NCA
2009).
There have been several factors propelling this newfound taste, but in this chapter
I specifically address manufacturer's adoption of the rhetoric of “terroir” or origin,
originally developed for wine. Under this rhetoric, the quality of a chocolate bar is said to
come from the place where groves are located, the varietals planted, farmers’ technique,
as well as from the craftsmanship of the chocolate maker. Nesto (2010:133) considers
that the trend is for chocolate makers to move “closer to the cacao plant.” This has
influenced the sourcing of cocoa. While all authors agree that wild cacao (Theobroma
cacao L.) originated in the upper basin of the Amazon River and its tributaries, the
process of domestication of this species has given origin to several genetically and
geographically distinct varieties. Traditionally, cacao has been classified in three groups:
“Criollos” from Central America; “Forasteros” from the Upper and Lower Amazon River
basin and “Trinitarios”—a Trinidad hybrid of “Criollos” and “Forasteros.” With one
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exception, most fine or flavor cocoa—used in fine chocolates and high quality chocolate
coatings—comes from “Criollos” and “Trinitarios,” while bulk cocoa—used for
manufacturing cocoa butter and high volume chocolates—comes from Forastero varietals
(Byskov and Scheu, 1991; ICCO, 2006). The exception is that the Nacional cacao variety
from Ecuador—although classified as a “Forastero”—is a source of fine cacao.
Generally, Forastero varietals offer higher yields than the other varietals, and require less
on-farm management. Also, the post-harvesting management of fine cocoa is more
complex, time-consuming and expensive. Fine cocoa is scarce (< 5% of the annual world
production), and comparatively expensive (see Figure 1). Ecuador’s is the largest
producer of fine cacao, accounting for almost half of the world production. Ecuador’s
Nacional varietal specific aroma—the Arriba flavor— is said to have premiums of U.S.
$400-$800 per metric tonne (Byskov and Scheu, 1991; Griffith, 2001) (ICCO, 2006,
2008).
The condition of scarcity and premium price of fine cocoa— a liability for massmarket candy— is a selling point for dark chocolate. Dark chocolate marketing material
is rich in statements about varietals, place and the particular conditions that are linked to
a special flavor. In this, the industry follows the pattern marked in wines, in which
premium quality is a product of values added by the intersection of geographically
distinctive physical (i.e., soil and climate) and biological (i.e., variety) factors, specific
agricultural practices, and traditional know-how (Hayes et al. 2005).
In chocolate, the use of fine cocoa has reached a new level with the crafting of
single varietal / single origin bars, instead of the far more common practice of blending
cocoa from different varietals and sources to achieve a brand’s taste. Single origin bars
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offer an opportunity to capitalize on the difficulties of sourcing fine cocoa beans,
transforming the problem of controlling beans origin and quality on the defining
characteristic of a unique brand. Manufacturers have adopted the expression “from bean
to bar,” which was used to describe the process of transforming beans into chocolate, to
reflect an improved control over the source of the beans. In addition, this same expression
suggests that it is possible for a consumer to trace the beans on a chocolate bar to the
place of production. Finally, some manufacturers extend the bean-to-bar narrative
linkages to include information about the cocoa farmers and the conditions under which
the production was done (Grimes 2009)
However, from a brand perspective moving “closer to the farm” is not without
risks (Nesto 2010:133). Cocoa production has social, economic and environmental
footprints, which are intrinsically linked to the nature of the crop. As chocolate makers
get close to the source of the beans, they get closer to the impacts. A brand’s reputation
still depends on traditionally-controlled manufacturing quality, but it can also be affected
by events outside of the manufacturing process. Well-known brands—such as Nestle or
Barry Callebaut—suffered from bad-reputation ‘spill-over’ from documentaries such as
child-labor-denouncing Mistrati and Romano’s The Dark Side of Chocolate (2010), or
the Fairtrade-busting BBC Panorama: Chocolate—The Bitter Truth (2010). Thus,
chocolate makers face a dual task: to define what their brand is, while simultaneously
defining what the brand is not (Golding 2008).
Contrary to many other crops, cocoa cultivation has not been mechanized, and
remains labor-intensive. This benefit small farmers, which rely on family labor.
However, farmers’ families may prioritize work on the fields over schooling for their
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children (Nkamleu and Kielland 2006). The use of forced labor is a more disturbing
result of cocoa labor requirements. Cocoa plantations’ dependence on slave and
indentured labor is a well documented historical fact (see Cardozo 1961; William
Gervase Clarence-Smith 1993; Satre 2005). There is evidence that the use of forced labor
continues. For instance, the U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report
(2009) mentions that forced child and adult labor is used in the cocoa sector of Ivory
Coast and Ghana, among other countries (USDS 2009). Chocolate makers have been
dealing with the results of these findings, including the public outrage that accompanies
them (Blowfield 2003, Berlan 2009). The largest world chocolate processors (Barry
Callebaut, Cadbury, Ferrero, Hershey Foods, Kraft Foods, Mars Incorporated, and
Nestle) finance the International Cocoa Initiative, a non-profit organization dedicated to
“ending child and forced labor in the sector” (ICI 2010). Also, as has happened in other
products such as coffee (McDonagh 2002), chocolate processors have been keen on
sourcing cocoa from producers whose compliance with labor standards is verified by a
third party. Finally, other manufacturers have opted-out of areas identified as prone to
labor abuses.
The rediscovery of the “bitter” or “dark” side of cocoa production also spotlighted
other impacts that the industry has on the economy and environment of less-developed
countries. As with any tropical commodity without staple food value, cocoa production
ties the welfare of farmers to the vagaries of the international markets and the fickle taste
of Northern consumers (Talbot 2002). Cocoa prices, like those of other commodities,
suffer from boom and bust cycles. During boom periods, with high world-market prices
and relatively scarce supply, farmers often replace forest with new plantations (Clough,
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Faust, and Tscharntke, 2009). Enticed by high prices, farmers also plant cocoa in land
that was used for food production, which may restrict food availability in the near future
(Belsky and Siebert 2003). When the production of these new plantings comes into the
market, overabundance of supply leads to drastic falls of word market prices. Lost
revenues jeopardize the livelihood of individual farmers and present a threat for regional
stability (see Figure 2). Indeed, Manzo (2005) suggests that the aforementioned harsh
labor conditions in Western Africa were born out of farmers need for extreme costcutting measures in response to the fall of word-market prices 4.
The expansion of the agrarian frontier that accompanies boom periods also
generates pressures on local ecosystems. Several studies have found that cacao groves,
even under low impact management, are not as diverse as the forest they replaced
(Andersson and Gradstein, 2005; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse, 2004; Faria and
Baumgarten, 2007; Greenberg, Bichier, and Cruz Angón, 2000; Haro-Carrion, Lozada,
Navarrete, and de Koning, 2009; Rice and Greenberg, 2000). When the prices collapse,
farmers are pressured to either intensify production, or shift to other uses of land (Clough,
Faust, and Tscharntke 2009). Intensely managed cocoa groves have higher yields than
shaded groves. However, the environmental impact of intensely managed groves is
higher, as they have no shade and require more inputs than less intensively managed ones
(Franzen and Mulder Borgerhoff 2007). Provision of ancillary ecosystem services is
diminished (Bisseleua, Missoup, and Vidal 2009). Finally, the loss of shaded plantations

4

Cocoa prices reached a historical low by the year 2000. Manzo (2005) indicates that, for
that period, gate prices were below the cost of production of even the most efficient
farmer.
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implies loss of the species' genetic variety, given that researchers have found that cocoa
farms function as in-situ reservoirs of rare, endangered or ‘heirloom’ varieties (Deheuvels
et al. 2004; Whitkus et al. 1998; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004).
Interestingly, the development of certification systems and geographical
marketing offers an opportunity for certain chocolate manufacturer to reap benefits out of
addressing sustainability issues in cocoa production. For example, the market for organic
chocolate products has grown 15% per year according to some estimates (Pay 2009).
Shade-grown, low input cocoa groves are usually organic by default, given that farmers
cannot afford agrochemical inputs (Barrett et al. 2002). The rise of the consumption of
organic products offers an opportunity to use this ‘organic by default’ management
system to enter an attractive market niche. It has also been reported that the market for
Fair-Trade products in the US has grown about 83% annually since 2002 (Pay 2009).
Thus Fair-Trade certified products deliver marketing benefits to manufacturers while
addressing social sustainability issues at the producers’ level. Other certification systems
generate value out of agronomic particularities of cocoa production. For instance,
protecting the environmental ancillary services provided by low intensity-shadedplantations was a driver for the involvement of the environmentally-centered certification
offered by Rainforest Alliance. Finally, two or more certification systems can be
simultaneously held by a bar aiming to capture potential consumers by creating a
smorgasbord of meanings and concepts that cater to the sensitivity of a wider audience
(Browne et al. 2000).
However, it has been observed that the narratives that declare that product has
superior ethical (and environmental) values can in fact hide the distance between
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producers and consumers (Hollander 2003). Hollander (2003) also suggest that the
deployment of ethical and geographical marketing creates premiums that are
disconnected from the commodity production costs.
Ecuador's cocoa: Living from the fumes of the past?
Ecuador’s reputation for fine cocoa was established back in the 19th century,
when the country was the world’s largest cocoa producer, accounting for 20 to 50% of
world’s production during the 19th century (Griffith 2004). Cocoa was planted in large
estates in the Ecuadorian coastal area, mainly in the sub basin of the Guayas River. A
geographer of the time describes this region as “one great paradise,” with “plantation
after plantation” and “hacienda after hacienda” extending along the river banks (Wolf
1893). However, the production of cocoa at the time was not uniform. Van Hall (1914)
recognized two commercial varieties, a Criollo-type known as Ecuador or Esmeraldas
Cundeamor and the Forastero-type Ecuador Amelonado. The first variety, the highly
appreciated Ecuador or Esmeraldas Cundeamor, was commercialized under the name of
“cacao de Esmeraldas” or “Esmeraldas” (van Hall 1914; Knapp 1920; Whymper 1921;
Lery 1954). The production of this cocoa was restricted to the province of Esmeraldas (in
Northwest Ecuador). Van Hall said that it had a close resemblance to Venezuelan
Criollos cacaos (Van Hall, 1914; Lery 1954). The second of Van Hall's varieties,
classified as Ecuador's Amelonado (or “cacao Nacional”), was found in four commercial
types named after the regions of production. Then and now, the Ecuadorian Amelonado
cocoa is well-regarded by the industry, because of its “strong flavor and scented aroma,"
being an exception to the general rule that ‘fine’ cacaos come exclusively from Criollotypes (Knapp 1920). Indeed, it is the only Forastero that qualifies as fine cacao. The first
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commercial type, the famous Arriba, came from the upper basin of the Guayas River and
its tributaries (arriba means “up,” as in “up-the-river”). The Arriba region roughly
encompasses the parts of the Province of Guayas, the Province of Los Ríos and a small
fraction of the Province of Bolívar (Wolf 1893; Parsons 1957; Crespo 1986). Outside of
this region, fine cocoa was also produced in the other areas, and traded under other
'market' names. The first among these Nacionales was produced in the wet part of the
Province of Manabí, near the towns of Chone and Calceta. This cocoa was commercially
known as “Bahia,” “Caraques,” or “Manabí” (Lery 1954; van Hall 1914; Whymper
1921) 5. Cocoa was also produced in the region of “Abajo” (down the river) (Parsons
1957), in Southern part of Guayas and the coastal area of Azuay and Cañar. The cocoa of
this region was known as “Balao,” for the name of the area where a still existing large
plantation is located (Van Hall 1914). Finally, cocoa was also produced in the Province
of El Oro. This last cocoa type was known as “cacao Machala.” (Parsons, 1957; Van Hall
1914; Knapp 1920; Whymper 1921). Finally, there is also a late 19th century account of
large wild cacao plantations along the Napo River (Eastern Ecuador, in the Upper
Amazon Basin) which was deemed “scarcely inferior to what is known in the market as
arriba” (Tyler 1894), and two early 20th century reports of wild cacao stands growing on
the banks of the River Bobonaza (Province of Napo) (Holloway 1932) and Rio Zamora
(Province of Zamora) (Hermessen 1917), but there are no records that suggest that cocoa
from this region was exported at the time.

5

Van Hall mentions that calling this cacao “Bahia” is “inconvenient” because this is also
the name of the cacao produced in the Brazilian state of Bahia.
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Ecuador's cocoa industry was the main source of income for the country,
accounting for 71% of the country exports by 1920 (Henderson 1997). However, by the
1930s, Ecuador's cocoa exporting industry had collapsed. Ecuador's plantations were
decimated by the attack of two previously unknown fungal plant pathogens, Crinipellis
perniciosa (known as “witch’s broom,” or “escoba de bruja”), and Moniliophthora roreri
(known as frosty-pod disease, or “monilla”) (Griffith, 2004; Parsons, 1957) 6. The
severity of the attack of these diseases cannot be overstated. Current reports indicate that
C. perniciosa can cause yields to drop by 90%; even more serious is the attack of M.
roreri which can infest and destroy up to 100% of the pods (Hebbar 2007; Griffith 2004;
Phillips-Mora and Wilkinson 2007).
The Nacional genotype, which recent genetic studies suggest were a highly
homogenous population, proved especially susceptible to the attack of these diseases
(Griffith 2004). Thus, by 1930 Ecuador's production (14,000 tons) was one-third of what
was produced in the year of 1920 (39,790 tons) (Lery 1954; Henderson 1997). Ecuador's
share of the world production fell from 11.7% in 1920 to 2.7% by 1930 (Lery 1954;
Henderson 1997), and the product accounted for just less than one-fifth of the country’s
exports (Pineo 2007).
The 1920’s collapse of the cocoa export industry7 gave origin to three lingering
trends whose effects have shaped contemporary cocoa production in Ecuador. First,
Ecuadorian cocoa production survived as a small farmer’s cash crop, in part because they
6

Griffith (2004) indicates that the first report of Crinipellis perniciosa in Ecuador is
dated from 1921 and that the first report for Moniliophthora roreri dates from 1917.
7

It also caused the collapse of Ecuador's economy, and lead to a period of civil unrest.
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did not have access to the resources needed to convert their holdings to more profitable
production systems, and in part because shade-grown cocoa tolerates adverse weather
factors, and thrives in landscapes and soils where other crops do not (Bentley, Boa, and
Stonehouse, 2004). Second, foreign disease-resistant cocoa varieties were introduced in
attempts to revitalize the industry (Lerceteau et al. 1997) 8. Because these introductions
did not have the Arriba flavor, naturally-occurring hybridization led to a progressive
erosion of the Arriba/Nacional genotype up to the point where it has been reported that
“the Arriba flavor is hardly found” (Petithuguenin and Roche 1995 in Deheuvels et al.
2004: 23). Thirdly, as early as the 1930’s, scientists were encouraging changes in
plantations management to combat diseases (Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004). Given
that both C. perniciosa and M. roreri infestations are more severe under dense canopies,
farmers were encouraged to regulate the shade covering their groves (Griffith 2004). The
practice of growing cocoa under shade has been progressively abandoned. Indeed, some
of the new varieties are not planted under shade at all (Espinosa et al. 2006; Bentley, Boa,
and Stonehouse 2004). In fact, CCN-51 9, a full-sun, high-yield, non aromatic variety
accounts for 48% of the plantings made within the last 5 years according to Bentley, Boa,
and Stonehouse (2004). The CCN-51 variety yields almost 4 times that of Nacional

8

However, there are reports of introduction of foreign Trinitarios (locally known as
Venezolanos) as early 1890 (Van Hall, 1914).
9

During field work in Ecuador, the first author was able to find a copy from a paper by
this variety creator, Homero U. Castro. Castro describes CCN 51 as a cross of F1 of
IMC-67 x ICS-95 by O-1, where O-1 was a cacao ascension collected by himself in a trip
to Ecuador's Valle de los Canelos (Castro 1981). According to this paper, CCN stands for
Coleccion Castro Naranjal and 51 stands for the number or the cross that gave origin to
this variety.
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(Espinosa et al. 2006) and is resistant to fungal diseases, but lacks the Arriba flavor
(Griffith 2004). The consequence of economic marginalization, genetic erosion and
changes in management practices have led to a progressive loss of Ecuadorian cocoa
quality. By 2005, the International Cacao Organization downgraded the country's cocoa
rating from 100% fine flavor cocoa to 75% (ICCO, 2006) 10.
The ICCO downgrade spurred responses from the government sector. At the time,
there were three main policies established to address the decline of Ecuadorian cocoa.
First, the Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle Ranching, Aquaculture and Fishing (Ministerio
de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca, MAGAP) published Accord 070 of July
22 of 2005, declaring cocoa as a Ecuador's National Symbol. This declaration cleared the
way for further actions. The following week the MAGAP published Accord 060 of July
27 of 2005, in which it bans shipments made of a mix of Nacional and CCN-51 beans.
Second, in 2006 the Ecuadorian Institute for Statistics and Standardization published the
fourth revision of the Cocoa Beans Technical Norm (NTE INEN 176:2006) which
created the legal framework to separate traditional (Nacional) and non-traditional
(hybrid/CCN-51) varieties, and price them differently. Third, the Institute of Ecuadorian
Intellectual Property (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Propiedad Intelectual, IEPI), with the
support of a heterogeneous alliance of cocoa exporters, producers' organizations, NGOs,
IGOs and government agencies, published and approved the creation of the “Arriba”
Protected Denomination of Origin (Arriba PDO). In this document, the use of the
“Arriba” label is restricted to Ecuador's cocoa beans of the Nacional variety.

10

Before this ruling, all of the cocoa beans from Ecuador were rated as “fine.”
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For chocolate makers, Arriba offers a unique opportunity for showcase their
brand. First, Arriba has a taste that—in words of the chocolate manufacturer Shawn
Askinosie—“even people unfamiliar with dark chocolate are able to appreciate.” Second,
Arriba is a historically acknowledged variety―a must-have in 'single-origin' line―with a
rich history of quality to back it up. Third, Ecuador's cocoa is the hands of small farmers,
but there have not been linkages between Ecuador's cocoa production and child labor
exploitation as has been the case in other source countries 11. This gives Ecuador and
advantage with chocolate makers who are wary of being criticized on social justice
grounds. Fourth, country-wide loss of shaded fine cocoa plantations can be translated into
a narrative in which chocolate consumption is tied to protection of these biodiversityrich, socially-important agro-ecosystems. Fifth, the Arriba PDO definition was designed
to cover all Nacional cocoa produced in Ecuador. Legally, any manufacturer can use the
Arriba label as long as the beans used on the bar come from Ecuador, and are of the
Nacional variety meaning that the beans do not need to come from the Arriba region
proper. International trends favoring dark chocolate, Ecuador's reputation for fine cocoa
quality, and a favorable regulation created the conditions for a boom of products labeled
“Arriba.” Indeed, the availability of single-origin “Arriba” bars have greatly increased
from one bar 12 in 1997 to more than 139 bars by 2010, according to the chocolate expert
Mark Christian (Mark Christian, phone interview with author, 03/20/2010). Evidently,
the rapid growth of this market segment suggests that chocolate manufacturers are
11

In Ecuador, children labor is used in the banana and cut flowers industries.

12

The U.S.-based Vintage Plantations Chocolate claims that their 1997 Plantations bar
was the first single-origin Arriba bar (Vintage Plantations 2010).
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interested in capitalizing on the marketing value of Arriba cocoa. This rapid growth also
suggests a market niche with relatively low barriers to entry. I propose that a study of
products designed to fit into this market-niche provides a unique opportunity to assess the
effects of the adoption of the alternative trade rhetoric in chocolate products specifically,
and in consumer's food goods in general. I conduct this study thorough the analysis of the
use of language on packing material. This material reflects manufacturers’ responses to
what they perceive to be their consumer's most pressing concerns. I use the on-barnarratives to trace the bars to their putative origins. I am also interested in getting
glimpses of the on-field application of this rhetoric, and assess the effect of the adoption
of these concerns in changing or modifying manufacturers’ practices.
The bars: collecting chocolate
From 2005 to 2009, I collected 39 chocolate bars from 27 sources/manufacturers.
For comparison purposes, this represents 37.5% of bars added from 2008 to May 2010 to
the Chocolate Census™ database of the C-Spot™, a web site designed to be the “ultra
consumer's guide for premium chocolate” (Mark Christian, email to author, 05/05/2010).
Of the 39 bars, 35 were commercially available in the US at the time of collection; 13 one
was supplied by a chocolate reviewer [as a scanned image], and the remaining three were
cocoa producers’ organizations marketing bars sold or given away at a farmer's meeting
in Ecuador (see Table 1). For the analysis, I selected a sub-sample with one bar from each
source (n=27). For drafting this sub sample, first I selected bars with 70-80% of cocoa.
Second, if a manufacturer produced more than one bar on this percentage, I selected bars

13

Hersheys' Cacao Reserve Country of Origin line was discontinued by the end of 2008.
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by origin (in order: Los Ríos > Guayas > Manabí > Esmeraldas > El Oro) 14, for a sub
sample of 27 bars by source.
The full texts from each wrapper, excluding the “nutritional information” and “list
of ingredients,” were entered in a MS Excel worksheet. I also noted presence of
certification seals (either logos or text), health statements, and contact information. While
each bar shape, size and packaging ('wrapper') was clearly distinctive, all the packing has
a 'front' side and a 'back' side. I recorded them separately. I entered text inside (as printed
inside or in attached marketing inserts) as a different variable. I translated texts in other
languages to English. For analysis, I used the translated texts. General statistics about
bars were calculated using Microsoft Excel 2002(SP3). Text processing was completed
with QDA-Miner 3.2.3. Text statistics were conducted with WordStat 6.0, with an
exclusion list made of articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and brand names.
For qualitative analysis, I used text from the bars and evaluated them against the
framework I derived from my review of issues covering cocoa production. I contacted
(by email, in English) the makers of the bars in cases where clarification was needed. In
practice, the U.S.-based chocolate manufacturers answered my questions, while European
chocolate makers did not.
Cocoa from Ecuador, chocolate from all over the world
By source, my sample encompasses bars from Argentina (1), Austria (1), Ecuador
(12), France (3), Germany (2), Italy (2), Switzerland (1) and the United States (US) (5).
In the US, the bars in my sample are priced in the range of US$ 0.04 to US$ 0.15 per

14

The order reflects “Arriba” historical range.

48

gram (US$ 1.1 to US$ 4.25 per oz). I did not include 'super premium' bars (> US$0.7 per
gram, ~US$20 per oz). The average cocoa content of the bars was 70% (± 7%), with the
“Fino de Aroma” bar having the lower percentage of cocoa (45%), and Cacaoyere's
Puerto Quito having the maximum (91%). Bar codes were present on 35 bars, with the
notable exception of the Fino de Aroma and Kallari's Roberto's Recipe bars made by the
Ecuadorian manufacturer El Salinerito, and the expected absence of coding on the three
marketing bars from cocoa producers’ organizations 15.
On-bar narratives: addressing issues in cocoa production
Analysis of the narratives by source shows that the most commonly used nongeographical (NG) product descriptor is “dark chocolate,” with all the manufacturers
using it (or its equivalent in other languages). Other NG quality qualifiers (fine, extra,
premium and unique) were used in 33% of the cases. A graphical representation of the
use of terms in the wrappers is found on Figure 3. In this figure, the size of the font is
proportional to the number of cases in which the word was found (n=27). Other than the
Ashumira Bitter Chocolate Bar from Agricola Shumiral, the percentage of cocoa in the
bar was printed on the front side of the packing of all the products. In all cases, this
percentage was printed in a contrasting, bold and enlarged font.
Single origin, varietals, and craftsmanship
I found a wide variation on the geographical definition of “single origin.” In my
sample by source, 48% of the manufacturers 'single origin' encompass all of Ecuador and
15

The presence of bar codes indicate that manufacturers expect to sell the bars at the
retail-level—giving that most supermarkets use these bars for price coding. The absence
of bar code indicates that the bar is to be sold informally—in fairs, in small manufacturerowned shops, or used for marketing purposes.
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48% of them define origin in terms of a fraction of the Ecuadorian territory (see Table 2).
The Hachez d'Arriba Classic constitutes a notable exemption, given that the manufacturer
only specifies that they use “premium cocoa beans from South America” (Hachez, n/d).
48% of makers describe the varietal used on their bars as Arriba ( “Ariba” sic Chocolove,
n/d); 11% use “Arriba Nacional;” 11% use Nacional; 22% do not declare what variety is
used on the bar; 7% describe the variety used on their bars as a rare Forastero but either
do not specify if Arriba is used (E. Guitard n/d), or declare that they use a variety other
than Arriba (Salgado n/d); finally, 1% declare that they use a Trinitario bean from
Ecuador (Pralus n/d).
Some manufacturers emphasize the role of their company in rescuing the Arriba
varietal. For example, Dagoba's label addresses the historical decline of Arriba
production, “Ecuador's once mighty Arriba Nacional is now on the verge of extinction”
(Dagoba, n/d), and suggests that the partnership of the company with some “dedicated”
farmers is necessary to rescue it. Kallari's narrative suggests that the decline on Nacional
production was caused because it was “over planted in factory farms,” which led to attack
of diseases and loss of most of the Nacional genotype. However, the Kallari label
explains that Nacional cocoa “survived and flourished in the Napo region, where it was
protected by traditional cultivation technique[s]” (Kallari, n/d).
Who is behind fine chocolate: farmers or manufacturers?
Overall, 52% of the manufacturers in my sample acknowledge the role of farmers
(producers) in protecting, selecting and cultivating cocoa varietals. Manufacturers also
mention that these farmers follow traditional management practices, generally described
as raising cocoa under the shade of other trees (i.e., [the farmers] “cultivated the cocoa in
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the traditional way, amid shade trees, bananas and a variety of other plants” (Zooter, n/d).
Other statements hint at connections but lack specifics. For example, the Amedei label
(n/d) suggests that making chocolate involves “forming relationships of friendship,
respect, and partnership with the people who live where cocoa grows, keepers of ancient
knowledge,” but further details are lacking.
Amedei stands in contrast with the narrative of two other bars, Askinosie San Jose
del Tambo and Kallari's Single Source. Askinosie’s take on the 'bean to bar' premise goes
to the point of personalizing their San Jose del Tambo Nibble Bar with the portrait of
Vitaliano Saravia, an Ecuadorian farmer and cocoa growers' leader who was “really
involved in introducing Shawn [Askinosie] to San Jose del Tambo [village] and who was
involved in the entire project, including the contribution of beans” (Shawn Askinosie,
phone interview with author, 04/21/2010). Askinosie’s commitment is stated on the back
of the bar: “the farmer on the front of this package helped gather and ferment the cocoa
beans for the bar inside” (Askinosie n/d). The level of involvement of this company with
the farmers leads to improved traceability, a point made clear with the statement that
“working directly and personally with this man [Vitaliano Saravia] and other
farmers−instead of brokers−allows me to help them improve the quality of their beans
and allows you to know exactly where your chocolate comes from” (Askinosie, n/d).
While Kallari's bar lacks this personal approach, in the text of the bar it specifies that it is
owned by the farmers, who harvest and market their own bars. Kallari's text informs the
reader that its beans come from 850 Kichwa families in the Napo Region of the
Ecuadorian Amazon, and the particular taste of the bar is owed to farmers harvesting
“endemic varieties that are available only on these small farms” (Kallari's n/d). Kallari
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also takes pride out of being a ‘farmer owned’ chocolate company (Kallari n/d). Kallari's
bar and the three cocoa grower's associations bars (Ashumiral, UNOCACE and Fortaleza
del Valle) also share the commonality in that the role of farmers, varietals and
management practices are emphasized while 'manufacturing craftsmanship' is ignored.
The emphasis on the local is understandable given that these four groups hire other
companies to produce their bars.
I found that the making of a single origin bar is not necessarily straightforward. It
may include steps done by companies other than the brand name. For example, in the
insert of the Chocolove Chocolatour Ecuador Bar, the narrator (whom I assume is the
manufacturer) comments on travel to Ecuador. The reader learns about the narrator’s
visits to cocoa farms, where this person saw “cocoa growing almost wild, intercropped
among the hardwood and fruit trees” (Chocolatour n/d). The narrator also visited “the
facilities where cocoa is fermented and cured and then ventured off into the forest,” and
tasted cocoa beans [sic] on the wild (Chocolatour n/d). The bar packaging also shows
indicators that suggest uniqueness and traceability, such as an “Limited production
counter,” “Lot number,” and other features that suggests that the manufacturers were able
to track the cocoa from the farms (that they visited on their trip) to their production
facility in the USA. However, the manufacturer also mentions that Chocolove is “Made
in Boulder, CO with Belgian chocolate” (Chocolatour n/d). The process of making this
bar is less straightforward than what its rhetoric suggests. In Chocolove’s manufacturing
process, the beans from Ecuador (or any other origin) are transported to Belgium,
processed into chocolate blocks, and transported to the USA for repacking and selling.
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On the rest of the bars, manufacturer's traditional craftsmanship is invariably
presented as a critical factor to achieve premium quality. For example, in Amano's
Guayas, the on-bar narrative explains that cocoa's floral aroma 16 is released only after the
beans are “hand roasted” and ground using an “antique stone grinder.” By using these
methods the company claims that it is “reviving the art of making chocolate from the
bean” (Amano, n/d).
The emphasis on craftsmanship is the strongest on the 48% of bars in which local
factors (farmers and varietals) are not spotlighted. On these bars, manufacturers are said
to play the key role on defining the quality of final product. However, they have a passive
role in bean sourcing: they receive, select, and process the beans without the involvement
described in the narratives of the previous group. A common claim is that manufacturers’
expertise is what allows them to select premium beans from abroad. For example, in the
narrative of the Bonnat Chocolat Equateur, it is said that their Maitre Chocolatier
Stephane Bonnat plays a key role by selecting premium beans from the unroasted beans
that arrive at his factory in Voiron (France) (Bonnat, n/d). The Swiss firm Lindt also
remarks on the importance of selecting beans for achieving premium quality. The
emphasis on manufacturing knowledge is the strongest suit of Hachez d'Arriba narrative.
For Hachez, the quality of their bars is given by processing, following a 100 year-old
“single recipe” that requires of a long processing time, expressed as “conching of 72
hours.” In chocolate production, “conching” is a process that contributes to flavor
development. Conching also delivers chocolate with an uniform taste, thus helping

16

Arriba is known by its floral aroma (described as hints of orange blossoms).
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manufacturers to account for variability in their supply of cocoa beans. The use of extralong conching times produces chocolate with a basic taste. Hachez is the only brand in
my sample that uses conching to signify quality (Hachez, n/d). The Hachez bar is also
unique in that it does not state which variety is used on the bar (although it uses
“d'Arriba” on the brand name), and its source of origin for the cocoa is “South America”
(Hachez, n/d)
Ethical and environmental sourcing: small farmers and shade-grown cocoa
Social and environmental aspects form part of the narratives of 70% of the
narratives by source. Of these, both social and environmental issues are covered on 37%;
exclusively environmental issues are covered on 16%, and exclusively social issues on
47% of them. However, only 46% of the bars are certified under Organic, Fair-trade,
and/or Rainforest Alliance certification schemes. Of the certified bars, organic is the most
frequent certification (50%), followed by Rainforest Alliance (16%), and Fair-Trade
(7.4%). I found that 16% of the bars exhibited two certification labels, with two possible
combinations: Rainforest Alliance/ Organic (8%), and Fair-Trade / Organic (8%).
As a whole, manufacturers weigh economic, environmental and social issues
similarly. For instance, Kallari's narrative is consistent with the bean-to-bar holistic
conceptualization of the brand. In fact, it is one that exhibits both Organic and Rainforest
Alliance certifications. Also, the narrative of this brand is a text-book definition of
sustainable development, by stating that “the profits” from the sales of the bars return to
the cooperative to support “sustainable development, health, and education programs
while helping to preserve one of Earth's most important climate-protecting, rain forest
ecosystems” (Kallari n/d).
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In another example, the narrative on the Ecuadoriana de Chocolates' Cacaoyere
bar confronts environmental, social and economic issues upfront. It informs the reader
that the cocoa comes from shaded cocoa groves owned by small farmers (with holdings
of 1 to 15 hectares), “in harmony with fruit and timber trees and tropical woodlands”
(Cacaoyere, n/d). The narrative then reports that “under normal circumstances, these
farmers’ yearly incomes are from US$ 700 to US$ 1200 (about US$60-100 per month),
which “is not enough to send their children to school, or to pay for health care”
(Cacaoyere n/d) 17. Then, it reports that through Cacaoyere these farmers receive a better
price for their cocoa, “45% higher than the local price” (Cacaoyere n/d). It also reports
that Cacaoyere collaborates with inter governmental and non- governmental institutions
(the German GTZ and the US financed ACDI VOCA are mentioned). Cacaoyere’s
narrative suggests that, with the help of the company and these partnerships, the
cooperatives should be able to reach environmental and economic sustainability. The
narrative of the Hoja Verde bar indicates that they source beans exclusively from shaded
plantations, “thereby supporting a balanced natural habitat-ensuring the well-being of
local communities who live in this fragile and important ecosystem” (Hoja Verde n/d). It
also links consumption of a Fair-Trade certified goods to economic, social and
environmental goals: “by choosing this Fair Trade certified product, you are directly
supporting a better life for farming families through fair prices, direct trade, community
development, and environmental stewardship” (Hoja Verde, n/d).
17

The reported monthly income of these farmers, of US$100, is a quarter of Ecuador's
poverty level monthly minimum income (US$385 per month for a family of five) (data
for April 2010, INEC 2010m). The income that the farmers get from Cacaoyere, 45%
higher for about ~US$145 per month, still is a fraction of what is need to feed a family.
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Finally, other companies gave more emphasis to the socio-economic issues. For example,
Askinosie “A Stake in the Outcome” statement─which in practice means that the
company shares 10% of its profits with the farmers who produced the beans (Shawn
Askinosie, phone interview with author, 04/21/2010.) ─ emphasize fairness in trade
outside of the Fair-Trade labeling system. Kallari declares that as a farmer owned brand it
transfers all of the chocolate profits back to the communities (Kallari, n/d)
Single-origin on the cheap
I found two different views of single-origin, with half of the manufacturers (48%)
opting for a country-wide definition of single origin, and the other half opting for a
single-origin which is a fraction of Ecuador's territory. My results suggest that there is an
inverse correlation between the area of the putative source of cocoa beans and the depth
of the relationship between manufacturers and farmers as stated in the bar’s narrative.
Indeed, manufacturers that specifically name a farmer, farmer's group or farmer's
organization as the source of their cocoa are more likely to have well defined
geographical sourcing. These manufacturers are also more likely to emphasize the
contribution of nature (place and variety) and culture (practice and knowledge) to the
quality of the final product. On the other hand, continental or country-wide sourcing is
linked to claims about manufacturers' expertise and craftsmanship, paying token attention
to the farmers on the ground.
My findings also suggest that the presence of Fair-Trade or Rainforest Alliance
certification on the bars increases the traceability of the product. Both Rainforest Alliance
and Fair-Trade publish an online accessible database with the name of the certified
producers by country and product, therefore limiting the scope of a search to a few well-
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defined locations. In the case of far more common organic certified products, the process
of tracing the beans to the point of origin using packing material data is challenging. A
unified organic certification database is lacking, so information about certified producers
is dispersed among several certifying companies (three in my sample: Naturland, CERES
and BCS OKO). However, the sole presence of these certification seals does not supply
ample evidence about the sourcing of cocoa. Certification acts as a barrier to entry at the
producer's level (limiting the number of cocoa suppliers for a particular bar), but
manufacturers can effectively source cocoa from any certified producer.
Overall, my results suggest that most chocolate makers are opting for a countrywide definition of origin that does not allow for tracing the bars to the cocoa-farmingcommunity where the beans were raised. In my sample of 27 bars by source, only 4
commercially available bars and the 3 producer's organizations bars supply enough detail
to trace the cocoa beans to the community of origin, although the narratives of the 23 out
of 27 bars in this sub sample address the role of farmers in sourcing the cocoa.
On the other hand, the experience of manufacturers that are engaged in close
relationships with producer's groups suggest that establishing these relationships is
challenging. Shawn Askinosie from Askinosie Chocolates argues that this is because “it
involves farmers meeting [for the first time] a chocolate maker [and chocolate makers
meeting farmers], without middlemen. It is difficult because it is new” (Shawn Askinosie,
interview with author, 04/21/2010). Pierrick Chouard, from Vintage Chocolates, argues
that the lack of reliability of some of their local [Ecuador] partners has forced this
company to change sourcing three times over the last 13 years. Chouard also indicated
that developing [Vintage's] group of 17 Los Ríos-based farmers/suppliers took this
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company most of the last 9 years, and demanded the expenditure of considerable human
and financial capital. Chouard argues that developing a true bean-to-bar product requires
significant investments and a high level of compromise. Bean-to-bar requires that a
manufacturer bypass the entrenched conventional trading system, therefore creating an
alternative commodity chain from the ground level (Pierrick Chouard, phone interview
with author, April 2010). The magnitude of the effort behind developing links is
daunting. For example, Clark Goble from Amano Chocolates mentioned that there is an
international competition for the best quality beans. In his words, “sometimes everyone
wants the same beans” (Goble, email to author, 2010). Relationships with cocoa
producers are not straightforward: there is competitive demand for high quality cocoa and
farmers and exporters sell to the highest bidder. This company, which works with small
farmers as well as large plantations, sometimes has to “work with [a] middleman, if only
to manage all the regulations of customs and handling transport” (Goble, email to the
author, 04/28/2010).
It can be argued that it is disingenuous to pretend the artisan chocolate makers can
effectively challenge the multinationals of the candy industry. Indeed in an email to listserve subscribers, the U.S. based non-profit Fine Chocolate Industry Association said that
members of the group “are not out to change the chocolate industry- I just want to
support and celebrate our small segment of it” (FCIA, email to the author, 05/12/2010).
From the labels, it is evident that manufacturers are designing products to meet the
demand of consumers for alternative chocolate—from the forest, high quality, safe and
traceable, and fair—but the mechanisms for the sourcing of this “alternative” cocoa are
not clearly stated in the labels of most products, indicating that most consumers are
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satisfied with vague references to geographical sourcing and supporting-the-farmers
rhetoric. Environmental and social certifications provide a higher level of traceability, but
do not necessarily signify a closer and committed relationships among producers,
manufacturers and consumers.
I argue that ”at-length” alternative-sourcing is a perilous approach for several
reasons. First, companies that rely on country-wide or regional sourcing have low control
over bean quality, making them vulnerable to irregular results. As the Askinosie case
illustrates, companies that work closely with farmers—and are willing to commit time
and resources to cultivate these relationships—are likely to secure access to a supply of
high-quality beans. Companies that opt out of developing relationships with the
producers will find themselves engaged in an endless race to secure high quality beans.
Second, at-length cocoa sourcing puts artisan companies in direct competition with the
large candy multinationals, which are quite interested in entering into these niche markets
and sourcing high-quality cocoa (i.e., Hershey's and Lindt). Direct trade sourcing—such
as Kallari or Askinosie—appears to offer a better option for achieving social and
environmental goals than more “at-length” sourcing, but more research is needed to
understand the potentials and limitations of this new mechanism for manufacturersproducers collaboration.
My results also suggest that Ecuadorian institutional efforts to protect Ecuadorian
fine cocoa production are only partially addressing this underlying issue. My results
suggest that the first problem for fine cocoa production is the use of the Arriba label to
cover all of the Ecuadorian territory. Arriba may be in fact the best known of all
Ecuadorian cocoa varieties, but this designation ignored the marketing potential of
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Ecuador's other historically-strong commercial varieties. A more strict adoption of
geographical marketing will allow cocoa producing regions to capitalize out of their own
genetic reservoirs. Historical data suggest that fine cocoa is to be found in other
Ecuadorian regions, but this issue needs to be explored.
I suggest that the adoption of new forms of varietal nomenclature (i.e.,
Motamayor et al. 2008 molecular markers proposal of a nomenclature based on 10
sources of cocoa diversity) may contribute to the rescue of endangered genotypes.
Centralized efforts to develop Nacional varieties should be focused to restricted
geographical ranges, trying to identify and propagate locally-adapted ecotypes. The
findings of Motamayor et al. (2008) are that the Nacional genotype exists in areas other
than Ecuadorian Western lowlands (i.e., Southern Ecuadorian Amazon region) which
suggest that farmers in Western and Eastern Ecuador should be able to develop their own
attractive varieties.
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Figure 1. Price by weight of cocoa beans (in US$ per tonne), 2004-2007, showing price
differential for fine versus bulk cocoa beans. Source: FAOSTAT 2010, ICCO 2010.

Year

Figure 2. World’s cocoa area harvested (in thousands of ha), production (in thousand
tonnes) and price per weight (in US$ per tonne), 1961-2009. Source: FAOSTAT 2010.
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Figure 3. Cloud tag for 75 most common terms (other than brand names) found in the wrappers of 27 chocolate bars made
with Ecuador’s, “Arriba” or Nacional cocoa beans. Size of font is proportional to the number of cases where a particular
world was found (n=27).number of cases where a particular world was found (n=27). Source: developed by the author
using world frequency table derived from 27 wrappers in Wordle World Cloud 2009 (Feinberg, 2009 @ www.wordle.net).

Table 1. Chocolate bars by brand, % of cocoa solids, manufacturer and country of origin
of manufacturer
Country of
manufacturer
Name, brand and % cocoa
Manufacturer
Amano Guayas 70%
Amano Chocolate
USA
Amedei Ecuador 70%
Amedei
Italy
Ashumira Shumiral (Azuay) n/d †
Agricola Shumiral
Ecuador
Askinosie San Jose del Tambo Nibble Askinosie Chocolate
USA
Bar 70%
Cacaoyere Cumba (Esmeraldas) 71%
Ecuatoriana de Chocolates
Ecuador
El Eno (Amazonia) 63%
“
“
Las Naves (Bolivar) 82%
“
“
Puerto Quito (Pichincha) 91%
“
“
Caoni Esmeraldas 55%
BLK Corporation
“
Los Ríos 77%
“
“
Chocolat Bonnat Equateur 75%
Voiron
France
Chocolove XOXOX Ecuador 72%
Chocolove
USA
Corporacion Fortaleza del Valle
Pacari
Ecuador
Calceta (Manabí) 60%†
Dagoba Los Ríos 68%
Dagoba
USA
Domori Cacao Arriba 70%
Domori
Italy
Cacao Cult Ecuador 70%
“
“
E. Guittard Quevedo (Los Ríos) 65%
Guittard Chocolate
USA
Company
Fino de Aroma 45%
El Salinerito
Ecuador
Francois Pralus Equateur Fortissima
Pralus S.A.S.
France
80%
Equateur Trinitario 75%
“
“
Hachez Cocoa d'Arriba 77%
Hachez Chocolate
Germany
Hershey's Cacao Reserve Arriba 50% The Hershey Company
USA
Hoja Verde 58%
Hoja Verde
Ecuador
Kallari 75%
Ecuatoriana de Chocolates
Ecuador
85%
“
“
Roberto's Recipe 75%
El Salinerito
“
Lindt Excellence Ecuador 75%
Lindt Switzerland
Switzerland
Nestle Dark 60%
Nestle Ecuador
Ecuador
Pacari Esmeraldas 60%
SKS-Ecuadorian Organics
“
Manabí 65%
“
“
Republica del Cacao El Oro 67%
Confiteca
“
Los Ríos 75%
“
“
Manabí 75%
“
“
(continued)
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Table 1. Continued
Country of
manufacturer
Argentina

Name, brand and % cocoa
Salgado Grand Cru Esmeraldas 70%

Manufacturer
Sucesores de Jose Salgado
SAIC
UNOCACE Floral 75% †
Tulicorp
Ecuador
Valrhona Alpaco Ecuador 66%
Valrhona
France
Vintage Plantations 90%
Vintage Plantations Ecuador Ecuador
Zooter Labooko Single Machala (El
Zotter Schokoladen
Austria
Oro) 60%‡
Manufaktur
All bars were commercially available at the time of collection unless marked: †
Promotional bar; ‡ Courtesy of Mark Christian (C-Spot).
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Table 2. Sources of cocoa, number of bars, scale of sourcing, place, and area (in sq km) of place
Source of cocoa
Continent
South America
Country
Ecuador
Region
Ecuadorian Amazon

65

Province
El Oro
Esmeraldas
Guayas
Los Ríos
Manabí
Canton/Parish
Calceta, Manabí

Bars (n=39)

Province/s

Internal level of sourcing
Canton
Parish

Area (sq. km)

1

20,421,180

a

16

256,369

b

11,6178

c

3

Morona
Napo
Orellana
Pastaza
Sucumbios
Zamora

All included

All included

1
3
1
3
2

El Oro
Esmeraldas
Guayas
Los Ríos
Manabí

“
“
“
“
“

“
“
“
“
“

5,817
15,576
17,140
7,151
18,894

b

1

Manabí

Bolivar
Chone
Portoviejo
Tosagua

”

445

e

b
d
b
b

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)
Source of cocoa
Canton/Parish
Cumba, Esmeraldas
El Eno, Amazonia
Las Naves, Bolivar
Machala, El Oro
(UROCAL)

Bars (n=39)
1
1
1
1

Province/s
Esmeraldas
Sucumbios
Bolivar
Guayas
Azuay
El Oro

Internal level of sourcing
Canton
Parish
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Atacames
Lago Agrio
Las Naves
Naranjal
Balao
Pucara
El Guabo
Santa Rosa
Machala
Puerto Quito
Quevedo
Chillanes

“
El Eno
All included
Some included

Area (sq. km)
511
448
147
4,951

f
g
h
i

Puerto Quito, Pichincha
1
Pichincha
All included
683 j
Quevedo, Los Ríos
1
Los Ríos
“
302 k
San Jose del Tambo,
1
Bolivar
San Jose del
242 l
Bolivar
Tambo
Shumiral, Azuay
1
Azuay
Pucara
Ponce Enriques
642 m
Note: Ecuador's subdivisions are as follow: Country> Province> Canton> Parish. “Regions” are used to group provinces but are
not an official political division category (to May 05 2010).
Sources: a World Bank (2008); b INEC, 2005; c Calculated from INEC (2005); d Calculated from INEC, 2002a; e Calculated from
INEC, 2002b and information from Fortaleza del Valle (2010); f INEC, 2002c; g Estimated from INEC, 2002d; h INEC, 2002e; i
INEC, 2002f, INEC, 2002g, INEC, 2002h, Ponce Enriquez (2010) and information from UROCAL (2010); j INEC, 2002i; k INEC,
2002j; l INEC, 2002j; m Ponce Enriquez (2010)
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CHAPTER III.
ON THE PATH OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Introduction and Background
Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and
vulnerable class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming
from trade liberalization places farmers in a “race to the bottom” that leads to
displacement, poverty, and environmental degradation (Porter 1999). It has been
proposed that alternative trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to reverse this trend
by harnessing the power of the markets to reward producers of goods with embedded
superior cultural, environmental, and social values (Goodman and DuPuis 2002; Bryant
and Goodman 2004; McMichael 2000).
Policy makers— influenced by the narrative of ‘sustainability through
consumption’— attempt to solve allocation issues by fomenting partnerships that
encourage the de-commoditization of consumer’s products by creating niche markets that
cater to the sensibilities of the Northern activist consumers (Bryant and Goodman 2004).
These initiatives—under the umbrella of ‘sustainable development’ (Brundtland 1987)—
seek to address social, economic, and environmental problems of contemporary food
systems (Bingen, Serrano, and Howard 2003). Thus, it is posed that parallel systems of
trade provide solutions to structural problems of commodity production and trade, such
as an export’s oligopoly, scale-biased regulatory regimes, and markets’ failure to account
for provision of environmental and social services. Alternative trade networks are
visualized as institutional arrangements through which the benefit generated by smallscale, low-input agricultural producers are valorized (Moberg 2005; Gómez Tovar et al.
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2005; Brown and Getz 2008). Thus, alternative trade networks create ‘partnerships of
virtue’ that challenge the transnationally-dominated global food system (McMichael
2000).
Under the banner of a common understanding of the “necessity, desirability and
universality” of sustainability (Luke 2005), local and international agencies vie for
producers to joint alternative trade development schemes. However, the discursive
concept of a partnership based in equity and mutual benefit (Ashman 2001) belie
differences at both ends of the commodity chain: what for consumers it is a matter of
expressing choice, for producers it is a matter of survival (Moberg 2005). The discourse
of sustainability becomes normative, because producers must meet their international
partner’s standards to gain access to capital (Melo and Wolf 2007). The disparity points
to the need to question the effectiveness of these partnerships, given that—underlying the
design and execution of any sustainable development project—there is a bare-naked
power differential between rural commodity producers and the globalized technocratic
elite who lead these programs.
In this chapter, I analyze the results of the alliance of Ecuador’s Cacao Producers
Federation (Federacion Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador, FEDECADE), its
Ecuadorian NGO counterpart (currently known as Fundacion Alianza CEIDE, 18 or
CYD), and a heterogeneous set of international donors. These projects spanned 10 years
(1997-2008), and nominally invested roughly US$ 1200 for each of the farmers involved

18

This NGO has been known as Corporacion of Conservacion y Desarrollo (CCD, 19922000), Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD, 2001-2007), and Fundacion Alianza CEIDE
(2007-current) (Juan Lecaro, electronic interview with author, 05/04/2010)
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(US$ 1,436,738 per 1172 families). The shared goal of these projects was to create an
alternative commercialization system that paid a fair value for the farmer’s shade-grown
fine cocoa known as Nacional. Shade-grown Nacional cocoa plantations are prized by
conservationists because these multi-strata agro-forestry systems provide environmental
goods and services—habitat for endangered wildlife species and protection to local water
courses—that are lost when they are converted to other crops systems (i.e., bananas or
full-sun cocoa). My focus is in the benefit reaped by farmers in the area of influence of
FEDECADE and beyond, one year after FEDECADE commercialization system ceased
to operate.
Methods
The study was conducted on Ecuador's western lowlands, from May to December
of 2009 (Figure 1). Fieldwork was conducted in the area of influence of FEDECADE, in
the provinces of Azuay, El Oro and Guayas. The study gathered data from three sources:
in-depth interviews with farmers, farmer’s leaders, and NGOs and founding agencies
personnel, an open-answer survey applied to 100 farmers, and the physical and digital
archives of FEDECADE and CYD. Interviews with cocoa exporters, NGO staff, and
other informants were conducted on an ad hoc basis.
The in-depth interview script was designed to gather information about the
experiences of farmer’s organization with cocoa commercialization, interactions with
local and external agencies, and a general feeling about the state of the industry from a
farmer’s perspective. The interviews were conducted in Spanish, in an ad-hoc basis,
based upon participant willingness and time availability. I interviewed farmers and
farmers’ leaders from all FEDECADE cooperatives or associations. I also conducted in-
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depth interviews with farmers that hold positions of leadership on their community’s
cocoa commercialization team. The interviews with farmers were complemented with
interviews with FEDECADE representatives and staff, government and non-profit
organization officials, cocoa exporters, other farmer’s organizations representatives and
cocoa town-level intermediaries.
The second data source consists of an open-answer survey applied to cocoa
producers from Guayas and Azuay (Appendix 1). These producers were included in the
records of FEDECADE. At the time of the study, a FEDECADE farmer could hold up to
three certifications (Fair Trade, Organic and Rainforest Alliance). The survey was
conducted at each participant’s residence. In total, I conducted 100 of these surveys. The
survey consisted of four parts. The first, personal history, included questions that
establish age, gender and background of the farmers in the sample. The second, land
management, gathered information about the amount of land managed, and the level of
fragmentation of this area. The third, cocoa and other crop production, asked questions
about the crops managed by each farmer (including questions about crop variety, yield,
and age of the crops); it also included questions about subjective perceptions about the
benefits and liabilities of cocoa varietals. Finally, commercialization and income, asks
questions about the income generated by cocoa under different selling modalities, and
asked about the contribution of other economic activities to farmer’s income. Farmer’s
were recruited in the sample depending on their willingness to participate in the study, on
the basis of two criteria: a) de-facto management of the land, b) being included in the
rolls of associations registered with FEDECADE. The application of these two criteria
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yielded a sample of 100 farmers out of 430 registered with FEDECADE’s Nueva Union
Campesina, 6 de Julio, Camacho and La Florida Associations.
The third data source consisted of approximately 277 MB (~450 files) available in
FEDECADE’s computers up to December of 2009; 194 MB of the Conservacion y
Desarrollo (CYD) cocoa project (~1000 files), and of 176 documents made publicly
available by CYD at the social publishing website Scribb [www.scribb.com]. The two
groups have produced documents that are not included in these repositories, but these
digital files are an archive that has been preserved in the face of changing technology,
frequent failure of electronic equipment, and lack of backups. The associations and
cooperatives of FEDECADE kept their commercialization records on Microsoft Excel
files, which sometimes had formula or format problems [i.e., errors in SUM range
assignation, or use of a “comma” for decimal points]. These problems were corrected, but
the data are otherwise reported as they appear in FEDECADE’s databases. From 2003 to
2008, FEDECADE associations stocked and sold six types of cocoa [Nacional Faitrade
Organic, Nacional Organic, Nacional Rainforest Alliance, Nacional conventional, CCN51 conventional and monilla 19] to internal and external markets.
I was also granted access to the personal archives stored in the town of Jesus
Maria in the residence of FEDECADE’s President, Agr. Victor Chacon Salinas. Relevant
files were scanned and converted to digital files. Data classification, management and
sorting was done using Atlas.Ti.6.1.1.

19

The “monilla” or “negro” are beans from pods damaged by frosty-pod disease,
Moniliophthora roreri. These beans are paid at 50% of the price of “normal” cocoa.
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In the results, I distinguish between CYD and FEDECADE. There are two caveats
with this study. First, FEDECADE was made into the beneficiary of CYD-devised
development projects. Second, CYD was in charge of the projects (from budgeting to
coordination). Thus, although FEDECADE was nominally given full responsibility over
certain components of the projects, it was limited to executing CYD’s plans.
Ecuador’s Federation of Cocoa Producers: then and now
The Ecuador’s Federation of Cocoa Producers (known as FEDECADE for the
acronym of its Spanish name “Federacion de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador”) is a
federated non-profit organization constituted in 1981. The FEDECADE membership
consisted of 1172 farmers (and their families) grouped in 11 associations located in the
provinces of Azuay, Bolívar, Esmeraldas, Guayas, and El Oro (FEDECADE 2008;
MAGAP et al. n/d; Transfair 2005) The farmers affiliated with FEDECADE hold 7900
ha of cocoa Nacional, of which 3000 ha were certified under the U.S. based Rainforest
Alliance; 1500 ha were certified as Organic by Germany-based BCS Öko-Garantie
GmbH, and 600 ha were certified Fairtrade by Germany-based FLO-Cert GmbH
(MAGAP et al. n/d). Certifications overlapped, thus a farm could be counted under the
three certification schemes simultaneously.
The FEDECADE has a long history of activism advocating for the “economic
interests” of Ecuador’s small and medium cocoa farmers (Victor Chacon Salinas,
interview with author, 12/10/2007). Guided by a pragmatic turn, FEDECADE has
evolved from a trade-union organization focused on “defending and advancing Ecuador’s
small and medium cocoa farmer’s interests” (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with
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author, 12/10/2007), to a one whose stated goal is “to produce and export fine and aroma
cocoa” (FEDECADE-Max_Havellar, n/d) 20
The change in FEDECADE from a ‘confront-the-establishment’ to an ‘exportoriented multi-certified organization’ can be traced back to its 1997 involvement with the
environmentally oriented CYD, an Ecuadorian Quito-based non-gubernamental
organization (NGO). For the next 10 years, CYD acted as FEDECADE’s main
intermediary for international donors, launching several projects that were nominally
focused on maximizing farmer’s profits derived from Nacional cocoa plots. In these
projects proposals, the alliance among FEDECADE, CYD and international donors was
presented as ‘win-win’ sustainable development partnership operating under a set of—
assumed—shared values based in a common understating of the problématique of
Ecuadorian Cocoa. For the donors and NGOs, the development of an environmentally
oriented certification system for cocoa offered an opportunity to improve cocoa farmer’s
social and economic welfare while maintaining the provision of environmental services
coming out of Nacional shaded cocoa plots (Rios et al. 1997). The alternative
commercialization chain was to challenge the traditional middlemen commodity chain in
which farmers’ gate price per quintal [100 pounds or 45.35 kg] that was 63% (or less) of
the market price paid by the exporters in Guayaquil, with the ultimate goal of transferring
more resources to the farmers (Desarrollo 2000).

20

This transition from “trade-union” to “money-oriented” is criticized by some ex
FEDECADE members, some of which denounced FEDECADE’s Chacon Salinas
leadership because “it abandoned its role of opposing ‘cocoa exporters’ by becoming one
of them” (Vincente Pidrahita, interview with author, Vinces, 12/08/2007).
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For FEDECADE, the alliance with CYD and international donors offered an
opportunity to address what the agronomist Victor Chacon Salinas—then and now
FEDECADE President, and a cocoa producer on his own—has long contended were the
factors that keep small cocoa producers in poverty. Chacon Salinas, in an early 1990s
document identified four major problems for Ecuadorian cocoa production at the time:
lack of generation and transfer of technology; low gate prices caused by both a
malfunctioning local commercialization chain and worldwide cocoa overproduction; lack
of credits available for long term, seasonal crops like cocoa; and lack of a suitable cocoa
gene bank from which to identify and propagate suitable high yield Nacional cocoa
varieties (Chacon Salinas 1990). FEDECADE was hopeful that projects and other private
initiatives would be able to fill the aforementioned voids. It was also expected that these
projects would address the lingering issue of lowering quality of Ecuadorian cocoa
exports, given that the middlemen-mediated chain was said to focus on quantity, not
quality (Chacon Salinas 1990). Furthermore, by offering premiums for cocoa produced in
shaded plantations, Chacon Salinas (1990) expected that these developments would
provide incentives to protect the shade-grown Nacional cocoa ecosystem from the threats
of deforestation, soil erosion, and pollution.
The need for private intervention was amplified by the weakening of the
Ecuadorian state that followed neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. A series of changes
created a situation where there was no clear policy in place, given that new regulatory
bodies came into existence only to be replaced after a short tenure. For instance,
Ecuador’s Cocoa National Program (Programa Nacional del Cacao, PNCC) was closed in
1995 (Rosero 2002). Although financed since 1977 with a 0.5% tax over the FOB value
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of the cocoa exports, the PNCC has long struggled to fulfill its multiple roles of providing
extension services, building infrastructure, and conducting cocoa research and
development with a staff of just thirty extension agents to supply the needs of 58,618
farms (what amounted to 1,890 farms per extension agent) (Soria 1986). After being
deemed ineffective, in 1989 its regulatory role was delegated to the privately-run nonprofit Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Productos
Agropecuarios) (Redaccion Expreso 1991; Rosero 2002). The Stock Exchange was
financed with 1.5% of the value FOB of the cocoa exports (of which 0.4% of the FOB
were to be dedicated to develop and implement a cocoa quality certification system, and
1.1% of the FOB was designated for extension services). When cocoa production reached
a historical low in 1998, the efforts of “La Bolsa” were found lacking (Guayaquil 1999a),
and the government transferred quality-control and industry development functions to the
private Nacional Association of Cocoa Exporters (Asociacion Nacional de Exportadores
de Cacao, ANECACAO), which then was funded with 0.42% of the FOB value of the
exports (Rosero 2002). The PNCC extension services were also privatized, with
controversial results: (Rivera and Alex 2004; Wong 2006; Flores G. 2007).
The retrenchment of the State also influenced the price paid to cocoa producers.
Attempts to foment the local production of cocoa elaborates 21—such as cocoa liquor and
cocoa paste—were abandoned, after the system of export quotas and price subsidies (for
local processors) collapsed under pressure by farmers and exporters in the late 1980s
(Norero Gonzalez 1988). The Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Stock Exchange did
21

Cocoa elaborates, such as cocoa licour, cocoa paste and cocoa butter, are a value-added
intermediate-step in the industrial process that transforms cocoa beans into chocolate.
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not fulfill its promises of creating a “fair and transparent” market for agricultural
products, and instead tried (unsuccessfully) to remain in control of all cocoa transactions
(Guayaquil 1990).
After cocoa was withdrawn from the Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Stock
Market in 1999 (Guayaquil 1999b), Ecuador’s internal price for cocoa has been generally
set by supply and demand, with the base of a ‘referential’ price set daily by ANECACAO
using data from the Stock Exchanges in New York and London (Rosero, 2002). Farmer’s
gate price is then set by subtracting intermediation costs from this ANECACAO base
price; thus, the gate price is negatively correlated with the length of the
commercialization chain.
Small farmers were especially affected by the challenges posed by these
institutional changes. While deemed insufficient, the PNCC provided a source of advice
that farmers were likely to use on an ad hoc basis (Cesar Carrillo, interview with author,
Jesus Maria, 12/17/2007). Further institutional failure drove a severe decline of cocoa
quality, which in turn led to the 2005 International Cacao Organization decision to
downgrade Ecuador’ cocoa rating from 100% fine flavor cocoa to 75% (ICCO, 2006).
Thus, shaded Nacional plantations came to be seen as an agro-ecosystem under threat.
The CYD documents of the time mention that cocoa production was being conducted in
an “institutional void,” and suggested that development projects could address these
problems (Desarrollo 2000). In general, CYD and FEDECADE shared views about the
root causes of cocoa production problems, and had a common understanding about ways
to address these issues (Valdivieso 2008, Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with author,
July 2009). In this narrative, the decline of Nacional is attributed to agricultural factors
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such as low productivity (diseases and lack of resources to maintain and replace
plantations), and economic factors such as an oligopolistic internal cocoa market
dominated by a few exporters. The loss of cocoa quality was explained as the
consequence of a middlemen mediated commodity chain that did not transfer premiums
for quality to the farmers and the lack of a system to reward farmers for the value added
to Nacional cocoa beans for its fine cocoa quality, as well as for its environmental and
social benefits (Desarrollo 1998; Desarrollo 2001; Desarrollo 2000).
However, FEDECADE and CYD shared understanding did not cover all the
aspects of cocoa production. The conflict FEDECADE-CYD was centered on the cocoa
hybrid known as CCN-51, a full-sun variety developed by Homero U. Castro—a cocoabreeder with an on-and-off friendship with FEDECADE’s president (Victor Chacon
Salinas, interview with author, July 2009) 22. Chacon Salinas considered CCN-51’s high
yield and disease-resistance characteristics as important assets for increasing the income
of all cocoa farmers. Chacon Salinas opinion was informed by his years long experience
with cocoa23, and stand in contrast with 1997 CYD views of this full-sun variety.

22

In a paper found during field work, Homero U. Castro describes CCN 51 as a cross of
F1 of IMC-67 x ICS-95 by O-1, where O-1 was a cacao ascension collected by himself in
a trip to Ecuador's Valle de los Canelos (Castro 1981). According to this paper, CCN
stands for Coleccion Castro Naranjal, where 51 is for the cross number of this variety.
23

Chacon Salinas worked for several years as a cocoa field hand and general laborer
before acquiring his degree in Agronomy. As an agronomist, he was hired as Cocoa
Assessor for some of the large cocoa haciendas of the Naranjal area, among them Balao
Chico. During these years, Chacon Salinas carefully documented how plots planted with
directed hybrids or ‘selected’ clones of “Nacional” (EET series) and other varieties (ICS95; IMC 67, and SCA-12) routinely outperformed plots of ‘pure’ “Nacional” genotypes.
Plots planted with selected genetic materials had “very good” or “extremely good”
production, yielding 15-20 qq/ha year [681-909 kg/ha year] to those with ‘pure’ National
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Although CYD personnel acknowledged that CCN-51 has “superior agronomic
characteristics,” full-sun plantations were seen as a potential environmental threat under
the assumption that high yield was linked to the management practices of agro-industrial
“monocultures,” heavily dependent on inputs such as agrochemical and fertilizers (Rios
et al. 1997). The environmental and ecological value of Nacional shaded plantations was
spotlighted when comparing these biodiversity-rich agro ecosystems with other local
crops (i.e., bananas) in an area where forests were already depleted. The CYD believed
that a market niche could be carved for the fine Nacional cocoa, while CCN-51 would
have to compete with bulk cocoa (Desarrollo 2000).
After a slow 1995-1997 starting phase which emphasized the development of
ecological certification norms 24, FEDECADE centered projects took a drastic turn to
economic development and sustainable development. This shift was caused by the 19971998 El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which flooded Ecuadorian lowlands (UN,
1998). The 1997-1998 ENSO affected all of Ecuador’s regional economy ( i.e.,
agriculture, fisheries, shrimp farming, etc), causing losses that amounted to one quarter of
the total agricultural gross internal product (Vos et al. 1999). Twenty percent of the area
dedicated to cocoa was flooded, with a loss of 40,000 ha (out of a 1997 estimate of
340,000 ha). Even areas that were not flooded were affected by the proliferation of
diseases caused by increased humidity and lower luminosity (Vos et al. 1999). Indeed,
or natural hybrids which yielded 7-9 qq/ha year [318-409 kg/ha year] (Chacon Salinas
1983; Chacon Salinas 1986).
24

Compiled under the name of “Normas para la produccion agricola para cacao del
Programa de Certificacion Eco-O.K.” Aspects of this normative were later adopted by the
Conservation Agriculture Network, the Sustainable Agriculture Network, and the
Rainforest Alliance Certified Programs that evolved from this early effort.
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the 1998 harvest was 43% of the previous year, (see Figure 2), and by 1999 the number
of Ecuadorian poor is said to have drastically increased (Vos et al 1999). The economic
crisis forced farmers to look for other sources of cash, such as harvesting shade trees or
sending family members abroad (Interview with a farmer, Nueva Union Campesina,
2009) 25.
The effects of the 1998 ENSO are reflected in the narrative of the CYD projects
of the time. For example, in its project proposal to INTERMON (a Spanish socially
oriented fund) for a commercialization scheme, CYD mentions, “by establishing a
standardized and fair commercialization system, the project will improve the livelihood
of small farmers’ families” (Desarrollo 2000). In this project narrative, environmental
certification (which was the leading goal of previously executed projects) becomes a
“marketing tool” that “will allow for a better product positioning in potential international
markets” (Desarrollo 2001). The CYD narrative of the time makes economic
development intrinsically linked to preservation of Nacional cocoa plots, in a shift that
brings it in close alignment with FEDECADE’s concerns about farmers’ welfare
(Desarrollo 2001).
The key strategy for achieving these two goals was to increase farmers’ incomes
by improving farmers’ access to the markets. This required three components:
infrastructure to process and stock high quality cocoa beans; a group of farmers that had
the know-how about how to buy cocoa from other farmers and sell the beans to the

25

The economic welfare of all Ecuadorians was affected by 1999-2000 bank crisis (50%
of all banks were closed or transferred to a state agency); a government decree that
‘freeze’ half the savings of all Ecuadorians, and 2000 Ecuador’s adoption of the US
dollar as the country’s currency.
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exporters, while making turning a “fair” profit; and a commercialization system that
would be able improve the income of farmers by bypassing middlemen, with the ultimate
goal of exporting certified Nacional cocoa independently. This project was leveraged in
the unique “fine and flavored” quality of the Nacional beans, under the assumption that
high-end chocolate makers would be willing to pay a higher price for value-added beans.
Investing for Development I: Infrastructure; Training and Extension, and Research
and Development, 1995-2008
INTERMON and other donors agreed to finance the projects. The bulk of the
projects investment—accounting for US$781,200 (54.37% of the total invested until
2008)—was done from 1999 to 2004, in five years following the 1997-1998 ENSO (see
Table 1). Leveraged with a considerable local counterpart, estimated in US$567,000 in
goods and services 26, FEDECADE-CYD built three new stock centers: 3 de Octubre at
Rio Bonito (El Oro); Camacho and Rio Blanco at Luz y Guia Campesina (Azuay), helped
pre-associations and farmers groups to built “tendales” (large concrete surfaces used to
dry cocoa), and updated and upgraded four ex-PNCC stock centers that were ‘on-loan’ to
the cooperatives of El Progreso (PRO), Nueva Union Campesina (NUC), 6 de Julio
(6DJ), La Florida (LFL) y La Delicia. Investing in commercialization infrastructure
amounted to US$ 246,100 from international funds by May of 2003 (Desarrollo 2003).
Further investments in infrastructure were made to achieve organic and Fair Trade
certification (GTZ, 2002-2004, US$25,000). Also, FEDECADE and other Ecuadorian
26

For example, farmers from 3 de Octubre (Rio Bonito) (3DO), Camacho (CAM) and
Rio Blanco (Luz y Guia Campesina) donated land used to built stock centers; farmers
from Rio Bonito, Camacho, working under the shared-work arrangement known as
‘minga,’ built the stock centers themselves.
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farmer’s organizations received infrastructure investment from funds provided by the
food multinational Kraft, the German international development agency GTZ and the
Dutch international development agency DOEN—with the goal of increasing Ecuador’s
overall output of Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa in a project that extended to the year
2008 27.
As a result of these investments, by 2008 FEDECADE had a network of seven
stock centers for receiving and processing cocoa from the farmers. The cocoa was then
transported to the stock center in Nueva Union Campesina, where it was prepared for
exportation. The stock centers had the capacity for serving more than one community
(i.e., NUC stock center was stocking cocoa from NUC and 6DJ; LFL stock center was
serving LFL and ATAIB). At one time, all of these stock centers had state-of-the-art
multi-story cocoa fermenters, solar and gas dryers, and multi-certification compliant
storage facilities.
Simultaneously, the projects were training farmers to achieve the goals of
increasing production, becoming certified and commercializing certified cocoa
(Desarrollo 2000) 28. Thus, Training and Agricultural Extension accounts for 25% of the
amount invested by the Canadian development agency FECD projects AG-0528 and AG0622 (Desarrollo 2001; 1998); US$ 40,000 from the project “Sustainable cocoa and

27

Later on, Kraft started sourcing their RA certified cacao from plantations in Western
Africa.
28

While the main goal of the projects was to commercialize cocoa resources were
invested in topics of particular interest for the projects’ donor.
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livelihoods” funded by the U.S. based Overbrook Foundation and an undetermined
amount from the other projects.
It should be noted that not all of the resources from these projects were directly
invested in FEDECADE. The CYD operation was costly, given that it required
mobilizing personnel from Quito to the project area. The CYD counterparts desire for
control and accountability, expressed in setting a complex set of goals, procedures, and
standards in order to guarantee project execution, developed into a situation where the
cost for “project coordination” took as much as 50% of the budget of the amount invested
by the FECD AG-0528 and AG-0622 (Desarrollo 2001; 1998). Evidently, other projects
were more efficient but the cost of project administration remained high.
Overall, research and development was the component that received least
financing, being limited to US$25,000 (1.74% of the total invested until 2008) from
Overbrook Foundation in 2002 for the development of greenhouse-plastic-based solar
dryers (later adopted by most Ecuadorian cocoa processing facilities). Additionally, there
was approximately $5,000 from the FECD AG-0622 project that was used to identify and
replicate cocoa promissory local ecotypes (Desarrollo 2001). Other than this, there were
no investments in renovating plantations from the project side.
While it was not possible to establish a direct relation between the availability of
these training programs and extension services and yield increases, I found evidence that
shows yields in the area of study have certainly increased. In 1997, a sample of 30
farmers of the Canton Naranjal shows that the average yield was of 359 kg/ha year (this
included both Nacional and CCN-51 plots), with Nacional yielding 297.7 kg/ha year and
CCN-51 yielding 369.5 kg/ha year (ECU-B7 1997: 82-84). In my 2009 survey, a
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subsample of farmers located in the Canton Naranjal (n=66, 6 de Julio and Nueva Union
Campesina cooperatives) declared an average cocoa yield (counting both Nacional and
CCN-51 varieties) of 747.7 kg/ha year (n=66, SD 7.64), with Nacional plots yielding 354
kg/ha year (n=66, SD 3.93) and CCN-51 yielding 1100.9 kg/ha year (plantings over 5
years, n=50, SD 3.23).
Variety wise, my 2009 survey results indicate FEDECADE affiliated farmers
opted for CCN-51 instead of the more traditional Nacional. Of the farmers that have
plantings with CCN-51 (n=72), 65 (90%) reported having planted this area within the last
14 years, and 38 (52%) reported that their CCN-51 plantings were younger than 7 years
(which falls squarely within the time CYD projects were being executed). Of the 72
farmers in the survey, only one reported that 8 years ago he had planted a plot with cocoa
Nacional “de pepa” (from seed). The finding suggests that FEDECADE farmers
continued to plant CCN-51, although Nacional-focused projects were running in the area.
Thus, despite the large investments by multiple international agencies, farmers were not
willing to “put all their eggs in one basket,” preferring rather to maintain multiple cocoa
varieties.
Investing for development II: commercialization, 2002-2008
The FEDECADE commercialization system started operating in 2002, with a seed
fund consisting of $60,000 (US$10,000 per cooperative) from a no-interest, refundable
loan that was part of the Ecuadorian Canadian Development Fund (Fondo Ecuatoriano
Canadiense para el Desarrollo, FECD) 29 financed AG-0528 and AG-0622 projects, and
29

Then Fondo Ecuadoriano Canadiense para el Desarrollo (FECD); since 2005,
Fideicomiso Ecuatoriano para el Desarrollo (FECD)
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$25,000 from the Spanish-based INTERMON 3125 project (see Table 1). By 2003, these
early commercialization exercises were operating in all the cooperatives involved;
however, “El Progreso,” which was the starting point for this initiative, was selling its
cocoa to the Union of Cocoa Farmers’s Associations (Union de Organizaciones
Campesinas Cacaoteras del Ecuador, UNOCACE) (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview
with author, 12/05/2009) 30. Commercialization-ready cooperatives—such as “El
Progreso”—became a prize contested by the NGOs and IGOs involved. The thug-of-war
among development institutions undermined federated bodies such as FEDECADE.
The belief that chocolate makers would be willing to pay for Nacional beans
proved partially true: FEDECADE found clients willing to pay premiums for certified
Nacional beans, but these clients were also looking for high quality beans with better than
the norm post-harvest treatment (Pierrick Chouard, interview with author, April 2010).
The first commercialization scheme, which involved buying dry cocoa beans from the
farmers, was abandoned when it was found that this practice lead to irregular cocoa
batches. After a troublesome first experience supplying cocoa to Vintage Chocolates—
which was the first company to launch a Rainforest Alliance-certified Nacional chocolate
bar back in 2004—FEDECADE and CYD found that quality-wise the best results were
achieved if farmers deliver unprocessed “cacao en baba” (wet cocoa beans) to the stock
centers, and then the stock center fermented and dried the beans uniformly. While this
practice was not new—given that around 10.9% of the farmers previously wet cocoa
30

UNOCACE was founded in 1999 and started commercializing cocoa in 2002. This
organization was financed as a final-product of the European Union-CIRAD-Ecuadorian
Ministry of Agriculture Project ECU-B7 3010/93/176, “Reactivacion de la produccion y
mejora de la calidad de cacao en Ecuador” (ECU-B7 1997).
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beans —most of them preferred to do the post-harvest themselves because middlemen
generally took a larger discount from the price than from dried or semi-dried cocoa
(ECU-B7 1997).
The response of FEDECADE to these concerns was to deal with the farmers as
fairly as possible, running experiments to find a fair “wet-to-dry” conversion ratio and
paying a higher overall price. On the other hand, management cost per bean increased,
given that now the stock centers assumed the costs (labor and inputs) of post-harvest
management. Thus, while in 2003 and 2004 FEDECADE management costs averaged
US$ 0.03 to 0.04 per kg of dry cocoa beans (2%-3% of the stock centers expenses), from
2005 to 2008 the management cost averaged in the range of US$ 0.16 to US$ 0.33 per kg
of dry cocoa beans (11% to 13% of the stock center expenses).
By 2004, it become evident that the commercialization funds secured from the
INTERMON 3125 and FECD AG-0528/AG-0627 development projects did not cover the
needs of the stock centers. Cocoa farmers were adamant about cash-on-delivery
transactions, and sometimes would take their beans to another place if there was no cash
to pay for their crop—even if their farm was certified.
High expectations were raised with the 2004 creation of the Citibank Foundation
financed 31 FEDECADE’s Trust Fund for Cocoa Commercialization (FTFCC). According
to CYD, the FTFCC was a financial tool that was designed to grant FEDECADE access
to international capital (Valdivieso S. 2008). Cocoa production is seasonal, so
FEDECADE only needed a loan from July to December of each year; at the time,
31

In this case, the financing consisted assuming the legal costs to establish the Trust
Fund, not a cash donation.
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Ecuador’s local banking system did not have the flexibility to grant credits for this sort of
ventures (Valdivieso S. 2008). Root Capital, (previously known as Ecological Financial)
a U.S. based non-profit social investment fund that specialized in providing capital for
rural communities—and that had previously financed FEDECADE under a personal
guarantee from Chacon Salinas—became the FTFCC’s first partner. Starting with
US$150,000 in 2004 (Krenke 2004), in 2006, Root Capital loaned US$300,000 to the
FTFCC at a yearly interest rate of 9% (at the time, the interest rate for a commercial
credit in Ecuador was 12-15%) (Estudios 2006); in 2007, it loaned the FTFCC
US$400,000; and in 2008, it loaned the FTFCC US$300,000.
From 2004 to 2008, Root Capital funded the FTFCC on a non-conditional basis:
credit was granted to FEDECADE (via FTFCC) to buy cocoa, FEDECADE associations
stocked cocoa, and FEDECADE sold their stocks to the best offer it could find in the
market. Produbanco, the local partner of Citibank, managed the cash flow between
farmers, the exporters, and the FTFCC. Root Capital-financed FTFCC granted
FEDECADE cooperatives and associations the flexibility to draft weekly loans, based on
estimates of cocoa local availability. These week-by-week loans allowed the stock
centers to pay farmers in cash, which was necessary if they were to remain competitive.
Root Capital’s loan repayment was guaranteed by the FTFCC structure, which collected
revenue from FEDECADE’s cocoa exports to Europe or US clients (Krenke 2004).
From 2004 to 2007, FEDECADE’s commercialization system enjoyed a period of
rapid growth because of the availability of low-interest credit, previous investments in
infrastructure and training, the ability to source Organic, Fairtrade and Rainforest
Alliance certified cocoa beans, and strategic NGO and IGO mediated relationships with
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chocolate manufacturers such as Hoja Verde (Ecuador), ICAM (Italy), Kraft (U.S.),
Vivani (Germany), Vintage (US), and with cocoa exporters COFINA and CAFIESA.
Using FCFCC capital, FEDECADE’s stock centers were able to process higher amounts
of cocoa beans, from 17,081 kg of beans per stock center (2 centers for 34,162 kg
overall) in 2003 to a maximum of 52,267 kg per stock center in 2007 (261,339 kg
overall).
However, in 2008 the stock centers saw a fall to slightly over 2004 levels, with
24,734 kg of cocoa processed in each of the stock centers involved (74,204 kg of cocoa
overall). This fall was caused by several factors. First, cocoa international prices changed
rapidly. Second, FEDECADE lost clients when some chocolate makers opted to
substitute fine-certified cocoa for cheaper alternatives.
The year of 2008 saw drastic changes in the price of cocoa. The ICCO statistics
show that prices went from US$ 3021.76 per MT (US$ 3.02 per kg) in June of 2008 to a
low of US$ 2067.72 per MT (US$2.06 per kg) in December of that year. This downfall
implied that FEDECADE’s stock centers were buying conventional cocoa that they
would later sell at loss. The managers of some stock centers opted for suspending
commercialization for a “a week or two, to see if the prices stabilized” (Anonymous
farmer, NUC, Dec 2009). The wait-and-see strategy minimized losses, but reduced the
volume of transactions—thus the drastic fall on the amount of cocoa processed.
The market for premium cocoa beans from FEDECADE (Organic and Rainforest
Alliance) was unfavorably affected by higher prices. Chocolate manufacturers became
reluctant to stock value-added fine certified cocoa. Some manufacturers discontinued fine
chocolate products (i.e. Hersheys’ Grand Reserve); others substituted extra-premium
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certified fine cocoa for cheaper alternatives, or fall back into chocolate lines made with a
mixture of fine and bulk cocoa.
The market for Rainforest Alliance cocoa beans shows how this substitution
occurs and how it affects producers of fine cocoa. In 2006 and 2007 Kraft Food Inc. was
an important FEDECADE client—buying several MT of RA certified fine cocoa. In
2007 Kraft diversified its suppliers to include plantations in Ivory Coast (Africa) that
Rainforest Alliance had recently certified. The supply of Ivory Coast Rainforest Alliance
certified grew cocoa rapidly, as farmers joined a project financed by a partnership
between Kraft, GTZ, USAID and others (among them the cocoa trader Armajaro 32) (Staff
2007) 33. In 2008, Kraft did not source RA certified cocoa from FEDECADE, and other
Ecuadorian farmer’s organizations that had been supplying cocoa for this company (i.e.,
Aroma Amazonico). Felipe Noboa, then CYD’s project director for the Kraft-GTZ
project, mentioned that Kraft withdrawal was in part because of quality issues—the
batches of cocoa it was receiving were irregular 34 and that Kraft “did not really embrace
the project” (Felipe Noboa, phone interview with author, September 2010).

32

In 2010, Armajaro’s business tactics became a subject of controversy in cocoa trading
circles. In 2010, this company managed to stock 7% of the worldwide supply of cocoa
beans; this behavior was denounced as one of the causes that drove cocoa prices to an
historical high. According to a N.Y. Times article, Armanjaro also bid heavily in cocoa
stock futures, and has been accused of “intentionally” manipulating the price of cocoa
beans (Werdigier and Creswell 2010).
33

The Ivory Coast RA-certified list of suppliers grew from 355 farmers in January of
2007 to 2039 farmers in Fall of 2009 (Hahn and Vogel 2009).
34

A fact that is not surprising given Kraft was sourcing cocoa from Western and Eastern
Ecuador.
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Rainforest Alliance, in a report on “Overseas Demand for Ecuadorian Cocoa”
done under contract for the U.S.-based Chemonics, Inc. for the U.S. AID’s Sustainable
Forest and Coast Initiative, concludes that the “GTZ/Kraft public private partnership”
shows that “certification alone is not enough to guarantee sustained access to premium
markets” given that not all the producers groups recruited for this initiative were able to
meet Kraft’s quality criteria. Rainforest Alliance also reported that Kraft would not buy
more cocoa from Ecuador until their stocks became depleted (Rainforest Alliance
2009:19).
The demand for Fair Trade-Organic cocoa held well, and FEDECADE increased
its output of this double-certified beans from 29500 kg in 2007 (11% of its 2007 output of
261339 kg) to 56236 kg in 2008 (75.78% of its 2008 output of 74,204 kg). However, the
rise on FT/Organic output was not enough to compensate for losing the RA and ‘plain’
Organic markets. Thus, while in 2007 the stock centers generated an overall profit of US$
16146.66, in 2008 it operation generated profits of just US$ 492.20.
In 2009, as a response to international credit restrictions and what they saw as
“chaos in the international cocoa prices” (William Foote, phone interview with author,
April 2010), Root Capital asked FEDECADE to secure a future sales cocoa contract
before granting a loan for 60% share of the value of the crop (Christian Pineda, interview
with author, September 2009; William Foote, phone interview with author, April 2010).
Future sales contracts are a standard requirement on Root’s loans that had been waived
previously. However, the cocoa market conditions made Root “less confident” of
FEDECADE’s ability to find markets (William Foote, phone interview with author,
2010). Indeed, this condition was not met by FEDECADE. Although from June of 2009
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to December of 2009 FEDECADE’s was avidly looking for a viable commercialization
partner it found that the premiums offered for even multi-certified cocoa did not cover
even the stock centers cocoa processing expenses. For example, while from 2005 to 2007
FEDECADE secured an average premium of US$405 per MT (US$0.4 per kg), in 2009 it
received an offer with a premium of US$22 per MT (US$ 0.02 per kg), which was not
enough to cover post-harvest and export costs (Christian Pineda, interview with author,
September 2009). After stocking cocoa at record prices during 2008, buyers were trying
to pay less. This is a strategy to average the values of their existing holdings. Under these
conditions, FEDECADE’s General Assembly decided that it was not possible to
commercialize cocoa. The Assembly also released FEDECADE’s associations so each
could negotiate deals with other commercialization schemes 35.
The [unexpected] results of development projects
The results of the evaluation of FEDECADE commercialization system (FCS) are
shown in Table 2 and 3. The FCS transferred revenues for farmers in two ways: as
members of a cooperative or association who shared on the profits and premiums of the
commercialization, and as individuals who received a higher price for their product.
With regard to the first method of revenue generation, FEDECADE data shows
that from 2003 to 2008 the commercialization system generated profits for US$
93,374.08 for the eight cooperatives and associations involved (see table 3). However,
FEDECADE’s strategy of delegating day-to-day tasks to each association’s
administration (namely their commercialization committees) resulted in varied financial

35

In 2010, LFL and CAM secured cocoa contracts with UROCAL.
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performance: some of the committees became adept at generating profits, others
struggled to stay even and some turned net losses (see Table 4 and Figure 3). Overall, the
stock centers were profitable only 62% of the time they operated. Gross profit and loss
margin (GPLM=(P&L*100)/Total Sales) vary widely by years and
associations/cooperatives; on average, the stock centers GPLM was 3.99% per year (SD
7.6%), with a maximum profit of 23.75% GPLM recorded for 3DO in 2005, and a record
loss of 8.35% GPLM for CAM in 2008. The FEDECADE attempted to regulate the
management of the stock centers by developing and implementing internal regulations of
increasing complexity. 36 The regulations nevertheless failed to guarantee the profitability
of the stock centers. Current and former committee members I interviewed coincide that
“learning the cocoa trade” required of them to learn to judge the quality of cocoa in a way
that outsmarted the exporters “calificador” 37 when buying fermented and dried cocoa
beans (2003-2004) (Anonymous farmer, interview with author, 6DJ). However, they also
said that they had to use the same skills to judge the cocoa of their fellow associates—
thus becoming what producers nicknamed “our own middleman” (Anonymous farmer,
interview with author, 6DJ). Buying wet cocoa was simpler, given that ‘fairness’
involved experimentation that lead to a empirical/objective conversion rate applied when
36

Thus, the first commercialization experiments were run under a short set of written
rules (119 words) (Desarrollo 2000); the 2005 CYD-edited “Guide for
commercialization” amounted to 1262 words (Desarrollo 2005), and the 2006
FEDECADE’s “Commercialization norms” totaled 2513 words.
37

A “calificador” is a specially trained employee that is in charge of evaluating the
quality of each lot of cocoa beans. This is a critical function, given that these people
strive for judging the quality of cocoa on the spot, using little or none equipment to assess
the worthiness (in quality terms) of a cocoa lot in a way that secures profits for the
exporter without disgruntling cocoa sellers.
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buying wet raw cocoa for post harvest processing by the association. Stock centers found
that they needed to adjust their conversion rates for summer or winter, and by location:
the conversion rate for “cacao de playa” (0-100 meters above sea level) was not the same
as for “cacao de monte” (100-400 meter above sea level) (Anonymous farmer, interview
with author, NUC). The main issue with this need for learning and experimentation is that
it remained a localized activity: this hard-won expertise was not institutionalized and
remained part of individuals’ experience, which mean that each stock center crew had to
“learn” by themselves every time they were replaced.
The second way in which the commercialization transferred resources to farmers
was by paying a higher gate price than was paid in the local market. On average, I
estimated that from 2003 to 2008 FEDECADE’s average gate price was US$405 per MT
(US$ 0.405 per kg) higher than the market gate price. After its six years run,
FEDECADE had transferred US$ 418,378 to the farmers that sold cocoa to the stock
centers, for an average of US$ 69,729 per year. The investment by international donors,
of US$ 1,436,738 according to CYD data, would have been recovered if the
commercialization scheme had worked for another fourteen years.
The commercialization system of FEDECADE did benefit farmers that were not
part of a FEDECADE’s affiliated association. First, the stock centers bought cocoa from
these farmers, under the “commercial partners” umbrella. This cocoa—which was not
certified under any scheme—was sold directly to the exporters as “cacao convencional”
(non-certified, without premium), although the stock centers’ processing costs were the
same as for ‘certified’ cocoa. However, the stock centers paid a higher than average price
to these farmers, thus this trade segment—which FEDECADE saw as fulfilling its social
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role—generated marginal profits (at best) and losses in some cases. Second, the stock
centers—with their direct links to exporters and chocolate manufacturers—became
regional price setters, against whom local intermediaries had to compete in order to
remain in the business. For instance, Justo Paucar, who was the President of the 3DO
association for the 2004-2005 period remembers that “after the stock centers opened, the
middleman had to pay twice as much for a can 38 of cocoa as before: they paid up to $16
per can, when before they were paying just about $8.” He said that [the mood at the stock
center] “was like a party,” with people coming from everywhere and taking turns to sell”
(Justo Paucar, interview with the author, Rio Bonito/3 de Octubre, October 2009).
Farmers remember these days fondly; in the 2009 survey, 29% of FEDECADE farmers
mentioned that selling fermented and dried cocoa to the stock centers was advantageous
to their household income even though the stock centers had been closed for at least one
year 39. In this sense, the FEDECADE commercialization system was successful at
challenging the intermediaries mediated commodity chain.
Even at the peak of FEDECADE’s operation, some intermediaries remained in the
area. Most of them did so because they were the only source of out-of-cocoa-season loans
for farmers. Farmers developed a split share approach towards the stock centers and the
intermediaries. They sold a share of their crop to the stock centers attracted by the overall
higher price, but designated another share to the intermediaries because of this loan-

38

A “can” (Lata in Espanish) is a volumetric measure for wet cacao. Roughly, 6 cans of
wet cacao yield 45 kg of dry beans (1 quintal or 100 pounds).
39

On the other hand, in my 2009 survey just 29% of the farmers reported that they were
fermenting cocoa, given that the middlemen did not ‘pay’ extra for this labor.
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granting role (Pedro Flores and Domingo Mendoza, interview with author, November
2009). These cash-for-crop loans are informal arrangements in which the farmer pays for
the loan by selling his or her cocoa to the loan makers. Although these loans are
nominally interest-free, middlemen extract profits out of negotiating price, and
discounting weight to remain profitable (“les da machete en peso y precio,” [cuts down
the price and plays with the weight], in the words of Pedro Flores and Domingo
Mendoza, 2009). The CYD and FEDECADE were aware of farmers’ dependence of
these paid-with-crop loans, but after the collapse of 6DJ commercialization (where
internally-issued loans that were not repaid) these institutions shunned granting loans to
farmers (FEDECADE 2004a; FEDECADE 2004b; Desarrollo 2005). By 2009,
intermediaries in the FEDECADE area were operating as they were before the projects
started 40.
On the down side, FEDECADE’s incursion on cocoa exporting also exposed the
associations to the risks of price-volatility. Stocking cocoa in a period where prices are
going down could easily wipe out the profits of a year, because the price of sale could be
lower than the price the association had paid for the cocoa (Anonymous farmer, NUC,
2009). The price paid to the unaffiliated “socios comerciales” was another source of
internal discord. The stock centers paid the same price for the “cacao convencional”
(non-certified) of the unaffiliated farmers as for the “cacao convencional” of the affiliated
ones. Some farmers thought that there was a level of unfairness (towards the association’s
farmers) in granting a fair price to individuals that did not cope with the burdens of

40

See Chapter 4 for a description of FEDECADE farmers in 2009.
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belonging to the associations (i.e., going to meetings, working in the association centers,
etc) (Anonymous farmer, NUC, 2009). Other farmers were concerned because “cacao
convencional” did not receive any premium, but processing costs were the same
(Anonymous farmer, NUC, 2009). My informant concluded that trading “conventional”
presented diminishing returns to the stock center, given that their processing costs for
non-premium or premium cacao were the same.
The administrative tasks of FEDECADE were also increasingly driven by the
needs of being certified. Each certification system required a dedicated database of
certified farmers, among other records. Also, the FEDECADE assumed the daunting task
of training farmers in these programs, in conditions where 68.9% of the farmers had just
an elementary school education and 8.7% were not able to write or read at all (ECU-B7
1997). Some of these producers had to be aware and comply with the “internal”
regulations for the organic certification (4100 words) (FEDECADE 2004b), the
Rainforest Alliance certification (6200 words) (FEDECADE 2004a), and/or Fair Trade
certification (a brief one page document).
Some stock center personnel reported that “certification traceability requirements”
were in conflict with their “post-harvest management/quality procedures” (Anonymous
farmer, NUC, 2009). The conflict was born of the fact that cocoa fermentation (a critical
step to achieve high quality beans) requires a large wet cocoa mass (at least 100 kg) but
certification requirements asked for separate processing for smaller batches (Anonymous
farmer, NUC, 2009). Thus, the stock centers were faced with contradictory demands that
implied sacrificing quality (a selling point) in favor of a certification requirement
(traceability).
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The operation of the commercialization systems was another point of contention
for the associations. In two cases, changes in an association’s directive resulted in those
association dropping out of the commercialization system. In the case of 6DJ, the
previous directive had granted loans to farmers to secure cocoa in the face of loangranting by intermediaries. A faction of the cooperative’s farmers ran for elections under
the argument that these “debts” should be covered using the cooperative’s
commercialization profits. When this group won, it canceled individual farmers’ debts.
The commercialization fund was depleted, and it closed operations. The response of CYD
and FEDECADE to this problem was to ban the diversion of funds from
commercialization to other uses. This norm was generally accepted until 2008, when the
NUC directive used part of its funds to acquire a lot to build a police force Immediate
Response Center (Puesto de Auxilio Inmediato, PAI) 41. This was done because early that
year several NUC farmers had been victims of violent crime (armed robbery) in their own
homes. In this case, FEDECADE considered that this diversion of funds was an internal
matter.
In a second example of internal struggle, FEDECADE’s internal norms specified
that the commercialization committee was made up of each Association’s elected
President and Treasurer. Thus, the “know-how” of an incumbent directive could be lost if
they were not reelected. This was the case of 3DO, which in 2005 generated a GPLM of
41

Ecuador Police’ is chronically underfunded, so it has limited ability to build new
infrastructure. In order to house troopers in a place, the community has to build (from
scratch) their own PAI. Once the PAI is build, the police normally assign a few troopers
and a vehicle to it. In NUC case, the main benefit of a PAI was that they believed that
police response time will go down to five to ten minutes (from the 30 minutes or more
that it took police to come from Naranjal).
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24%. A faction within the association argued (among other points) that this margin was
too high, and that profits should be transferred to the farmers instead of the stock center
fund. This group won the early 2006 election. However, in 2006, under the new directive
3DO stock center suffered a 3% loss of the total sales. In 2007, this stock center turned a
profit of 4% of the total sales. In 2008, this association did not operate at all (3DO
farmers sold their cocoa to other FEDECADE centers) (Justo Paucar, interview with the
author, Rio Bonito/3 de Octubre, October 2009).
Lessons learned: shades of gray in a development program
In summary, from 1995 to 2008 the farmers affiliated with FEDECADE were the
recipients of a loosely coordinated multi-year development program directed by an
Ecuadorian NGO, supported by donations from a heterogeneous set of international
donors, and commercial loans from a socially-aware investment fund. This program’s
overall goal was to increase the income of farmers planting shade-grown Nacional cocoa,
an endemic Ecuadorian variety that was deemed endangered by technological and
economic developments. In 2009, after 6 years of operation, FEDECADE’s
commercialization system ceased to operate. The project had achieved its generic goal of
increasing cocoa output per unit of area, and in increasing farmer’s income by creating an
alternative commercialization system that transferred revenues from cocoa exports
directly to the farmers. This alternative commodity chain gave farmers an attractive outlet
for their products, and forced intermediaries to rationalize their profitability. By
leveraging FEDECADE’s activities with low-interest international capital, CYD project
acted as an agent of change at the local market and thus apparently harnessed the forces
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of capitalism in benefit of cocoa farmers. However, in 2009, a series of internal and
external factors forced FEDECADE to stop its activity.
This failure can be explained in several ways. From a structural point of view,
even the best-financed multi-certified small farmers association is at a clear disadvantage
in relation to the power of multinational corporations. The collapse of FEDECADE’s RA
certified cocoa market, after Kraft Foods Inc. started to source RA cocoa from West
Africa, shows how the worldwide race for achieving certification actually benefits
multinational companies which have the ability to source commodities from the lowest
cost (or most convenient) supplier. Certification-based alternative trade systems, which
were heralded as the great and promising alternative to the multinational dominated
commodity chain, have become a victim of their own success. Quoting an anonymous
respondent to a Rainforest Alliance conducted survey: “the price benefit of certification
only works if demand outstrips supply” (Rainforest Alliance 2009: 20). With producers
all over the world vying for a “label” to give them a market edge, FEDECADE’s
experience suggest that certified products have become just another commodity subject to
cycles driven by supply and demand. Furthermore, when fine cocoa becomes too
expensive, chocolate makers substitute fine cocoa for cheaper bulk cocoa and spices—as
they have been doing since Venezuelan and Mexican “Criollos” were substituted with the
less-well regarded Ecuadorian Nacional and when Nacional was substituted with West
Africa and Brazil Forasteros (Alden 1976).
Questions can also be raised about FEDECADE’s approach towards
commercialization, which called for selling cocoa to the highest bidder. As advertised by
CYD, this highest-bidder-approach generated revenues in the short term. However, in
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2009 FEDECADE was not able to secure a purchase order because it lacked a strategic
partner. Meanwhile, other FEDECADE-like organizations continued to work, favored by
their long-term relationship with one buyer (i.e., UNOCACE with the French firm Kaoka
(Interview with Freddy Cabello, UNOCACE manager, Quito, December 2009).
FEDECADE’s example also raises doubts about the viability of pairing
developing-country organizations with global financial partners. In these relationships,
the burden of risk is carried by those in developing economies. When Root deemed
FEDECADE’s cocoa business was “too risky,” it pulled out (Foote, 2010). FEDECADE
was not able to find other financer for the FTFCC, which led to its inability to operate in
2009. While external factors—the worldwide 2007-2008 economic crisis—are the
underlying causes of Root’s credit restriction, this illustrates the power differential that
exists between financers and producers, and certainly points to the vulnerability of the
developing country partners in these alliances. Finally, FEDECADE’s experience also
shows the failings of leveraging development on what remains a commodity, subject to
the whims of the international markets. Cocoa prices and stocks have been fluctuating
wildly in the global markets, reaching historical heights only to fall vertiginously. The
behavior of Northern stockholders, from small investors to the Armajaro Hedge Fund,
have deep repercussions on the livelihoods (and hopes) of commodity-producing farmers
in the developing world. Thus, successful commodity-based development programs
exacerbate rural communities’ exposure to these risks.
Internally, the uneven performances of FEDECADE’s stock centers highlight the
perils of imposing a for-profit capitalistic enterprise on top of locally existing socialcapital-based structures. FEDECADE’s associations and cooperatives respond to the
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concerns of their constituents, with directives elected by a majority of the votes. On the
other hand, the stock centers were thought to behave as a community-based enterprise,
generating profits for the benefit of the community. FEDECADE’s answer for the
challenge of sustaining internal governance for a revenue-generating venture—
delegating the stock center management to each community elected directive—responded
to a belief in self-determination at the association level. However, as the case of 6DJ
illustrates, the stock centers became hostages of internal politics, with groups within the
Association bidding for control of the source of revenue (or rents from debt forgiveness).
The second failing of FEDECADE’s answer was that the hard-won human capital (as
experience gained by working in commercialization) was lost in democratic elections. It
can be argued that some of the stock center failures could have been avoided if its
administration would have been set up with some degree of independence from the
associations’ directives. From one perspective, CYD’s timid attempt to push
FEDECADE towards capitalism was certainly insufficient. From the other, these findings
also suggest an ongoing struggle for defining terms and conditions under which
development projects operate. On one side stand the values and goals of the NGOs and
their international counterparts; on the other side, stand the values and goals of the
farmers. While there are points of commonality among these voices, it is worth
remembering that the funders, co-opted by a prodding NGO intermediary, decide which
projects are financed. Local failures—such as that of FEDECADE— are the result of
imposing a problem-solving agenda, which does not incorporate local viewpoints. On the
other hand, these results show structural failures in the conceptualization of alternative
trade. As alternative trade captures a larger share of production, it becomes
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commoditized; thus, these efforts become a victim of their own success. FEDECADE’s
Fair Trade experience is also instructive, because although this market held it was not
large enough to keep the system operating. Also, basic business management concepts—
such as profitability, revenue generation, and how to achieve economies of scale—seem
to have been lacking from the technological expertise transferred to FEDECADE.
Finally, the results of the survey indicate that CYD and international donors have
not succeeded at convincing farmers to remain wedded to Nacional. Only one out of the
100 farmers I interviewed replanted his farm with Nacional, and that was done eight
years ago. Meanwhile, in the last seven years (within the period of execution of the
projects) 38 farmers had renovated their plantations using CCN-51 (out of 100). These
data suggest that even when the stock centers paid premium prices for Nacional, farmers
were voicing their choice for agricultural intensification by planting CCN-51. Farmers’
assessment was probably guided by three facts: CCN-51 yields three times as much
cocoa per unit of area as Nacional; the market gate price for both varieties remains the
same, and finally, trading CCN-51 does not require fulfilling strict and contradictory
regulations at all, and can be conducted even if stock centers are closed.
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Figure 1. Area of Study. Ecuador, the Western lowlands (Costa), APOV and FEDECADE associations and cooperatives.
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Figure 2. Ecuadorian cocoa production statistics, 1961-2009. (a) Area harvested
(ha/year). (b) Production by year (tonnes/year). (c) Yield by area (kg/ha/year). Source:
FAOSTAT 2010; ANECACAO 2010.
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Figure 3. FEDECADE profit and loss margin as percentage of sales box plot for all
associations/cooperatives by year, where × marks average profit and loss margin, box is
represents first and third quartile, and error bars show inter-associations variability.
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Table 1. Investing in FEDECADE: Year of execution, project title, donors, and project amounts in US$.

Year
1996

Project title
Establishment of cocoa certification system

19961998

Development of cocoa commercialization
system and creation of ecological
certification norms FOES-154E [152]
Construction of a cocoa stock center and a
cocoa commercialization business
INTERMON 3125
Cacao's production and commercialization
improvement AG-0528

19992000
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19992001
20012004
20052006
20062007
20062008

Production and commercialization of fine
and aroma cacao in Ecuador's South
Western Region AG-0622
Establishment of certified cocoa chain of
custody
Sustainable cocoa and livelihoods
Expand and create production and
management structures and competencies of
1500 small scale cocoa producers in order
to increase production and exportation of
Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa from
Ecuador

Donor
Earth Love
Fund
EcuadorianSwiss Fund

Country of
origin
UK
Switzerland

Local
TOTAL
counterparts PROJECT
Donor ($) ($)†
($)
$5,000
$2,500
$7,500
$81,538*

$25,000*

$106,538

$125,000*

$5,000*

$130,000

INTERMON
3125

Spain

Ecuadorian
Canadian
Fund
Ecuadorian
Canadian
Fund
Overbrook
Foundation
Overbrook
Foundation
Kraft-RAGoldamnDOEN

Canada

$307,500

$243,600

$551,100

Canada

$348,700

$319,680

$668,380

US

$40,000

$12,500

$52,500

US

$20,000

$30,000

$50,000

$235,000

$200,000

$435,000

Germany,
US,
Netherland

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Year
20062008

Project title
Expand and create production and
management structures and competencies
of 1500 small scale cocoa producers in
order to increase production and
exportation of Rainforest Alliance
certified cocoa from Ecuador

Country of
Donor
origin
Deutsche
Germany
Gesellschaft für
Technische
Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ)

Local
TOTAL
counterparts PROJECT
Donor ($)
($)†
($)
$189,000
$200,000
$389,000
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TOTAL INVESTMENT
$1,436,738 $1,103,280 $2,540,018
†This amount was the cash value of local contributions to the projects, donated by FEDECADE’s members (land and work),
FEDECADE’s local NGO partner (at the time, Conservacion y Desarrollo), or by other agencies. * Estimated value, given that
amounts were originally reported in sucres (S/.) (by 1999, Ecuador adopted US$ as a currency, to the conversion factor of
US$1=S/. 25000).
Source: Archives of Conservacion y Desarollo (Quito, Ecuador) (2010); Archives of FEDECADE (Jesus Maria, Ecuador) (2009).

Table 2. Average commercialization parameters for FEDECADE commercialization system, 2003 to 2007.
Years
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Parameters
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
A Associations/Coops (n)
2
4
5
6
5
3
†
B Assoc. gate price (AGP) (US$ per kg)
1.29
1.29
1.53
1.81
2.05
2.60
†
C Assoc. sale price (ASP) (US$ per kg)
1.37
1.36
1.91
2.20
2.56
2.97
D FOB price (US$ per kg)‡
1.71
1.45
1.45
1.61
2.38
2.50
††
E Market gate price (MGP) (US$ per kg)
1.17
0.96
1.03
1.27
1.69
2.02
F Cocoa bought (kg)
34965.29 112675.28 206979.15 241099.32 270175.94
79719.73
G Cocoa sold (kg)
34162.78 107012.70 209740.91 227097.05 261339.68
74204.54
H Management losses (% of D)
3.24%
3.04%
-0.97%
2.58%
4.82%
2.50%
I Management cost (US$ per kg)
0.03
0.04
0.19
0.16
0.33
0.22
†
‡
††
Sources: Archives of Fedecade 2009; Anecacao 2010; 2004: Guayaquil 2004; 2005-2007: FAO (2010) gate price - US$10;
2008: Guayaquil 2008

Table 3. Expenses; sales; profit and loss, and estimated revenue (in US$) for farmers for FEDECADE commercialization system,
2003 to 2007.
Commercialization profit and loss
J Expenses [(B*F)+(I*G)] (US$)
K Sales (C*G) (US$)
L Profit & loss (P&L) (US$)
M P&L as % sales [(L/K)*100]

2003
46536.26
47422.41
886.15
1.87%

2004
147555.56
145404.09
-2151.47
-1.48%

Years

2005
2006
2007
2008
362657.01 459686.76 646773.29 216760.61
400313.99 500030.31 662919.95 217252.81
37656.98
40343.55
16146.66
492.20
9.41%
8.07%
2.44%
0.23%
Years

Total
1879969.48
1973343.56
93374.08
20.53%
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Revenue for farmers (estimated)
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total
N Farmer's sales at AGP (B*F)
45223.26 145629.62 315720.22 435639.29 552932.16 207580.96 1702725.51
(US$)
O Farmer's sales at MGP (E*F)
40763.88 107872.04 212158.67 307351.17 455360.43 160840.53 1284346.71
(US$)
P Revenue (estimated) (N-O)
4459.37
37757.59 103561.55 128288.12 97571.73
46740.43
418378.80
(US$)
Sources: † Archives of Fedecade 2009; ‡ Anecacao 2010; †† 2004: Guayaquil 2004; 2005-2007: FAO (2010) gate price - US$10;
2008: Guayaquil 2008.

Table 4. Profit and loss margin 2003-2008 for all cooperatives and associations involved
with FEDECADE commercialization system
Year
Cooperative or
Association
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
NUC
3.76% -3.37%
6.06%
8.30%
-2.43%
5.83%
LFL
• -2.04%
1.31% 14.36% 10.55% -0.70%
CAM
• -5.44% 19.67% 11.97%
6.69% -8.34%
6DJ
-3.11%
4.64%
1.45%
†
†
†
3DO
•
•
23.75%
-2.60%
3.87%
†
PRO
•
•
•
2.31%
‡
‡
ROS
•
•
•
0.87%
†
†
FRT
•
•
•
•
2.48%
‡
NUC: Cooperative Nueva Union Campesina; LFL: Cooperative La Florida; CAM:
Association Camacho (Luz y Guia Campesina); 6DJ: Cooperative 6 de Julio; 3DO:
Association 3 de Octubre; PRO: Association El Progreso; ROS: Association Rosalino
Ortega; FRT: Association Frutas Tropicales. Notes: • Cooperative or association was not
yet incorporated to the commercialization system; † coop/assoc. did not participate in any
associative commercialization system; ‡ coop/assoc. continued trading cocoa
independently or by joining an associative commercialization system other than
FEDECADE’s. Sources: Archives of FEDECADE 2009.
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CHAPTER IV.
COCOA FARMER’S LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES
Introduction and Background
Practitioners of sustainable development—in their search for a way to meet the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
theirs—attempt to make development environmentally, socially and economically
sustainable. What is not to like about finding ways to allow people to satisfy needs in
ways in which benefits and tradeoffs are negotiated among equals, goes the argument. On
the basis of the assumption that cooperation offers a better alternative than self-interest,
sustainable development programs are conceived as alternative trade networks that offer
mutual benefits to participants. Consumers get access to high-quality, traceable (safe) and
ecologically/ethically superior goods; manufacturers and dealers get access to an
attractive niche –market, and producers are compensated with economic premiums for
the environmental and social services of their crops (McMichael 2000; Murray and
Raynolds 2000; Rice 2001; Ponte 2002; Raynolds 2002). Alternative trade creates
networks of virtue, which connect producers and customers in a way that transform the
daily act of consumption in an exercise on ecological—and ethical—global citizenship
(Seyfang 2006; Barnett et al. 2005; Clarke et al. 2007; MacMaoláin 2002). However,
under the discourse of partnerships, equity and fairness—and the perception of the
sustainability necessity, desirability and universality (Luke 2005) —lies a question that
haunts Brundtland’s (1987) definition of sustainable development: whose present, and
whose future? Whose interests, and how, are represented in an alternative
trade/sustainable development partnerships? (Luke, 2005).
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In this chapter, I address these questions by analyzing the role that the ideological
construct of sustainability-through-trade has played in reshaping Ecuadorian cocoa
production since the late 1990s. This commodity and setting present a useful lens to look
at the often ignored tradeoffs of sustainability. In the simplified dialectic of current
Ecuadorian production—developed and implemented by a myriad of nongovernmental,
governmental and international development agencies—on one side stands the low-yield,
shade-grown fine cocoa variety known as Nacional—which meets all the ecological,
social, and quality requirements for alternative trade and sustainability partnerships. On
the other side, stands the full-sun hybrid cocoa known as CCN-51—which offers high
yield in exchange of the ecological services of Nacional. Thus—goes the argument—
Ecuador’s small farmers should opt for alternative trade to protect the unique agrarian
landscape of shaded cocoa farms. By joining alternative trade networks, “farmers will be
able to improve their incomes, and gain further benefits from stronger social networks
and changes in perception towards conservation and biodiversity” (GTZ 2007)—a
rhetorical argument which carries undertones of a win-win situation that balances
economic, social and ecological sustainability. However, my findings suggest that the
arguments of NGOs and IGOs do not truly reflect the complex choices and options that
farmers face on a day-to-day basis, nor effectively address the economic tradeoffs of
these views. The emphasis on shared benefits and consensus has obscured the fact that
power defines who wins and who losses out of sustainability projects.
Between a rock and a hard place: Ecuador’s cocoa production dilemma
Ecuador’s cocoa production is marked by Nacional, a scarce shade-grown
Forastero-type fine cocoa known by unique floral or fruity “Arriba” flavor or aroma
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(Loor et al. 2009; Motamayor et al. 2008; Lerceteau et al. 1997). This kind of cocoa is
mostly grown in family farms of less than seven ha. Ecuador’s produces about 50% of the
world harvest of fine cocoa, which in turn accounts for 3 to 7% of the world’s cocoa
(Jano 2007; Rosero 2002). Traditionally, Nacional cocoa is grown in a species-rich multistory cropping system in which each hectare contains a lower stratum made of 400-800
cocoa trees and 10-30 plantain plants and other fruit-bearing trees (i.e., citrus such as
oranges and tangerines), and an upper stratum made of roughly 20 timber trees
representing several species (Rios et al. 1997; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004;
Andersson and Gradstein 2005; Haro-Carrion et al. 2009). Shade-grown cocoa farms
provide habitat for local species of amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals, which are
otherwise limited by a regional prevalence of bananas and other monoculture green
deserts (Soluri 2000; Rios et al. 1997; Greenberg, Bichier, and Cruz Angón 2000; Beer et
al. 1998; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004; Faria and Baumgarten 2007; Franzen and
Mulder Borgerhoff 2007; Clough, Faust, and Tscharntke 2009; Southgate and Whitaker
1992; Sierra and Stallings 1998). The mechanism that produced flavor is complex (Luna
et al. 2002), but the “Arriba” aroma comes from a combination of distinctive genetics,
farming practices (pre and post harvesting), and environmental factors (such as climate,
soil and luminosity) that occur exclusively in Ecuador’s lowlands (Motamayor et al.
2008; Deheuvels et al. 2004; Loor et al. 2009; Lerceteau et al. 1997; Cambrai et al.
2010).
However, the quality of Nacional and the richness of the agro-forestry system in
which it is produced have some agricultural weaknesses, namely disease susceptibility
and low yield. The Nacional genotype is highly susceptible to two fungal plant
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pathogens, Crinipellis perniciosa (known as “witch’s broom,” or “escoba de bruja”), and
Moniliophthora roreri (known as frosty-pod disease, or “monilla”) (Griffith, 2004;
Parsons, 1957). These diseases caused the collapse of the Ecuadorian cocoa production
back in the early 20th century, as C. perniciosa can cause yields to drop by 90% and M.
roreri can infest and destroy up to a 100% of the pods (Henderson 1997; Pineo 1988;
Griffith 2004; Parsons 1957; Hebbar 2007; Phillips-Mora and Wilkinson 2007); even
today, these pathogens can cause losses of up to 50% or more of the crop (Griffith, 2004).
Second, Nacional farms—and the famed Arriba quality—are trapped in a loop in which
low yields and low-intensity management go hand in hand. In 2008, Ecuador’s cocoa
yield of 250.3 kg/ ha year was half the world’s average (495.5 kg/ha/year) (FAOSTAT
2010). The country’s growing exports, given cocoa groves yield remain constant
overall 42 are sustained by increasing the area planted with cocoa (See Figure 1).
Although the problems of Nacional are chronic (in fact, these issues date back to
the 1930’s), some of them appear amenable to solutions derived from agricultural
intensification methods. In fact, by 1965 an Ecuadorian agronomist by the name of
Homero U. Castro—working independently in Naranjal cocoa farm aptly named
“Theobroma”— developed a variety known by the abbreviation CCN-51 (which stands
for Coleccion Castro Naranjal cross# 51)43 as a F1 cross of IMC-67 x ICS-95 by O-1,
where O-1 is a cocoa ascension collected by Castro himself in a trip to Ecuador's Valle de
42

Cocoa yield vary from year to year —because of the effects of the climatic phenomena
known as El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and its La Niña counterpart, but the trend
is slightly negative (decreasing yields).
43

There are reports of other available CCN clones ( i.e., CCN-31 in Rohsius, Matissek,
and Lieberei 2005); CCN10 and CCN16 in (Zhang et al. 2008).
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los Canelos (Castro 1981). The CCN-51 variety grows in full-sun, is resistant to the
attack of witch’s broom and frosty-pod disease, and is moderately resistant to
Ceratocystis cacaofunesta (which causes the disease known as Ceratocystis Wilt of
Cacao) (Engelbrecht, Harrington, and Alfenas 2007; Sanches et al. 2008). The yield of
CCN-51 is high, and under “optimal circumstances”—full-sun, high density planting
(2200 plants/ha), and use of inputs such as irrigation, fertilizers and other
agrochemicals—yields up to 4000 kg/ha year, although yields of 2000-3000 kg/ha year
seem to be the norm for this density and intensity of management (Espinosa et al. 2006:
36). Even at lower planting densities, CCN-51’s yield is 3-4 times the yield of Nacional
(750-1500 kg/ha year @ 833 plants /ha according to Espinosa et al. 2006).
On top of superior agronomic characteristics, CCN-51 is freely available in
Ecuador, given that by the time of Castro’s sudden death (late 1980’s) he had not
patented the variety (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with author, Jesus Maria,
December 2009). Given that CCN-51 plants were available on the haciendas where
Castro conducted his trials (i.e., Hacienda Balao, Canas and Pechichal), and it is easy to
graft—according to the grafting professionals I interviewed—there was a boom in the
planting of this variety in large and medium cocoa farms during the 1980s and 1990s,
which were looking for an alternative to the ICS-clones that had been found to be highly
susceptible to Ceratocystis Wilt (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with author, Jesus
Maria, December 2009).
Information about rate of adoption of this variety is scarce, but a 1997 survey of
304 cocoa farms found that 8.8% of the total area was planted with Nacional, 85% of the
area was planted with natural crosses of Nacional x Trinitario types, and just 0.3% of the
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area was planted with CCN-51 (ECU-B7 1997). By 2002, it was estimated that about 5%
of Ecuador’ area dedicated to cocoa was planted with CCN-51 (9000 ha) (Quito 2001); in
2008, it was reported that CCN-51 accounted for 6% of the area dedicated to cocoa
(27827 ha out of 463787 ha) (CORPEI 2008).
However, the rapid adoption of CCN-51 was met with resistance by high-quality
chocolate manufacturers, given that it lacks the aroma of Nacional. This issue was
amplified by differences between this variety and Nacional in respect to fermentation
times, by the practice of mixing the production of the two varieties, and an Ecuadorian
cocoa internal market failure to compensate farmers for post-harvest treatment. Cocoa
beans must be fermented to develop chocolate flavors and other aromas. Nacional and
related hybrids develop their particular aroma with a relatively short fermenting time of
2-4 days (Luna et al. 2002). However, CCN-51—which presents a higher amount of
mucilage—requires longer fermentation time (6 days, according to Perez Piza 2006).
Furthermore, the traditional fermenting methods used for Nacional did not work for
CCN-51, which gained a bad reputation—although when treated well it develops a
chocolate favor described as “basic-Ghana” (von Rutte 2004).
Evidently, when the two varieties were mixed the results were worse, given that
neither Nacional nor CCN-51 received optimal treatment. Jürgen Rausch, of the German
fine chocolate manufacturer Rausch Plantagen Schokolade, said that the effects of the
practice of mixing varieties were such that some European clients have returned
shipments of Ecuadorian cocoa. He said that because of the mix, fine chocolate
manufacturers were sourcing fine cocoa from other countries, and that “producers and
exporters that are mixing these varieties [Nacional and CCN-51] will not have the chance
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to sell cocoa as fine and aroma, and they will get paid as if they would be selling
‘consumer’s cocoa’ [bulk cocoa]” (Rausch in Guayaquil 2010). Finally, since the 1980’s,
cocoa farmers have been receiving the same price for well fermented cocoa versus cocoa
that was not fermented. The intermediaries—as was still the practice during my field
work in 2009—rate cocoa beans exclusively on the basis of their humidity content. Under
these conditions, farmers have incentives to dry their cocoa as soon as possible, and to
avoid the labor costs and risks of fermenting the beans. The practice of fermenting was
abandoned, which led to a significant loss of quality.
Consequently, in 2005, the International Cacao Organization downgraded
Ecuador’s cocoa rating from 100% fine flavor cocoa to 75%, and informed Ecuadorian
exporters that this rating could be further reduced (ICCO 2006). In this context—and
under the threat of further sanctions—the problem has been framed in a way in which it
appears that Ecuador’s cocoa farmers must choose between two opposite paths of
development. The first—the alternative trade/sustainable development model—argument
is to protect and promote Nacional, and then sell the product for a higher price in
specialized markets (i.e., organic, ecologic, etc). This model makes three assumptions: a)
the premium of niche marketing will compensate farmers for the low productivity of
Nacional farms; b) farmers will gain other benefits from investments on their social
networks—thus gaining strength from collectivism; c) the economic and social benefits
will provide incentives to farmers to conserve and protect their shade-grown Nacional
plantations, therefore turning them into stewards of the ecological services provided by
this crop. The ultimate goal of this model is to have farmer’s associations that entirely
bypass the conventional cocoa commercialization chain entirely, thus selling cocoa
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directly to chocolate manufacturers abroad (Radi and Ramirez 2006; Fischerworring
2007). However, proponents are willing to settle for developing “associative
commercialization systems” that simply bypass the local middleman (Freire and Rios
2007). These actions will increase farmer’s income by about 25%, with the further
benefit of producers “gaining respect” (Freire and Rios 2007).
Proponents of the alternative trade model acknowledge that there are substantial
barriers to the successful implementation of even basic models of alternative trade, given
that farmers’ associations must make substantial improvements to meet the quality
requirements of high-end chocolate manufacturers and the standards of certificationschemes—the gatekeepers of specialized market-niches. Associative commercialization
depends on having the know-how to run the business and to properly manage cocoa,
capital for buying cocoa stocks, communications, and infrastructure for post-harvesting
(fermentation and drying) and bean storage. Thus, the successful implementation of an
associative commercialization program depends on developing alliances with sources of
capital to finance training and infrastructure—something that appears accessible given
the number and coverage of institutions working in Ecuadorian Cocoa (see Table 1).
However, producers must join in an association to access to these institutional sources of
capital (Freire and Rios 2007).
Investment in Nacional is justified by the attractiveness of Nacional as highquality fine “Arriba” cocoa, with value added by certification schemes (Radi and
Ramirez 2006). Fine cacao is scarce, accounting for just 5% of the world production.
Ecuador’s production accounts for half of this volume. Thus, the demand for “Arriba” is
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said to be “dynamic and unsatisfied,” and it is argued that this variety “will be always in
demand by high quality chocolate manufacturers” (Radi and Ramirez 2006).
The second model—agricultural intensification—receives considerably less
attention by NGOs and other institutions. Given that the low yield of existing Nacional
plantations is caused by its susceptibility to diseases and low investment on agricultural
technology, the argument is that the farmer’s income will increase by changing varieties
(adopting either CCN-51 or INIAP’s clones of selected Nacional), and implementing
better crop management practices via investments in extension services and training.
Farmers also opt for replacing a fraction of their cocoa holdings for other crops (i.e.,
passion fruit, bananas, plantains, or papaya) which are more profitable than cocoa. The
NGOs projects generally provide extension services and training, and there are projects
that certainly are geared towards improving farmer’s awareness about the crop (i.e.,
Farmer’s Field Schools run by the U.S. based NGO ACDI/VOCA). Also, there are
programs that deliver free or low cost improved plants—generally CCN-51—to farmers.
The technology to produce plants is simple. For example, the Puebloviejo’s Technical
High School—a small local institution, with contributions of Ecuador’s MAGAP, INIAP
and the local municipality—was able to develop and implement a program to produce
and donate 50,000 CCN-51 plants (enough to plant 50 ha) to “poor farmers” of that
locality in the Province of Los Ríos (Medrano 2009).
However, although producing plants is easy, there are reports that suggest that
farms renovation is uncommon (ECU-B7 1997). There are two reasons that explain why
farmers do not opt for farm renovation: a) renovation or replanting requires an important
up-front investment (US$ 2600/ha, according to Quiroz and Agama 2006); b) the farmer
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must be able to finance the up-keep of the renovated plantation for the 5-8 years it takes
for it area to regain productivity.. All in all, this requires a period of at 8 years to break
even. Renovation requires that farmers have access to medium term credit. Given the
scarcity of this kind of financing, most farmers opt for renovating/replanting small
extensions of their cocoa holdings on an ad-hoc basis. A similar strategy is used to deal
with agricultural diversification.
Given that each model presents benefits, limitations, and liabilities, in Ecuador
there is an ongoing debate about which should be planted cocoa, how and in which ways
it should be produced. Supporters of Nacional put forth arguments based in this variety’s
status as fine cacao, market-niche potential and for the ecological services provided by
shade-cocoa. On the other hand, holders of CCN-51 present arguments on the basis of its
productivity, and think that this variety has been unjustly marginalized in policy circles.
Fernando Crespo, President of the Association of Producers of Fine and Aroma Cacao
(Asociacion de Productores de Cacao Fino y de Aroma—which despite its name
agglomerates producers that have holdings of CCN-51), declared that he was concerned
that “there are people that are planning to terminate CCN-51” (Fernando Crespo in
Guayaquil 2010b). Crespo’s fears became reality when in June of 2010 politicians and
farmer’s groups proposed a “Cacao Law” which aimed to finance a Nacional cocoa
program with a 1.5% tax on cocoa exports—but it also made an attempt to heavily
regulate plantings of other varieties (Guayaquil 2010c; Guayaquil 2010d). This proposal
was rejected by other sectors. Benjamin Rosales Valenzuela—editorialist at Ecuador’s
most prestigious newspaper “El Comercio”—argues that the proposed ban of CCN-51 is
foolish, given that this variety’s yields “will allow small farmers to get out of poverty”
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(Rosales Valenzuela 2010). He also criticizes other aspects of the proposed law—which
included a tax on chocolate and cocoa elaborated-product 44 exports—and argues that it
was designed by “retrogrades” and propelled by “neocolonialist mentalities” with the
ultimate goal of keeping Ecuador’ as a supplier of low cost, unprocessed beans (Rosales
Valenzuela 2010). Finally, he argued against the idea of creating a Quito-based
bureaucratic body to administer the tax financed “cocoa program” because the people
behind this initiative are the same that are trying to stop change—thus keeping farmers
poor (Rosales Valenzuela 2010).
Although individual exporters and the ANECACAO’s Executive Director said
that they shared the need for fomenting production, some argued that the proposed tax
rate was too high (cocoa exporter Lourdes Delgado, in Guayaquil 2010c). They also
expressed concerns that the law had the goal of banning further plantings of the CCN-51
variety, although the designers of the text said “that the goal [of the law] was to advance
the cause of Nacional” (Vicente Urrutia in Guayaquil 2010c). Vicente Zeller, another
cocoa exporter, argued that even though CCN-51 had a bad reputation, with the
development of new fermentation methods this issue has been resolved, and that there is
a substantial demand for this variety (Vicente Zeller in Guayaquil 2010d). Both Zeller
and Delgado expressed that instead of banning, or talking about banning a variety, there
should be a survey to find “farmer’s truth, given that some farmers prefer CCN-51
because it is more profitable” (Vicent Zeller in Guayaquil 2010d).

44

Such as cocoa paste, cocoa licour and cocoa butter.
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In this chapter, I address this question by comparing the income that small
farmers derive from Nacional and CCN-51 cocoa plots. I frame the results comparing two
farmer’s associations, one of which is actively selling certified organic and Rainforest
Alliance cocoa, and other where farmers are selling cocoa through local markets. I also
include the income of crops grown with cocoa, as well as those that are cultivated
independently. I also analyze the role of farm employment in cocoa farmers’ livelihood.
Finally, I address the issues surrounding why a farmer selects a given variety.
Methods
The study was conducted on Ecuador's western lowlands, from May to December
of 2009. Fieldwork was conducted in the provinces of Azuay, El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos,
Manabí, Santa Elena, and Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas (see Figure 2). This study
gathered data from three sources: a collection of cocoa-related publications and resources
collected during field-work, in-depth interviews with farmers and farmers’ leaders in all
the aforementioned provinces and an open-answer survey applied to farmers residing in
the provinces of Azuay, Guayas and Los Ríos.
The first data source consists of approximately 100 brochures, reports and
handbooks on the general topic of Ecuadorian cocoa. These documents were published
by organizations involved with cocoa-development projects from 2000 to 2009. Among
others, this repository contains documents published by farmer’s organizations, cocoa
exporters, local and international non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental
organizations, government agencies and private companies. These documents range from
publicity materials to documents dealing specifically with alternative trade networks. All
these documents are publicly available in Ecuador, although circulation may be restricted
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because of limited number of copies. These documents are complemented with several
digital repositories, among them the judicial magazine known as “Derecho Ecuador”
[http://www.derechoecuador.com/] which makes copies of the Ecuadorian Official
Registry freely available.
Regarding the second data source, the in-depth interviews script was designed to
gather information about farmer organizations’ experiences with cocoa
commercialization, interactions with local and external agencies, and a general feeling
about the state of the industry from farmers’ perspective. The participation on the
interviews was voluntary. I conducted the interviews in Spanish. I interviewed farmers
and leaders from 12 cooperatives, pre-cooperatives and associations.
This study’s third data source consists of an open-answer survey given to cocoa
producers from Los Ríos, Guayas, and Azuay. These producers were included in the
records of one of two farmers’ organizations working in these provinces. The first farmer
organization, the “Federacion Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador”
(FEDECADE) is a federation (union of associations and cooperatives) that has about
1100 members associated with 12 farmers’ groups located in the provinces of Azuay,
Esmeraldas, El Oro and Guayas (see Figure 2). The FEDECADE farmers hold up to three
certifications (Fair Trade, Organic and Rainforest Alliance). To achieve these
certifications and develop its commercialization system, from 1997 to 2008 FEDECADE
received support from several international agencies through an alliance with an
Ecuadorian NGO called Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD)(Conservation and
Development). However, at the time of the study FEDECADE’s commercialization
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system was not operating, and the farmers I interviewed were selling their cocoa at the
local market.
The second farmer organization, the “Asociacion de Productores Organicos de
Vinces” (APOV), has approximately 240 members with farms located near the town of
Vinces, Province of Los Ríos (Figure 2). At the time of the study, an APOV farmer could
hold two certifications (Organic and Rainforest Alliance). Contrary to FEDECADE, the
APOV had not received any investment from the IGOs-NGOs conglomerate. Instead, it
was created as a mutual benefit venture of cocoa farmer’s, local intellectuals, Vinces’
Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of Guayaquil at Vinces, an ex-NGO
field agent/organic certification agent, and COFINA—a cocoa exporter that became
involved in alternative trade markets via FEDECADE’s experience. The APOV
commercialization model does bypass local middlemen, but delivers cocoa to the
exporter COFINA. COFINA then allocates APOV’s Rainforest Alliance and Organic
Certified cocoa to clients willing to pay for this crop. The APOV is favored by its
symbiotic relationship with the Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of
Guayaquil at Vinces. First, the APOV is a tenant of this institute—thus sidestepping the
need for costly commercialization infrastructure. Second, the APOV farmers have access
to a continuous stream of young agronomists—some of which receive cacao training
from the APOV.
Both FEDECADE and APOV are established in areas that have been long
dedicated to agriculture: APOV’s Vinces was at the center of the late 1800’s and early
1900’s first Ecuadorian cocoa boom, and FEDECADE’s farms are located in areas
opened to the cultivation of cocoa and bananas in the early 1950’s and 1960’s.
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The survey was conducted at each participant’s residence in the case of
FEDECADE members, and at the communal point-of-sale in the case of APOV’s. The
interviews were conducted in Spanish by me and took about 60-90 minutes. The survey
consisted of four parts (see Appendix 1). The first, personal history, is made of questions
that establish age, gender and background of the farmers in the sample. The second, land
management, measures the amount of land managed, and the level of fragmentation of
this area. The third, cocoa and other crop production, asks questions about the crops
managed by each farmer (including questions about crop variety, yield, and age of the
crops); it also includes questions about farmer’s perception about the benefits and
liabilities of cocoa varietals. Finally, the commercialization and income section, asks
questions about the income generated by cocoa under different selling modalities, and
asks for other economic activities that contribute to farmer’s income. In addition, APOV
supplied individual farmer’s cocoa sales (by variety, price and amount) data from their
commercialization records. All economic and transactional data is presented in US
dollars (US$), which has been the Ecuadorian legal tender since 2000. A detailed list of
the variables collected can be found in Appendix 2.
Farmer’s were recruited in the sample depending on their willingness to
participate in the study, and on the basis of two criteria: a) de-facto management of the
land, b) being included in the rolls of associations registered with FEDECADE, or
membership with the APOV. The application of these two criteria yielded a sample of
100 farmers (out of 174 possible) registered with FEDECADE’s Nueva Union
Campesina, 6 de Julio, Camacho and La Florida Associations, and a sample of 60 farmers
(out of 223 possible) belonging to the APOV.
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In addition to the data gathered from the surveys and previously existing
databases, I conducted in-depth interviews with farmers that had been or were currently
involved with their community’s cocoa commercialization team in the case of
associations affiliated to FEDECADE. This information was complemented with
interviews with FEDECADE and APOV representatives and staff, government and nonprofit organization officials, cocoa exporters, other farmer’s organizations representatives
and cocoa town-level middlemen. I was granted access to an anonymized version of
FEDECADE and APOV commercialization databases, and other financial and economic
information. A farmer’s on-farm gross product is reported as the standardized Farm
Gross Product in US$ per ha year (FGP ha/year), which is the sum of income for all
possible on-farm crops standardized by total farm area (see Figure 3).
None of the farmers in my sample keep detailed accounting of farm expenses, so
to estimate crop expenses for cocoa Nacional and CCN-51, I rely on the Average
Management Cost by Province published in the Fine Cacao Management Cost Census 45
(CORPEI 2009). Data gathered with the in-depth interviews with farmers were used to
estimate management cost for other crops (i.e., bananas, passion fruit or plantains). These
estimates are used to calculate a farmer’s Gross Agricultural Income (GAI), and the Farm
Gross Income (FGI), which is a farmer’s GAI divided by the area of his or her holdings
(see Figure 3).
To establish the percentage of farmers whose agricultural income sets them below
poverty, I compared the GAI values with the values of the Ecuadorian national extreme
45

While the Census focused in Nacional, it also includes Management Costs for CCN-51
plots.
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poverty level and the basic income level (INEC’s Canasta Familiar Vital and Canasta
Familiar Basica) (INEC 2010). The INEC CFV (Canasta Familiar Vital) is set based on
the survival income for a family of four; families that earn less than this amount are
classified as extremely poor. The CFB, which is set at a higher level of income, sets the
level below which a family of four is classified as poor. Given that GAI income data
presents a yearly estimate based in the prices for October and November of 2009, I used
the CFV and CFB for these months multiplied by 12 to get a comparable yearly statistic.
With these caveats, the CFV level is set at a monthly income of $370.25 for an annual
value of $4443; the CFB level is a monthly income of $522.46 for an annual value of
$6269 (INEC 2010).
When appropriate, general statistics (i.e., mean, median, SD) were calculated
using Microsoft Excel 2002 (SP3). Linear regression and other tests were conducted
using Minitab 14. Survey text processing was done using QDA-Miner 3.2.3; interview
data mining and sorting was done using Atlas.Ti.6.1.1.
To establish the relationship between poverty, crop diversification and area of a
farmer’s holding, first I classified farmers in four groups each one set by one type of crop
diversification schemes I found during field work: Nacional-only, CCN-51-only, both
Nacional and CCN-51, cocoa (Nacional and CCN-51) and other crops. Second, I
performed linear regression analysis to establish the average gross agricultural income
(GAI) as a function of the area held under a given crop diversification scheme. Then, I
used the regression equations to find the area of a holding under each diversification
scheme—all other things being equal— that will generate an income that sets that farmer
above CFV or CFB by the type of cropping system. I follow this procedure under the
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assumption that holding the land (actively managing it) precedes receiving income from
crops planted in that area.
Cocoa farmer profiles
In the survey, I found that the average FEDECADE farmer is 54 years old (with
ages from 18 to 83 years) and the average APOV farmer is 55 years old (age range 24 to
83 years old), with a bias towards older farmers (see Figure 4). In both cases, the majority
of respondents are male (84% FEDECADE, 92% APOV).46
These similarities in age and gender composition do not extend to other
parameters. In a question about place of birth, slightly less than half FEDECADE farmers
were born in a locality other than their current place of residence (49%, <50 km) while 9
out of 10 APOV farmers said that they were born in the town of Vinces or nearby (90%,
<50 km). On average, FEDECADE farmers acquired their lands 33 years ago, with 70%
of them having done so during the 1970’s land reform. The last farmer to have acquired
land through land reform did so 27 years ago; after that point in time, new arrivals
reportedly got their holdings by purchasing, renting, or inheritance.
About half (53%) of FEDECADE farmers learned about cocoa from their
parents. The other 47% reported that their parents had crops other than cocoa. The APOV
farmers answers to the family history question indicate that 72 % of their parents had or
worked in cocoa; only 16% reported that their parents farmed crops other than cocoa.

46

The gender proportion in the sample reflects the gender ratio of memberships in both
organizations, which is skewed towards males. In fact, the gender ratio for the roster of
the sampled FEDECADE associations is 83% male, 17% female; the gender ratio for the
APOV roster is 87% male, 13% female (Archives of FEDECADE, 2009; Archives of
APOV, 2009).
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Differences in regional history versus family tradition are also felt in the way that current
farmers acquired their current holdings. The most common way for holding acquisition
by FEDECADE farmers is through “land reform” (51%), followed by “purchase” (25%)
and “inheritance” (19%); APOV’s most frequent holding acquisition answer is
“inheritance” (45%), followed by “purchase” (38%) and “land reform” (11%). A Z-test
indicates that FEDECADE and APOV results are statistically different for all these
parameters, with a confidence level of 95% for all other than “Purchase” (which is
statistically different for a confidence level of 90%).
The survey results show that 42% of FEDECADE farmers’ depend exclusively on
cocoa (both Nacional and CCN-51), 31% raise other crops to supplement their cocoa
income, and 27% rely on off-farm employment to supplement income. Only 10.1% of the
APOV farmers depend exclusively on cocoa. The large majority of APOV farmers
(76.3%) supplement their income with other crops, or with off-farm income (13.6%) (see
Table 2).
Only 12% of FEDECADE’s farmers and 13% APOV’s have access to loans for
agriculture; survey respondents said that “there are no loans for cocoa because it yields
too little,” “the loans are only for short cycle,” and that “the interest was too high.”
Interestingly, in the case of FEDECADE one middleman originated one-third of the
loans; this person also bought the product of 12% of the farmers. The APOV farmers said
that they did not have access to middlemen loans.
Farm descriptions: holdings, varieties, and yields
The average FEDECADE holdings are larger (7.93 ha) than the holdings of the
APOV average farmer (4.58 ha). With regard to variety planted, 27% of FEDECADE
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farmers reported that they have only Nacional plants, 59% have both Nacional and CCN51 in separated plots, and 14% have converted their holdings to exclusively CCN-51. On
the other hand, 80% of APOVs’ farmers reported that their farms are planted with
Nacional exclusively; 20% reported that they have land dedicated to both varieties, and
none of them said that they have converted their land to the new variety. A McNemar
Test for variety-planted proportions shown no statistically significant preference for any
variety in the case of FEDECADE; the same test for the APOV is statistically significant
showing a strong preference for Nacional. However, a farmer stated preference for one
variety does not influence the amount of land dedicated to each one. The average
FEDECADE Nacional planting is 5.09 ha (SD 5.75) and are 28 years old (SD 17.14); the
average APOV Nacional planting is of 4.31 ha (SD 4.34) and 32 years old (SD 32.69).
The average FEDECADE CCN-51 planting is smaller (2.84 ha, SD 2.74), and
considerably newer than their Nacional counterparts (5 years old, SD 5.03). The average
APOV CCN-51plantings are also smaller (average is 1.98 ha, SD 2.26), and newer (6.8
years old, SD 3.7). Indeed, half of the APOV farmer that got CCN-51 plants reported that
these were a gift from a government program, and were less than one-year old. The
average FEDECADE CCN-51-only farm is of 3.78 ha and was planted 7 years ago; as
previously mentioned, no APOV farmer had a CCN-51-only farm. Finally, the mean area
dedicated to Nacional by a FEDECADE farmer is statistically similar to the mean area
dedicated to Nacional by an APOV farmer, the same holds for CCN-51 plantings, which
indicate that farmer’s in both locations strive for a balance between the yield of each
variety and other factors ( i.e., lack of capital for converting plots, or strategies of crop
diversification for risk reduction).
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The economics of farmers’ decisions: shade-grown but low yield vs. full-sun but
high yield
FEDECADE’s average farmer Nacional yield is of 379 kg/ha/year (SD 160.6)
(which is higher than Ecuador’s average of 250.3 kg/ha/year); for CCN-51, the average
yield is 721 kg/ha year (SD 508.0). The APOV records show that the average organic
farm yield is 295 kg/ha year (SD 98.9), with the highest Nacional yields reached in farms
using APOV’s cocoa organic-farming technological package (OTP). This package,
consisting of moderate shade reduction, pruning, increased cacao tree density, and use of
organic approved fertilizers and disease controllers 47, increases Nacional yield to an
average of 587 kg/ha/year (n=15, SD 150.68). While these results are encouraging, the
application of the OPT is limited given farmer’s lack of upfront investment capital. The
APOV farmers reported that CCN-51 yield is 354 kg/ha year, with the average being
weighted down by recently planted plots which make for half of the respondents 48.
The FEDECADE data for Nacional shows slight negative correlations between
age of plantation and yield (-0.317, p-value=0.001). A correlation age of plantings vs.
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The APOV package was developed under the leadership of the Ing. Julio Cerezo,
current APOV President and former Director of the Agricultural Technology Institute of
the University of Guayaquil at Vinces. It consists of replacing low-yielding cocoa trees
for better plants, increasing cocoa plants density, pruning, shade reduction, fertilization
and disease control (with organic products). However, the APOV handles a good part of
these tasks, given that individual farmers lack the equipment and training to perform
them on their own (i.e., they need an expansive gas-powered mechanical pruning saw,
and sprayer pumps to apply products). For 2010, APOV is adding irrigation to this
package.
48

In fact, about 25% of APOV farmers that have CCN-51 received their plants during
last year, as a part of a government-funded program that provided each farmer with a few
(100 to 250) CCN-51 plants.
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yield for FEDECADE CCN-51 is positive (0.304, p-value=0.015).The results suggests
that CCN-51’s peak production is reached when the crop is 10 to 15 years old, but the
later behavior of the variety is unknown given that the oldest registered CCN-51
plantation in my sample was planted 20 years ago. Information gathered from two largesized local farms (30 ha, 25 years old; 70 ha, 5 years old) suggest that CCN-51’s older
plants yield remains high if adequate inputs are supplied (a farmer reported reaching
1363.63 kg/ha/year with pruning, weeding, irrigation and fertilization). Data from APOV
did not show any correlation between age of plant and yield
The FEDECADE farmers sold their cocoa in two different ways. The first
modality, selling minimally processed fresh cocoa by volume (a modality know as
“fresco y desvenado,” fresh and depulped), had an average price of US$117.41 per 45kg
(or roughly 6 “latas” [cans]) for October and November of 2009 (n=67, SD5.87). The
second was the more traditional modality of selling dried cocoa (which may have been
fermented). Dried cocoa had a gate price of US$120.66 per 45 kg (n=78, SD 6.28) for the
same period.
More than a quarter of FEDECADE farmers (29%) complain that they do not get
a better price for Nacional cocoa. Indeed, I found that the difference in prices for wet
Nacional and wet CCN-51 is not statistically significant: wet Nacional was sold at
$117.22 per 45 kg (n=83, SD 7.14), while wet CCN-51 was sold at $117.66 per 45 kg
(n=64, SD 6.76). The APOV farmers get a Nacional premium of $10-15 all year round
(APOV’s receives CCN-51 at practically Vinces’ market price).
All APOV farmers sold their cocoa under the fresh and depulped modality for an
average gate price of US$114.2 per 45 kg for the same period. The APOV sold this cocoa
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for an average price of US$126.90 per 45 kg; the difference between farmer’s gate price
and price of sale went to cover APOV’s operational expenses (i.e., post-harvest,
transportation, repayment of capital for commercialization, certifications, etc). However,
the APOV gate price was US$ 10-15 higher than Vinces’ market price, thus remained
attractive to the farmers. 49 Indeed, APOV consistently delivered higher prices for its
affiliated farmers, but geographical location certainly matters.
To visualize these prices in a larger context, when FEDECADE farmers sold wet
cocoa they received 88% of ANECACAO’s FOB price (ANECACAO 2010). 50 A
FEDECADE farmer that sold dry cocoa got 92% of the FOB. The APOV farmers only
sold wet cocoa and received 87% of the FOB price. The APOV (as an institution) got
paid 97% of ANECACAO FOB for dry cocoa. Overall, FEDECADE and APOV farmers
received 73% of the value that their crop has in the international markets 51 when selling
wet cocoa.
Crop diversification and on-farm income
Crop selection and on-farm diversification influence the reported FEDECADE
farm gross product (FGP) and estimated farm gross income (FGI). The FGP of
FEDECADE farmers that rely on Nacional alone (n=24) is $878.12 per ha/year, while the
FGP of FEDECADE farmers that rely on CCN-51 alone (n=10) is $2729.65 per ha/year
49

Vinces is located at 100 km from Guayaquil; Naranjal is located at 45 km from
Guayaquil, and these two points are connected by a main highway.
50

ANECACAO ASE FOB averaged US$ 130.89 per 45 kg for ASE quality cocoa. Cocoa
ranked higher than ASE (i.e., ASS or ASSP), fetch higher prices.

51

Cocoa was traded for US$153.56 per 45 kg for October and November of 2009 at New
York (NYSEC) and London (LIFFE).
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(n= 10). FEDECADE farmers that hold both varieties (n=32) have a FGP of $ 1568.15,
with 33 of their gross income coming from Nacional and 66% from CCN-51 (even
though Nacional plantings are twice as large as those of CCN-51) (see Table 3). APOV
figures are lower; the average FGP farmers that rely only on Nacional cocoa is of
$741.63 per ha/year (n=10). The APOV sample of farmers that have CCN-51 old enough
to be productive stage is too small for generalizations (n=4).
In the survey, 28% of FEDECADE farmers reported that they raise other crops to
supplement their cocoa income. While preferences vary according to place, market, and
local conditions, most farmers chose between four alternative crops: bananas, plantains,
passion fruit, and citrus. Gate prices for these other crops are relatively uniform across
the region. Data about average yields and gate prices can be found in table 3 (other
crops). The best FGP is achieved in farms that grow CCN-51 with another crop (plantains
or citrus). These farms average FGP is $3078 per ha/year (n=3), with 86% of the FGP
coming from CCN-51 and 14% of the FGP coming from the other tree crops. The second
best combination is to have Nacional, CCN-51 and other crops (i.e., passion fruit or
plantain), which yields a FGP of $2278 per ha/year (n=11), with Nacional accounting for
26% of the FGP, CCN-51 for 55% of the FGP, and the other crops for 19% of the FGP.
Following this is a combination of Nacional, CCN-51 and Nacional-intercropped
organic/Fair-Trade bananas, 52 which produces a FGP ha/year of $1801 (n=7) with 27%
of the FGP coming from Nacional, 13% coming from CCN-51 and 60% coming from

52

The Fair-Trade and Organic certified bananas are sold through two channels other than
FEDECADE: the El Guabo Association of Banana Producers or the Union de
Campesinos del Litoral (UROCAL).
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bananas 53. The last alternative, planting organic/Fair Trade bananas in association with
Nacional cocoa, generates a FGP of $1514 ha/year (n=5).54 In this case, Nacional
accounts for 29% of the FGP while bananas account for 71% (see Figure 5).
Instead of fruits, 53% of APOV’s farmers plant what is colloquially known “short
cycle” (ciclo corto), meaning rice or maize. 55 The average FGP for farmers that raise
cocoa and short cycle is $2007.3 per ha/year (n=32), with 30% of the FGP coming from
the cocoa plantings and 70% of the FGP coming from the rice or maize; other alternatives
(Nacional + bananas, Nacional + bananas + short cycle, Nacional + plantains) average
FGP is of $2651.1 per ha/year (n=12) (see Figure 5).However, I suspect that the
contribution of rice or maize to the APOV farmers’ income is understated for two
reasons. First, “short cycle” management is input-dependent, and farmers routinely use
agrochemicals (fertilizers and pesticides) on these crops, which are incompatible with
APOV’s organically managed cocoa. In order to maintain the all-important cocoa
certification, APOV farmers have adopted the practice of physically, colloquially and
mentally isolating—which fences and buffer zones, or by demurring when talking about
them—these parcels from those under organic management. This “isolation-by-practice”
may lead to underreporting these crops. Second, at the time of field work Ecuador’s
53

The farmers said that they could only cultivate and certify banana planted in
association with Nacional; they did not plant banana in association with CCN-51.
54

The farmers reported that the yield of 1 ha of this associated crops yielded 276 “boxes”
of banana per year [6 Mt/ha/year]. At the time of the study, the gate price for a 22 kg
“box” of organic certified banana was of $7.00.
55

In fact, by March 2010 all banana-growers were no longer members of the APOV
given that they “had started using agrochemicals because their banana plants got infected
with Sigatoka and the organic remedies were not enough (Ana Nivela, interview with the
author, July 2010).
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government opted for establishing a ‘fixed official price’ for both rice and maize. This
price, of $12 per 45 kg of maize and $28 per 45 kg of rice, made farmers reluctant to
plant these crops given that “at that [official] price, one does not earn enough money to
pay the production costs” (Anita Nivela, interview with the author, July 2010). This
information leads me to believe that in 2009 the APOV farmers planted less of these
crops than what is normal for them.
On-farm production cost and farm gross agricultural income
On farm production costs are shown in Table 5. Data for cocoa management cost
(for both Nacional and CCN-51) come from the Average Management Cost by Province
published in the Fine Cacao Management Cost Census (CORPEI 2009); for crops other
than cocoa, management cost data were supplied by key informants (farmers or local
specialists). In all cases, the yield and gate price for all crops are an average of the yields
and prices reported by the farmers in my sample.
The FEDECADE’s Nacional-only farms FGI average $476 ha/year. In contrast,
FEDECADE CCN-51-only farmers could earn $1380 ha/year, even though CCN-51
production costs are higher (see Table 4). The average FEDECADE FGI of farmers that
have the two cocoa varieties is $811 ha/year. The highest FGI, of $1537 ha/year, 56 is
achieved by farmers that raise plantains or oranges in association with their CCN-51
plots. The income from farmers that keep cocoa plots of Nacional and CCN-51, plus
other crops (passion fruit, papaya or plantain) is $1131.03 ha/year. Farmers with plots of
Nacional cocoa, bananas associated with Nacional, and CCN-51 plots (not associated),
56

Plantains or papaya are used as temporary shade for young CCN-51 plants. Citrus
(normally oranges and tangerines) are used for permanent shade.
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generates an average FGI of $835 ha/year. Finally, the average FGI of farmers than
combine Nacional and bananas is of $696 ha/year (see Figure 5).
The FGI of APOV farmers is lower than the FGI of FEDECADE farmers. The
FGI for farmers that only grow Nacional is $352.73 per ha/year. Farmers that have cocoa
and other crops (combinations of cocoa, bananas or plantains, and short cycle) fare better,
with a FGI of $1039.30 per ha/year. Finally, the best result for an APOV farmer is to
have cocoa and short cycle, an alternative that generates a FGI of $1154.80 ha/year (see
Figure 5).
Agricultural income and poverty level
As discussed in the Methods section, for the purposes of this study the Family
Vital Requirements (Canasta Familiar Vital, CFV) threshold is set at an annual income
level of $4443; the Family Basic Requirements (Canasta Familiar Basica) threshold is set
for an annual income of $6269 (INEC 2010).
The comparison on farmers’ Gross Agricultural Income (GAI) and Ecuador’s
poverty level is striking. The annual income of 47% of FEDECADE farmers is below
what is needed to meet the Family Vital Requirements (CFV), the income of 19% is
above CFV but below what is needed to meet the Family Basic Requirements (CFB), and
the income of 33% is above Family Basic Requirements (CFB). The income of 71% of
APOV farmers is below the CFV; the income of 11% of the farmers is above CFV but
below CFB, and the income of 18% of the farmers is above CFB.
The income of FEDECADE farmers that rely on Nacional-only cocoa farms is the
lowest. The gross agricultural income of 83 % of the farmers that have Nacional-only
farms is below CFV, the income of 13% is above CFV but below CFB, and the income of
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4% is above CFB. Farmers with plots of Nacional and CCN-51 fare somewhat fare better,
with 60% of the farmers below CFV, 20% above CFV but below CFB, and 20% above
CFB. The two best combinations found for FEDECADE farmers are Nacional, CCN-51
and Fair Trade bananas, with 29% of farmers below CFV, no farmers in the above CFVbelow CFB range, and 71% above CFB, and CCN-51 with others, in which the income
of 100% of the farmers is above CFB.
In the case of APOV farmers, the gross agricultural income (GAI) of 90% of the
farmers that rely exclusively on cocoa is below the CFV, and the income of 10% is above
CFV but below CFB. In my sample, I did not find any APOV Nacional-only farmers with
income above CFB. Farmers that grow cocoa and short cycle are slightly better off,
although the income of 70% of them is below CFV, the income of 3% is above CFV but
below CFB, and income of 27% is above CFB. The GAI of farmers that have cocoa and
other crops (bananas or plantains and short cycle) is better, thus the income of 59% of the
farmers is below CFV, the income of 33% is under CFB, and the incomes of 8% sets
them above CFB.
The regression analysis shows a positive linear relationship between the area
managed by a farmer and his income level in all cases (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). In
general, farmers with smaller farms have less income. However, I found that in 24% of
FEDECADE cases, and 6% of the APOV, farmers with a comparable area of holdings
had different incomes (thus the income of one farmer did fall below the poverty level,
while the income of other was above this level) (see Figure 8 and 9). Given that market
prices and yield are relatively constant within FEDECADE’s (or APOV’s) area of
influence, the overlap is explained by differences between cropping systems.
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Graphically, the slope of the regression trend line in plots of high yield cocoa
(CCN-51) or multi-cropping systems (cocoa and other crops) is steeper: these systems
generate more income per unit of area (Figure 6 and 7). For example, if a FEDECADE
farmer—selling cocoa at the local market price—needs a holding of 3.43 ha of CCN-51
(or 2.89 of cocoa and other crops, i.e., passion fruit or Fair Trade bananas), for his or her
income to be above CFV. However, he or she needs a holding of 12.12 ha of Nacional to
reach the CFV level. The APOV farmers face a similar challenge. Thus, an APOV farmer
who raises Nacional and other crops (short cycle, conventional bananas) needs a holding
of 4.11 ha for his or her income to be above CFV. If an APOV farmer raises cocoa
Nacional-only, this person needs holdings of 12.58 ha for his (or her) income to be above
CFV. Evidently, farmer’s choice matters.
Risk reduction: Farmers perceptions about Nacional and CCN-51
In the survey and interviews, I found that FEDECADE and APOV farmers view
Nacional similarly. Farmers appreciate Nacional for its organoleptic characteristics of
aroma, taste and flavor, which is interesting given that farmers do not asses their crop
under these parameters. Of FEDECADE farmers, 90% mentioned aroma as a positive
characteristic of Nacional; all APOV respondents also mentioned it. Some of
FEDECADE’s survey responses suggest external influence: “it is the best cocoa in the
World,” “[having Nacional] is our [Ecuador’s] privilege;” “because even the Europeans
say that it [Nacional] is the best cocoa in the world because it’s great flavor and aroma”
(see Figure 10). On the other hand, 70% of FEDECADE farmers identified CCN-51’s
lack of aroma as this variety main weakness.
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Farmers in both locations appreciate Nacional for its final bean weight (after
fermenting and drying) (49.5% FEDECADE, 34.5% APOV) and low-cost management
(1.9% FEDECADE, 3.1% APOV). APOV farmers appreciate Nacional for characteristics
that were not mentioned by FEDECADE farmers, such as hardiness, resilience to adverse
weather (drought or flooding), “good yield” without inputs, and plant durability. The
CCN-51 variety is appreciated for its yield (70% of FEDECADE’s farmers), ease of pod
collection, ease of plant management (18% FEDECADE), and resistance to disease (10%
FEDECADE’s) (Figure 11). While farmers mention that this variety requires more “care”
(i.e., fertilizing, irrigating, pruning) they also say that CCN-51’s yield makes it a
worthwhile investment, and that CCN-51 “si deja platita” [CCN-51 generates profits] in
the words of an anonymous survey respondent. Also, the amounts of inputs used in CCN51 must not be over emphasized—at least in the case of small farmers in Ecuador. The
self-described “conventional” CCN-51 farmers I interview used herbicides (gliphosates),
organic fertilizers (treated manure), urea, topical applications of copper-sulfate
compounds when pruning, and insecticides to control plagues (ants), but the use of these
products did not reach the amounts and prevalence of use as in other crops in the area
(i.e., bananas). The FEDECADE has had Rainforest Alliance certified CCN-51 plots
(although it did not find a market for these beans), and other CCN-51 farmers reported
that they managed CCN-51 the same way they managed Nacional, with water and
pruning. Evidently, more research is needed on this topic: the lack of regard for CCN-51
is generating a bias against learning about the true risks and benefits of this variety.
Farmers also agree on variety’s weakness. The Nacional variety susceptibility to
diseases is seen as a major problem by 71% of FEDECADE farmers, and 75% of APOV
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farmers. Of diseases and pests of concern, the most frequently mentioned is frosty pod,
which was identified “as the main cause of crop loss” by 29% of FEDECADE farmers
and 30% of APOV farmers. An APOV farmer said that “in a bad year, losses to monilla
[frosty pod] go up to 80% of the pods.” The second most commonly mentioned disease is
witches broom (27% of FEDECADE and 30% of APOV farmers), followed by parasitic
plants (locally known as “hierba pajarito” (7% FEDECADE, 2% APOV). The least
mentioned disease is cacao wilt (‘mal de machete’ or ‘pudricion de la pata’) which is a
source of concern for 5% of FEDECADE farmers with holdings of CCN-51, but it was
not mentioned by FEDECADE Nacional-only holders or by any of the APOV farmers.
One APOV farmer mentioned that, beyond the attack of the “witches broom”, he was
also concerned about Nacional losses to the disease locally known as “mancha negra”
(cocoa black pod rot, Phytophthora cf. palmivora).
While susceptibility to disease (other than the cocoa wilt) is not a major concern
for CCN-51 farmers, they worry about the water requirements of this variety.
Additionally, CCN-51 pods’ abundance and easiness of collection—cited as an advantage
by most farmers—is seen as a disadvantage by others: cocoa-pods thieves strike CCN-51
plots because in a short period of time (1 hour or so) they can fill sacks with pods and run
(even at night). Farmers argued that thieves do not hit Nacional plots, because pods are
scarce, and they would need to work to make it worthwhile. 57 Thus, farmers may opt for
Nacional as a risk reduction strategy in areas where cocoa thievery is high.

57

Altought cocoa thievery is a common event (all the farmers I interview have suffered
from it), it is not reported in crime statistics.
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Finally, one survey respondent argued that his worries about CCN-51 were born
out of what other people said: “son las amenazas que hay, que esta variedad no ha de
valer” [there are threats [by others who say] that this variety will be worthless]. The bad
reputation of CCN-51 appears to be affecting farmer’s view about this variety.
On the other hand, farmers that have converted their farms to CCN-51 are
extremely critical of Nacional. For example, an unaffiliated anonymous farmer from the
vicinity of El Progreso (Province of El Oro) said that he changed his farm to CCN-51
about 12 years ago because “Nacional does not give you enough money to live.” He
mentioned that he was continuously “working on the farm, fertilizing, irrigating,
controlling diseases” but that “it [Nacional] was good for nothing, the plants did not
yield.” He received technical support from staff of a development project working with
the nearby UNOCACE-affiliated [ex-FEDECADE] Asociation of Cacao Producers “El
Progreso”, but “everything was the same.” He mentioned that although “El Progreso pays
more for Nacional” (about $20 over the market price per 45 kg, similar to APOV’s
premium), it “is not enough.” Roughly 12 years after switching to CCN-51, he says that
his average yield is up to 810 kg/ha year, and that “he gets the same price for CCN-51 as
others get for Nacional.” He argues that “there is no difference; they say Nacional is
better but they do not want to pay more.” He finally argued that “[he] did not want
anything to do with Nacional anymore: not even as a gift” (Anonymous farmer, interview
with the author, La Cadena).
The closest to a defender of Nacional who I interviewed is a farmer who said he
was keeping his Nacional plot because he and his son (an immigrant to the US) “loved
the trees, the birds, and to have something for other animals.” This farmer has plots of
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Nacional with shade of both timber and fruit-bearing trees (avocados, zapote, and others)
and plots planted with a combination of CCN-51 and passion fruit. He said that Nacional
was “not profitable,” but argued that his other crops were. Thus, he concluded saying that
he was going to keep his Nacional because the other crops gave him income to feed his
family. He appreciated his Nacional forest. In his words, “it takes [shade] trees 10, 20,
even 50 years to growth, and you can cut them down in minutes” (Anonymous farmer,
interview with the author, Nueva Union Campesina).
The Secret Economic Life of Cocoa Farmers: wearing four hats (Nacional, CCN-51,
other crops and off-farm work)
In-depth interviews with farmers reveal that they make careful analysis of the
risks involved with certain agricultural choices. While this analysis is inherently done at
the individual level, the overall results of the interviews suggest that farmer weighs
information gathered from his/her social network, makes rough economic calculations,
and makes educated guesses about the risk of a crop before launching himself/herself in a
short-medium term entrepreneurial investment. For instance, I interviewed an
independent, non-affiliated farmers from the town of Jesus Maria (Guayas) that decided
to replace his small (2 ha) banana plantation “about three years ago” with cocoa because
“[banana] did not really work for us [small farmers] anymore.” This change from one
crop to the other was not immediate; it is an ongoing process in which cacao plants’
acquisition and planting have been done in steps: “[I plant cacao] when I [farmer and his
family] have the means, and when the weather [rain] favors; if you get some money, you
buy 600 plants, and you take care of them for a year or so with water when needed, and
weed control, and one or two sacks of urea for finishing; then you wait until you get more
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money, and you plant another 900 plants. Meanwhile you have to have another job,
because the plantain that you use as temporary shade does not yield enough money to
survive.”
This farmer planted 360 plants of Nacional “de pepa” (from seed) because “it is
cheaper this way,” but he sourced CCN-51 plants from a “reputable source in Naranjal,
because they have one CCN-51 that is very pretty.” He strongly recommended that” one
has to be careful about sourcing plants,” because “if you do not get good scion and stock
material you get plants that are all male and later you have to replace them.” This farmer
planted CCN-51 because “he knew the material, he knew the genetics of the plant.”
About planting Nacional, he said that he thinks that “when you plant from seed you play
with dice: you are not sure about anything, so although the upfront cost of CCN-51 is
higher ($0.35 per plant of CCN-51, $0.10 per plant of Nacional) it is cheaper at the end.”
This farmer accounting supports this opinion: he reported that his 360 Nacional plants
yield about “one can a year [7.5 kg; 0.02 kg/plant year];” the others (1140 CCN-51
plants) yield 8-9 latas [68 kg; 0.06 kg/plant year], even thought he gives both Nacional
and CCN-51 plants the same treatment. Given that this farmer sold both CCN-51 and
Nacional for the same gate price, this means that each one of this farmer’s CCN-51 plant
produces three times the income of a Nacional plant (for the same ‘management’
investment).
Arriba: An unsustainable crop?
The results of this study indicate that there are parts of the Ecuadorian cocoa
narrative that accurately portray reality: cocoa holders and their holdings are relatively
old, and poor. The agricultural income of 66% of FEDECADE and 82% of APOV

154

farmers is below Ecuador’s poverty line; even more, the agricultural income of 47% of
FEDECADE’s and 71% of APOV’s members is below the extreme poverty line. There
are points of commonality among these poor farmers: reduced size of holdings, and that
most of them (96% FEDECADE, 100% APOV) have farms planted with cocoa of the
Nacional variety.
The APOV case illustrates the limitations of the alternative trade model. Although
APOV farmers are selling their cocoa for a price which is higher than what they can get
in the local market, this premium does not allow them to rise above the poverty level. It
also shows some of the limits of these trade-models: the APOV (the institution) gets 97%
of the FOB value of cocoa (while farmers get 87%) yet this difference is needed to cover
the costs of meeting the quality and certification requirements of its clients. The
FEDECADE farmers, with the geographical advantage of lower transportation costs, get
a similar share of the FOB selling at the local market price without the premium afforded
by certification.
However, there are factors that farmers control that influence their income. Of
these, the results show that crop diversification strategies exert a strong influence in
farmer’s income. Farmers with more types of crops certainly fare better; while the crops
planted vary according to region and farmer’s personal assessment and preferences, I
found that several combinations are possible. However, the results also indicate that
Nacional lacks profitability in all planting schemes.
Thus, although most farmers still have Nacional (86% of FEDECADE, 100% of
APOV), this is changing rapidly. Thus, 59% of FEDECADE farmers and 20% of APOV
farmers have plots with CCN-51, and these plots are younger (mean=5 years old) and
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more productive than any Nacional plot. In the survey and interviews, I found that two
factors explain this rapid change. First, simply put, CCN-51 yield by area is up to three
times the yield of Nacional, even in cases where there has been a constant, long term
efforts to improve Nacional plantations. In the FEDECADE general area—whose farmers
had the support of Nacional-oriented NGO projects for the last 10 years—CCN-51 yields
721 kg/ha year to Nacional 379 kg/ha year. In the APOV general area CCN-51 yields are
higher (354 kg/ha year) than the average Nacional’ (295 kg ha/year) even thought these
plots have not yet reached full production. Farmers are aware that CCN-51 is more
costly, and that it requires more ‘care,’ but they said that this variety’s yield compensates
them for the extra investment. Second, in the regional markets, a farmer gets paid the
same price for both varieties; or, if the farmer is associated to a ‘certified’ associative
commercialization organization that manages to get a differentiated price for Nacional
cocoa, the amount of the premium does not compensate the farmer for the low yield of
this variety.
However, farmers have found three ways around the failings of Nacional, namely
Nacional-based organic agricultural intensification, multi-crop agriculture, and off-farm
employment. The first strategy is shown by APOV’s Organic Technology Package
(OTP), which in preliminary trials delivers a yield of 587 kg/ha year. This result also
raises questions about what the OTP could do for CCN-51 trees. While the
implementation of the OTP package is limited because of its costs and complexity, it
shows that changes in management result in more productive cocoa farms. Unfortunately,
the APOV OTP has built-in limiting factors that may prevent it from being readily
transferred to other locations: it is premised on the APOV alliance with the Vinces’
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Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of Guayaquil, and leveraged on the
supply of young agronomists formed at this institution. Some of the labors of the OTP,
such as aggressive pruning, and shade control, require tools and training that farmers do
not have. Even more, these tasks are physically demanding, risky and challenging for
farmers who on average are on average 54 years old.
The second strategy is crop diversification. Either by replacing or complementing
cocoa, crop diversification increases on-farm agricultural income. Evidently, farmers in
different areas have developed different ways of implementing diversification: APOV
farmers prefer short cycle; FEDECADE’s farmers opt for bananas, plantains or passion
fruit. Even the planting of plots of CCN-51 should be viewed from this perspective; it
provides another source of income. The farmers face two constrains that limits the
implementation of these practices: first, it is related to personal know-how, and secondly,
there is a need for capital investment to plant other crops. The survey results show that
the availability of agricultural loans is limited, which is a severe limitation. Furthermore,
this strategy cannot be standardized: all the farmers I surveyed and interviewed have a
different take on what is profitable for them, depending on their experience, labor
availability, geography, and other factors. Nevertheless, crop diversification offers a
further benefit: if farmers are making a decent living out of their work, some of them may
opt for conserving Nacional for its aesthetic values.
The third strategy is to opt for off-farm employment. The results show that 27%
of FEDECADE’s and 13.6% of APOV’s survey respondents work off-farm, in
occupations that go from agricultural labor for other farmers (11% FEDECADE, 1%
APOV), commerce (tending shops), trades (cleaning houses, bus and taxi drivers,
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fishermen, extracting crab meat, waiting tables), and professional services (my sample
included a teacher, a doctor, an economist and a government employee). This last group,
which accounts for 1% of FEDECADE and 7% of APOV farmers offers a view of a
possible future for Ecuador’s cocoa farming: all these people reported that the highest
share of their income came from their professional occupations, and that cocoa was
secondary. These professionals liked Nacional, because it was easy to keep.
In conclusion, this study shows weaknesses in the conceptualization and
implementation of the alternative trade and the agricultural intensification models on the
context of Ecuadorian cocoa production. Alternative trade—derived from ecological or
environmental friendly certification schemes, or in varietal attributes—offers at best a
limited tool to address poverty, unless accompanied by a strong agricultural
intensification component. In Ecuadorian cocoa, low yield does not lead to profitability.
However, agricultural intensification does not necessarily mean intensive use of
agrochemicals and similar inputs. As the APOV case shows, there are other alternatives
that achieve good results using organic methods. Nevertheless, an emphasis on the
Nacional variety has resulted in reduced research and development for CCN-51.
Farmers have ways of increasing income that challenge the conventional view of
agricultural intensification as ‘one crop.’ Farmers use their knowledge of local markets,
their abilities, labor availability, and other agricultural, social and economic variables in
ways that it maximizes their opportunities and minimizes risks: most the farmers in my
survey were the survivors of three or more decades of cocoa price swings, botched
government price fixing schemes, weather phenomena, and fickle markets. For some,
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their response is opting for one high yield variety (CCN-51); for others, planting crops
other than cocoa. Even more opt for having Nacional, CCN-51 and other crops.
Evidently, this suggests the need for a reevaluation of ‘one-crop’ development
programs. While this sort of projects—on the basis of the expertise of a selected group,
easily framed in terms of problems and solutions— are attractive for development
agencies, they lack a farmer’s nuanced understanding of the local growing conditions.
This understanding—the knowledge of each farmer about himself, his land, the crops—is
lost when an externally-financed solution are applied wholesale. A common complain
among Ecuadorian environmentalists is that agrochemicals are used “en plancha” (in all
the area of a plantation). Paradoxically, these groups apply ‘sustainable development’ and
‘certification’ projects in the same way.
The findings also point out to other failings in the contemporary discourse on
Ecuadorian cocoa production. Indeed, the middlemen are part of the problem. However,
instead of just ignoring them (at best) or demonizing them, there is a need to see them as
part of the solutions: if an associative commercialization system is lacking, the
middlemen—and their practices—remain. If the goal of a policy maker is to improve the
quality of Ecuadorian cocoa, there is a need to train these agents in assessment of cocoa,
following rules and procedures that are as strict as those imposed to the associative
farmers.
Finally, there is a need to attack structural problems that cannot be solved by
alternative trade or agricultural intensification models. There is a lack of credit for cocoa,
given banker’s perception of the low profitability of cocoa—and farmers cannot improve
their farms because they lack credit. If some of the resources used in promoting
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alternative trade were divested for granting low-interest, 10-year term loans, more
farmers could implement improvements that will allow them to increase their incomes.
Also, alternative trade does reward farmers for non-transactional goods and services (i.e.,
ecosystem services). The premiums that the market would bear are subject to supply and
demand; while a farmer’s lost opportunities remain constant. Thus, farmers bear the cost
of providing these services.
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(a) Ecuadorian cocoa farms average yield by area harvested, from 1961 to 2009 (in
kg/ha year). Note: 1981-1981, 1987-1988 and 1997-1998 are years with strong
influence of El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Source: FAOSTAT 2010
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(b) Ecuadorian cocoa production (in thousand tonnes) and area harvested (in
thousand ha) from 1961 to 2009. Source: FAOSTAT 2010.
Figure 1. Ecuadorian cocoa production statistics: a) production by area harvested, 19642009; b) production by area (kg/ha), 1964-2009.
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Figure 2. Area of Study. Ecuador, the Western lowlands (Costa), APOV and FEDECADE associations and cooperatives.

(c) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP), where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is
the reported gate price for crop 1, and TFS is the total area of the farm.
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(d) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Income, where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is the
reported gate price for crop 1; n stands for crop planted (1-4), and TFS is the total area of the farm.
Figure 3. Formulas to calculate (a) standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP in US$ ha/year) and (b) standardized Farm Gross
Income (in US$ ha year)
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Figure 4. Histogram for the frequency of farmer’s age (in years) for (a) FEDECADE
(n=100) and (b) APOV (n=60).
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Figure 5. Standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP) and standardized Farm Gross Income
(FGI) (in US$ /ha year) by crop system by Farmer’s Organization.
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Figure 6. Regression analysis for yearly agricultural gross income (US$) by area (ha) by cropping system for FEDECADE
farmers, with guides for yearly Family Vital Income Level (CFV) and Family Basic Level (CFB).
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Figure 7. Regression analysis for yearly agricultural gross income (US$) by area (ha) by cropping system for APOV farmers, with
guides for yearly Family Vital Income Level (CFV) and Family Basic Level (CFB).

Figure 8. Dot plot for FEDECADE farmers with incomes below and above Ecuadorian
poverty level (CFB) by area of holdings (ha).

Figure 9. Dot plot for APOV farmers with incomes below and above Ecuadorian poverty
level (CFV) by area of holdings (ha).
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Figure 10. Tree of cacao Nacional, Nueva Union Campesina, Guayas, 2009
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Figure 11. Tree of CCN-51 cacao, Nueva Union Campesina, Guayas, 2009
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Table 1. List of farmer’s associations (FA), Ecuadorian government agencies (GA),
intergovernmental organizations (IGO), projects (LFP), local government associations
(LGA), non-governmental organizations (NGO), private agencies (PA), public/private
sector partnerships (PPP), and University-level Educational Institutions (UEI) that have
worked in Nacional related cocoa projects, 2006-2008
Institution
Aroma Amazonico
Asociacion de Productores de Cacao de
San Carlos [Association of Cocoa
Producers of San Carlos]
Corporation Fortaleza del Valle
Asociacion de Productores de Cacao de
Atacames [Association of Cocoa Producers
of Atacames]
Organización de Productores de Cacao
Orgánicos Sabor Arriba
Asociacion de productores de cacao del
Norte de Esmeraldas [Association of Cocoa
Producers of Northern Esmeraldas]
Corporation Integral of Associations of
Camilo Ponce Enriquez
Federacion de Productores de Cacao del
Ecuador [Ecuadorian Federation of Cocoa
Producers]
Federación de Organizaciones Campesinas
del Cantón Muisne (Federation of Farmers’
Organizations of the Canton Muisne)
Federación de Organizaciones de la
Nacionalidad Kichwa de Napo [Federation
of Farmers’ Organizations of Napo’s
Kichwa Nationality]
Association Kallari
Union Cantonal de Organizaciones de
Participacion Social por la Justicia del
Canton Las Naves [Union of Organizations
of Social Participation for the Justice of the
Canton Las Naves]

Acronym

Country of origin
Ecuador
Ecuador

Type
FA
FA

Ecuador
Ecuador

FA
FA

APROCACA
O
APROCANE

Ecuador

FA

Ecuador

FA

CIACPE

Ecuador

FA

FEDECADE

Ecuador

FA

FOCAME

Ecuador

FA

FONAKIN

Ecuador

FA

Kallari
UCOCS

Ecuador
Ecuador

FA
FA

APROCA

[continued]
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies;
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions.

171

Table 1. [Continued]
Institution
Union Nacional de Organizaciones
Campesinas Cacaoteras del Ecuador
[Union of Rural Cacao Organizations of
Ecuador]
Union de Organizaciones de productores
agropecuarios Moraspungo [Union of
Agriculture and Cattle Ranching Producers
of Moraspungo]
Corporación de Promoción de
Exportaciones e Inversiones [Corporation
for the Promotion of Exports and
Investments]
Instituto para el Ecodesarrollo Regional
Amazonico [Institute for the Amazon
Region Ecodevelopment]
Instituto Autonomo de Investigaciones
Agropecuarias [Autonomous Insitute for
research in Agriculture and Cattle
Ranching ]
Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia
[Ministery for Agriculture and Cattle
Ranching]
Unidad de Desarollo Norte de la
Presidencia de la Republica del Ecuador
[Northern Development Unit of the
Ecuador’s Presidency]
Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst [German
Development Service]
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit [German Agency for
Technical Cooperation]
Swiss Agency for Cooperation and
Development
Agency for International Development of
United States of America

Acronym
UNOCACE

Country of origin
Ecuador

Type
FA

UOPAM

Ecuador

FA

CORPEI

Ecuador

GA

ECORAE

Ecuador

GA

INIAP

Ecuador

GA

MAG

Ecuador

GA

UDENOR

Ecuador

GA

DED

Germany

IGO

GTZ

Germany

IGO

SDC

Switzerland

IGO

US AID

US

IGO

[continued]
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies;
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions.
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Table 1. [Continued]
Institution
Proyecto de generacion de ingresos y
empleo para la frontera norte del Ecuador
[US AID] [Project for the generation of
income and employment for Ecuador’s
northern border]
Programa de desarrollo sostenible de la
frontera Amazonica Norte(Loan BID
1420/OC EC)
[Program for the Sustainable Development
of the Northern Amazonic Frontier]
Consorcio de Municipios Amazonicos
[Amazonic Municipalities Consortium]
Fundacion Altropico
Fundacion Equinoccio
Fundacion Jatun Sacha
Fundacion Same
Agricultural Cooperative Development
International and Volunteers in Overseas
Cooperative Assistance
Corporación Esmeraldeña para la
Formación y Desarrollo Integral
[Esmeraldas’ Corporation for Integral
Education and Development]
Conservacion y Desarrollo
[Conservation and Development]
Fondo Ecuatoriano de Cooperacion para el
Desarrollo [Ecuadorian Fund of
Cooperation for Development]
Fundacion Ecuatoriana de Tecnologia
Apropiada [Ecuadorian Foundation for
Appropiate Technology]
Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio
Fundación para el Desarrollo y la
Creatividad Productiva
[Foundation for the Development and the
Creative Productivity]
Yachana Foundation

Acronym
PRONORTE

Country of origin
Ecuador-US

Type
IGP

AMAZNOR

Ecuador

LFP

COMAGA

Ecuador

LGA

ACDI/VOCA

Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
US

NGO
NGO
NGO
NGO
NGO

CEFODI

Ecuador

NGO

CYD

Ecuador

NGO

FECD

Ecuador

NGO

FEDETA

Ecuador

NGO

FEPP
FUNDES

Ecuador
Ecuador

NGO
NGO

FUNEDESIN

Ecuador/US

NGO
[continued]
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies;
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions.
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Table 1. [Continued]
Institution
Acronym
Country of origin Type
Fundacion de promocion y accion para el
FUNPAD
Ecuador
NGO
Desarrollo
(Foundation for the Promotion and Action
for Development]
Fundaccion Maquita Cusunchik
MCCH
Ecuador
NGO
Asociacion Nacional de Exportadores de
ANECACAO Ecuador
PA
Cacao
[Nacional Association of Cocoa Exporters]
Bundesverband Großhandel, Außenhandel, BGA
Germany
PA
Dienstleistungen e.V. [Federation of
German Wholesale and Foreign Trade]
Corporacion Ecuatoriana de Cafetaleros
CORECAF
Ecuador
PA
[Coffee-growers Ecuadorian Corporation]
Biocomercio Sostenible [Sustainable
Biocomercio Ecuador
PPP
Biotrade]
Sistema de Capacitación en el Manejo de
Consorcio
Ecuador
PPP
los Recursos Naturales Renovables-System CAMAREN
for training in Natural Resources
Management
Escuela Politecnica del Ejercito
ESPE
Ecuador
UEI
[Army Polytecnic School]
Universidad Luis Vargas Torres
ULVT
Ecuador
UEI
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies;
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions.
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Table 2. On-farm and off-farm sources of income FEDECADE and APOV farmers.
Source of income
On-farm
Cacao only
Other crops
Off-farm

Agricultural
Commerce
Professional
Services
Trade
Multiple
Pension

FEDECADE
n

Total

Total

%

APOV
N

%

42
31

42.0
31.0
73.0

6
45

10.1
76.3
86.4

11
3
1
3
8
1
---

11.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
8.0
1.0
--27.0

1
1
4
1
----1

1.7
1.7
7.7
1.7
----1.7
13.6

Table 3. Crops systems, number of farmers, standardized farm gross product (FGP) (in
US$/ha year), proportion of FGP from each crop, standardized farm gross income (FGI)
in (US$/ha year) and rank of that cropping systems for FEDECADE and APOV.
Crops by farm

N

FGP ha/year
(US $)

Share FGP
ha/year by
crop by farm

FEDECADE
Nacional-only
24 878.12
100
CCN-51-only*
10 2729.65
100
Nacional+CCN-51
32 1568.15
33:67
Nacional +bananas
5
1514.61
29:71
Nacional+CCN-51+bananas 7
1801.60
27:13:60
Nacional+CCN-51+other
11 2278.09
26:55:19
CCN-51+other
3
3078.52
86:14
APOV
Nacional-only
10 741.63
100
Nacional +short cycle
32 2007.30
30:70
Nacional+others
12 2651.1
30:70
*Only CCN-51 plantations older than 5 years were counted.
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FGI
ha/year
(US$)

Rank
(1 – 7)

476.17
1380.27
811.65
696.47
835.59
1131.03
1537.93

7
2
5
6
4
3
1

352.73 3
1154.80 1
1039.30 2

Table 4. Crop (by farmer’s organization), yield (as reported and in standard units) gate price (as reported and in standard units),
production cost (as reported and in standard units)
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Crop

Yield [unit]/ha year

Yield (Mt /ha
year)

Production
cost

0.38 Mt/ha year

Gate price
Gate
Production cost
($ per
price†
($/[unit])‡
†
[unit])
$117.48/qq‡ $2584/Mt $1.21/kg

Nacional
(FEDECADE)
Nacional
(APOV)
CCN-51
(FEDECADE)
Bananas*
(FEDECADE)
Bananas
(APOV)
Plantains
Others-papaya
Otherspassion fruit
Others-short
cycle (maize)

8.34 qq/ha year‡
6.49 qq/ha year‡

0.26 Mt/ha year

$114.42/qq‡ $2517/Mt $1.32/kg

$1320/Mt

23.31 qq/ha year‡

1.1 Mt/ha year

$117.90/qq‡ $2594/Mt $1.27/kg

$1270/Mt

276 boxes˟

6 Mt/ha year

$7/box

$318/Mt

$3/box‡

$136/Mt

276 boxes˟

6 Mt/ha year

$4/box

$184/Mt

$3/box‡

$136/Mt

857 bunches
600 dozens
250 sacks+

--7.2 Mt/ha year
17 Mt/ha year

$4/bunch
$8/dozen
$25/sack

--$666/Mt
$367/Mt

$2000/ha year‡
$2700/ha year‡
$2700/ha year‡

--$180/Mt
$159/Mt

$1210/Mt

2.7
$12/qq*
$264/Mt $6/qq‡
$132/Mt
Mt/ha/harvest
(8.1 Mt/ha year)
Others-short
60/qq/ha/harvest‡
2.7Mt/ha/harvest $28/qq*
$616/Mt $1250/ha/harvest $457.6/Mt
cycle (rice)
(5.4 Mt/ha year)
Notes: ‡ qq=quintals=100lb=45.45kg=0.045Mt; ˟ 1 box=42 kg; + 1 sack=45 kg. * Government fixed price. † Average
October/November 2009. ‡
60 qq/ha year‡

Table 5. Area (ha) by cropping system and farmer’s association needed for farmer’s
agricultural gross income to be above Ecuador’s extreme poverty level (CFV) and
poverty level (CFB)
Farmer’s
association
FEDECADE

APOV

Cropping System

income>
CFV

Area (ha)
income>
CFB

Nacional
CCN-51
Nacional and
CCN-51
Cocoa and others

13.12
3.43

19.65
5.01

5.12
2.89

7.52
5.26

Nacional
Cocoa and others

12.58
4.11

17.75
5.78
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Table 6. Regression analysis equations for agricultural gross income (US$) by area (ha) by cropping system and farmer’s
association.
Association
FEDECADE

Cropping System
Nacional Only

CCN-51 Only
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Nacional+CCN51

Cocoa+Others

Regression Analysis: GAI versus Area
Regression Equation
GAI = 495 + 1153 Area
Predictor
Coef SE
Coef
Constant
767.0
343.0
Area
280.16
40.60
S = 1189.09
R-Sq = 68.4% R-Sq(adj) = 67.0%
Regression Equation
GAI = 767 + 280 Area
Predictor
Coef SE
Coef
Constant
495.4
447.3
Area
1152.79
62.99
S = 1118.02
R-Sq = 97.7% R-Sq(adj) = 97.4%
Regression Equation
GAI = 551 + 760 Area
Predictor
Constant
Area
S = 2518.42
Regression Equation
Predictor
Constant
Area
S = 3271.59

Coef SE
Coef
551
1164
760.2
155.7
R-Sq = 46%
R-Sq(adj) = 44.1%
GAI = 2282 + 723 Area
Coef SE
Coef
2282
1404
723.5
153.9
R-Sq = 51.3% R-Sq(adj) = 48.9%

T
2.24
6.90

P
0.036
0.000

T
1.11
18.30

P
0.300
0.000

T
0.47
4.88

P
0.639
0.000

T
1.62
4.70

P
0.119
0.000
(continued)

Table 6. Continued.
Association
APOV

Cropping System
Nacional Only

Cocoa+others

Regression Analysis: GAI versus Area
Regression Equation
GAI = 0.0153 + 353 Area
Predictor
Coef SE
Coef
Constant
0.01527
0.01355
Area
353.186
0.002
S = 0.0306912
R-Sq = 100% R-Sq(adj) = 100.0%
Regression Equation
GAI = -66 + 1096 Area
Predictor
Coef SE
Coef
Constant
-66.3
348.6
Area
1096.25
57.10
S = 1570.49
R-Sq = 89.8% R-Sq(adj) = 89.5%

T
1.13
173428

P
0.292
0.000

T
-0.19
19.20

P
0.850
0.000
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CHAPTER V.
CONCLUSION
This study was born out of turning the definition of sustainable development into
a question: if it is a “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland
1987), there is a need to ask about whose present and whose future is represented into the
implementation of this multigenerational project (Luke 2005).
The aims of this study were: a) to understand to what is chocolate manufacturers’
perception of what consumers are looking for—what are the qualities that made
alternative goods, b) to understand how the perception of consumer’s demand for
sustainability-enhanced chocolate is translated into the implementation of cocoa-centered
development projects, c) to understand how the implementation of these projects ignores
the impacts that these efforts impose on the farmers.
In Chapter II, I show that chocolate wrappers’ narratives are rich in keywords
which denote sustainability (i.e., nature, rainforest and farmers), a finding that suggest
that manufacturers are designing products to meet the demand of consumers for
alternative chocolate. However, the mechanisms for the sourcing of this alternative cocoa
are not stated in the labels of most products. Half of the manufacturers use a countrywide definition of origin, paying a token attention to the farmers in the ground.
Certification—when present—does not imply the presence of a deep relationship between
producers and manufacturers. Certification acts as a barrier to entry at the producer's level
(limiting the number of cocoa suppliers for a particular bar), but manufacturers source
cocoa from any certified producer. The use of country-wide sourcing, and the lack of
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commitment of manufacturers also suggest that manufacturers perceive that most
consumers are satisfied with vague references to “geographical sourcing,” “protectingthe-environment” and “supporting-the-farmers.” Vague commitments to alternative-trade
sourcing create risks for chocolate manufacturers—as well as for cocoa producers. From
the chocolate manufactures perspective, companies that work closely with farmers—and
are willing to commit time and resources to cultivate these relationships—are likely to
secure access to a supply of high-quality beans. On the other hand, companies that opt
out of developing relationships with the producers will find themselves engaged in an
endless race to secure high quality beans. At-length cocoa sourcing puts artisan
companies in direct competition with the large candy multinationals, which are quite
interested in entering into these niche markets and sourcing high-quality cocoa (i.e.,
Kraft, Hershey's and Lindt).
At-length alternative trade cocoa sourcing also creates risks for producers’
organizations. In Chapter III, I show the effects that a producers’ “at-length” alternativetrade strategy had on the Ecuadorian Federation of Cocoa Producers (FEDECADE). In
2009, the commercialization system of FEDECADE ceased to operate after the
FEDECADE was unable to find a client willing to pay a premium price for its multicertified Nacional cocoa. This collapse, after just six years of operation, marked the end
of a thirteen-years-long (1995-2008) effort financed with over a million dollars of
investment by international donors The project achieved its generic goal of increasing the
income of farmers by creating an alternative commercialization system that transferred
revenues from cocoa exports directly to the farmers. The alternative commodity chain
organized by FEDECADE gave farmers an attractive outlet for their products, and forced
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intermediaries to rationalize their profitability. These benefits were lost when in 2009
FEDECADE was not able to secure a purchase order, because it lacked a strategic
partner. FEDECADE’s approach towards commercialization was to for sell cocoa to the
highest bidder—the farmer’s equivalent to chocolate manufacturers “at-length” cocoa
sourcing. The sell-to-the-highest-bidder strategy generated revenues in the short term, but
did not lead to long-term sustainability.
The experience of FEDECADE shows another risk of “at-length” alternative
trade. The collapse of FEDECADE’s RA certified cocoa market, after Kraft Foods Inc.
started to source RA cocoa from Ivory Coast (Africa), suggests that certification—the
basic tool of alternative trade—do not guarantee sustainability. Certified farmers face
diminishing returns as more farmers join certification programs—lured as they are by the
promises of NGOs and IGOs with worldwide outreach. In fact, the same actors
(Rainforest Alliance-Kraft-GTZ) financed the efforts of FEDECADE in Ecuador, as well
as the efforts of the farmers of Ivory Coast. When the supply of certified goods outpaces
demand, the premiums for certified goods collapse. The race for certification benefits
multinational companies, which have the ability to source commodities from the lowest
(or more convenient) supplier: certified products become another commodity, subject to
cycles driven by supply and demand.
The FEDECADE case also raises doubts about the viability of pairing
developing-country organizations with global financial partners. In these relationships,
the burden of risk is carried by those in developing economies. When FEDECADE’s U.S.
financial partner (Root Capital) deemed that the cocoa business was too risky, it pulled
out. FEDECADE was not able to find another source of capital. There is a power
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differential between financers and producers, and certainly points to the vulnerability of
the developing country partners in these alliances.
Finally, FEDECADE’s experience also shows the failings of leveraging
development on a commodity like cocoa, subject to the whims of the international
markets. Cocoa prices and stocks have been fluctuating widely in the global markets,
reaching historical heights only to fall vertiginously. The behavior of Northern
stockholders, from small investors to the Armajaro Hedge Fund, have deep repercussions
on the livelihoods (and hopes) of commodity-producing farmers in the developing world.
Thus, successful commodity-based development programs exacerbate rural communities’
exposure to these risks.
Finally, the results of my study indicate that the NGOs and IGOs behind the
FEDECADE project have not succeeded at convincing farmers to remain wedded to
Nacional. Only one out of the 100 farmers I interviewed replanted his farm with
Nacional, and that was done eight years ago. Meanwhile, in the last seven years (within
the period of execution of the projects) 38 farmers (out of 100) had renovated their
plantations using CCN-51, a high-yield full-sun cocoa hybrid that lacks the Nacional
flavor. These data suggest that even when the stock centers paid premium prices for
Nacional, farmers were voicing their choice for agricultural intensification by planting
CCN-51.
In Chapter IV, I address the reasons that explain why most farmers opt for the
CCN-51 variety. I found that crop diversification strategies exert a strong influence in
farmer’s income. Farmers with more types of crops fare better, because the other crops
replace or supplement the income from cocoa. The responses to my survey suggest that
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farmers see the CCN-51 cocoa variety as another source of income. The CCN-51 variety
is attractive because its yield by area is up to three times the yield of Nacional. In the
FEDECADE general area—whose farmers had the support of Nacional-oriented NGO
projects for the last 10 years—CCN-51 yields 721 kg/ha year to Nacional 379 kg/ha year.
In the APOV general area CCN-51 yields are higher (354 kg/ha year) than the average
Nacional’ (295 kg ha/year) even thought the CCN-51 plots have not yet reached full
production. Farmers are aware that CCN-51 is more costly, and that it requires more
‘care,’ but they said that this variety’s yield compensates them for the extra investment.
The farmers’ overall preference for the CCN-51 variety is because in the regional
markets a farmer gets paid the same price for both varieties (but CCN-51 yield is higher
than the yield of Nacional). In cases when the farmer is associated with a ‘certified’
associative commercialization organization that manages to get a differentiated price for
Nacional cocoa, the amount of the premium does not compensate the farmer for the low
yield of this variety.
The results of my study suggest that Nacional lacks profitability. The results also
indicate that there are two ways in which this variety could survive. First, if farmers are
making a decent living out of other crops, some of them may opt for conserving Nacional
for its aesthetic values. Also, in some cases Nacional holdings are in hands of
professionals (i.e., teachers, doctors, and economists) that reported that the largest share
of their income came from their professional occupations, and that cocoa was secondary.
These professionals liked Nacional, because it is easy to keep.
In conclusion, in Chapter IV my study shows weaknesses in the conceptualization
and implementation of the alternative trade and the agricultural intensification models in
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the context of Ecuadorian cocoa production. Alternative trade—derived from ecological
or environmental friendly certification schemes, or in varietal attributes—offers at best a
limited tool to address poverty, unless accompanied by a strong agricultural
intensification component. In Ecuadorian cocoa, low yield does not lead to profitability.
Farmers have ways of increasing income that challenge the conventional view of
agricultural intensification as ‘one crop.’ Farmers use their knowledge of local markets,
their abilities, labor availability, and other agricultural, social and economic variables in
ways that it maximizes their opportunities and minimizes risks: most the farmers in my
survey were the survivors of three or more decades of cocoa price swings, botched
government price fixing schemes, 58 weather phenomena, and fickle markets. For some,
their response is opting for one high yield variety (CCN-51); for others, planting crops
other than cocoa. Even more opt for having Nacional, CCN-51 and other crops.
Evidently, this suggests the need for a reevaluation of ‘one-crop’ development
programs. While this sort of projects—on the basis of the expertise of a selected group,
easily framed in terms of problems and solutions— are attractive for development
agencies, they lack a farmer’s nuanced understanding of the local growing conditions.
This understanding—the knowledge of each farmer about himself, his land, the crops—is
lost when an externally-financed solution are applied wholesale. A common complaint
among Ecuadorian environmentalists is that agrochemicals are used “en plancha” (in all
the area of a plantation). Paradoxically, these groups apply ‘sustainable development’ and
‘certification’ projects in the same way.

58

From farmer’s perspective.
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The findings also point out to other failings in the contemporary discourse on
Ecuadorian cocoa production. Indeed, the middlemen are part of the problem. However,
instead of just ignoring them (at best) or demonizing them, there is a need to see them as
part of the solutions: if an associative commercialization system is lacking, the
middlemen—and their practices—remain. If the goal of a policy maker is to improve the
quality of Ecuadorian cocoa, there is a need to train these agents in assessment of cocoa,
following rules and procedures that are as strict as those imposed to the associative
farmers.
Finally, there is a need to attack structural problems that cannot be solved by
alternative trade or agricultural intensification models. There is a lack of credit for cocoa,
given banker’s perception of the low profitability of cocoa—and farmers cannot improve
their farms because they lack credit. If some of the resources used in promoting
alternative trade had been used instead in a fund for granting low-interest, 10-year term
loans, more farmers would have been able to improve their farms in ways that would
have allowed them to increase their incomes. As it is working, alternative trade does
reward farmers for non-transactional goods and services (i.e., ecosystem services). The
premiums that the market would bear are subject to supply and demand; while a farmer’s
lost opportunities remain constant. Thus, farmers bear the cost of providing these
services.
In summary, my findings suggest that manufacturers perceive that most
consumers are satisfied with vague references to “geographical sourcing,” “protectingthe-environment” and “supporting-the-farmers.” This vague commitment to alternativetrade sourcing—which I call “at-length” alternative trade—create risks for chocolate
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manufacturers as well as for cocoa producers. Companies that opt out of developing
relationships with the producers will find themselves engaged in an endless race to secure
high quality beans, and in direct competition with the large candy multinationals, which
are quite interested in the alternative trade niche markets.
I also found that the implementation of “at-length” alternative trade-sustainable
development projects at the producers’ side offer at best a mixed bag of success and
failures. After 13 years and over a million-dollar investments that propped an alternative
trade effort with the broad goal of addressing poverty by raising farmers’ income, I found
that farmers’ incomes got a temporary boost from alternative trade. These projects
achieved the goal of forcing cocoa middlemen and exporters to rationalize their behavior,
transferring a larger share of cocoa market value to the farmers. However, by 2009 this
effort collapsed. The collapse is partially explained because the FEDECADE (the
farmers’ organization involved in this project) opted for the producers’ version of “atlength” alternative trade, selling certified cocoa to the highest bidder. The lack of
commitment of producers’ groups mirrors the lack of commitment of chocolate
manufacturers. The FEDECADE commercialization system failure the evidence suggest
that alternative-trade and premium commodities remain subject to supply and demand.
Farmers face diminishing gains as more farmers opt for certification. A worldwide race
for achieving certification actually benefits multinational corporations, which regain the
power to source commodities from the lowest cost (or most convenient) supplier. In
addition, the results question the strategy of leveraging sustainable development projects
on a commodity, subject to the whims of the international markets. Even if successful,
these projects only exacerbate rural communities’ exposure to these risks. Finally, the
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results show how power plays a role at setting the terms, goals and results of
sustainability partnerships. It is necessary to remember that funding institutions
(international agencies, non-profits, and the likes) decide which projects are financed.
Rhetorical price of partnership aside, sustainable development projects are biased
towards the agenda of these agencies—and their perceptions of the wishes of Northern
consumers.
Finally, the results of my study show a linkage between poverty and farmer’s
reliance in the low yield fine cacao known as Nacional—the darling of alternative traders.
I found that the premiums paid for this variety—fine cocoa, shade-grown, organic,
certified—do not compensate farmers for the low yield. Plain and simple, Nacional lacks
profitability. Even more, outside of associative commercialization systems, farmers get
the same gate price for both varieties. These findings point out to a new consideration of
alternative trade schemes. Alternative trade should be seen as a way to fund a selffinanced farmer’s organization that provides services to farmer’s groups. The goal of this
association must be to help farmers optimize their activities, via agricultural
intensification, crop diversification and similar local thought schemes. If equality and
fairness are put at the forefront, it is not fair that farmers bear the costs of the ecological
services of shaded plantations—if the cost of this keeping is that they remain in poverty.
Thus, the findings of this study point at the need for careful assessment of
whether the needs of the present generation are being met. Self-reliance and selfawareness are part of the way of farming: the cocoa farmer’s in my sample have survived
to 30-years or more of commodities volatility, changes government, social upheaval, and
fickle markets. Alternative trade/sustainable development projects emphasis on
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consensus, expertise, instrumentality, and pursuit of Northern consumer’s via
certification forfeits the values of farmers’ experiences—thus fail. After all—when the
funding for projects dries up and the army of NGO’s and IGO’s consultants move
towards greener pastures—the farmers are who remain in the land, left behind.
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APPENDIX 1
SURVEY
ABANDONADOS: EL DESTINO DE LOS AGRICULTORES EN LA ERA DEL
DESARROLLO SUSTENTABLE
Cristian Melo
Department of International Relations
Florida International University
University Park DM 430
11200 SW 8th Street,
Miami Fl 33199

Genero:

Hombre

Mujer

Edad:

1. Localidad y Afiliación
1.1 Localidad/Cooperativa/Asociación:
1.2 Afiliación:

FEDECADE

APOV

INDEPENDIENTE/NINGUNA

Otro Grupo Cacaotero:
1.3 Donde nacio?
1.4 Si nacio en otro sitio (fuera del area), hace cuanto tiempo vive aqui? años.
1.5 Esta pregunta es sobre tenencia de tierra. Como adquirio sus tierras? Heredo, compro,
arrienda, o le dieron tierra por reforma agraria?
1.6 Sus padres era cacaoteros, o tenian otra actividad?
1.7 Y cuando usted ya no este, quien cree que va a trabajar la tierra? A alguno de sus
hijos le interesa la agricultura, o tienen otras profesiones?
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2. Extensión, tenencia y uso del suelo
2.1 Cuanta tierra tiene, maneja o renta usted (anotar respuesta)? Unidad:
2.2 Conversión a hectáreas
2.3 Tenencia de tierra:

PROPIA

RENTA

COMUNAL

Otra: Si renta, puedo preguntarle cuanto paga por la tierra?
2.4 Que cultivos tiene y que superficie de la tierra dedica a este cultivo?
Cultivo

Superficie

2.4.1

Cacao Nacional

2.4.2

Cacao CCN5

2.4.3

Cacao OTRA/s

Unidad

Edad

Superficie

(años)

(has)

VARIEDAD/es: (*)
2.4.4

Banano en Huerta

2.4.5

Banano Separado

2.4.6 Otro 1:
2.4.7 Otro 2
2.4.8 Otro 3
2.4.3.1 * Otras variedades:
2.5 Que plantas y arboles tiene usted para sombra de cacao (las mas comunes)?
3.1 En su opinión, cuales son los problemas que usted tiene con el cacao?
3.2 Hay diferencia entre el Nacional y el de ramilla CCN-51? Que tiene de bueno y malo
cada una?
3.2.1 Que tiene de bueno el Nacional?
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3.2.2 Que tiene de malo?
3.2.3 Que tiene de bueno el ramilla CCN-51?
3.2.4 Que tiene de malo?
3.3 Tiene usted en la finca?

Tendal de caña

Marquesina-secadora solar

Tendal de cemento

Secadora a gas

Secadora a leña

Caja de fermentación
3.4 Como y donde fermenta el cacao? Cuanto se demora? Cual es el precio de cacao
fermentado respecto al precio de cacao sin fermentar?
3.5 Como y donde seca el cacao? Cuanto se demora? Cual es el precio de cacao seco
respecto al precio de cacao fresco?
3.6 Tiene alguna ventaja tiene vender cacao fermentado y secado? No?
3.7 Cuanto tiempo le dedica al cultivo en dias por mes? dias
3.8 Trabaja solo? Le ayuda alguien mas?
4. Production, costos y rendimiento
Cultivo

Rendimiento

Costos de

Ultimo fecha y

(qq/ha/año o

produccion

precio de venta

cajas/ha/año)
4.1

Cacao Nacional

4.2

Cacao CCN-

51/Ramilla
4.3

Cacao OTRA/s

VARIEDAD/es: (*)
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4.4

Banano en Huerta

4.5

Banano Separado

4.6 Otro 1:
4.7 Otro 2
4.8 Otro 3

4.9 Donde generalmente vende el cacao? Que tanto del total vende en este sitio? Que tal
es el precio? Le pagan mas por Nacional? Lo mismo que por el CCN-51?
4.10 Hay otro/otros sitios donde vende cacao? Que tanto del total vende en este sitio?
Que tal es el precio? Le pagan mas por Nacional? Lo mismo que por el CCN-51?
5. Otros Ingresos
5.1 A parte del cacao, tiene usted otra fuente de ingreso? Trabaja en una bananera, en una
hacienda, otra actividad?

SI

NO

5.2 Y en que trabaja cuando se acaba la cosecha?
5.2.1 Que tan lejos es?
5.2.2 Y quien se queda en la finca?
5.3 Tiene usted acceso a préstamos antes de la cosecha? A un préstamo que se pague con
cacao?
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APPENDIX 2
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Variable
GEN

Description
Gender

Type
Nominal

AGE
PLA

Age
Place

Continuous
Nominal

AFL

Affiliation

Categorical

BOR
TOR
OWN
REN

Place of birth
Time of residence
Land ownership
Rent or Lease amount (US$/ha/year)

Nominal
Continuous
Binary
Continuous

WOO

Way of ownership

Categorical

RCG
RFG
PCG

Relatives were cacao growers
Relatives were farmers (other crops)
Expectations about progeny
remaining cocoa growers
Number of plots owned

Binary
Binary
Binary

FRA
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Continuous

Coding
F, FEMALE; M,
MALE
SDJ, 6 DE JULIO,
GUAYAS; LFL, LA
FLORIDA, AZUAY;
CAM, CAMACHO,
AZUAY; NUC,
NUEVA UNIÓN
CAMPESINA,
GUAYAS; VIN,
VINCES, LOS
RÍOS.
0, INDEPENDENT;
1, FEDECADE; 2,
APOV; 3, UROCAL.

BOUGHT,
BOUGHT AND
INHERITED;
BOUGHT AND
LAND REFORM;
BOUGHT, LAND
REFORM AND
RENT; GIFT;
INHERITANCE;
INHERITANCE
AND LAND
REFORM; LAND
REFORM; LOAN;
RENT.

Variable

Description

Type

SUR
NAC
AGN
SUN
CCN
AGC
SUC
BAN

Surface owned (total)
Farmer grows cacao Nacional
Nacional groove age (average years)
Nacional groove surface (ha)
Farmer grows cacao CCN-51
CCN-51 groove age (average years)
Nacional groove surface (ha)
Farmer has banana associated with
cacao
Associated banana/cacao groove
surface (ha)
1st other crop
1st other crop type
1st other crop surface (ha)
2nd other crop
2nd other crop type
2nd other crop surface (ha)
3rd other crop
3rd other crop type
3rd other crop surface (ha)
Farmer has shade-grown cacao
Shadow complexity (number of
species mentioned during survey)
Cacao post harvest infrastructure

Continuous
Binary
Continuous
Continuous
Binary
Continuous
Continuous
Binary

FER
DIF

Farmer ferment cacao (any method)
Difference on price for fermented
cacao vs. non-fermented cacao

Binary
Categorical

DRY
TIM

Binary
Continuous

SLA

Farmer dries cacao before sale
Time dedicated to cacao
(days/month)
Source of farm labor

YIN

Nacional cacao yield (qq/ha/year)

Continuous

SUB
OCR1
OCT1
OCS1
OCR2
OCT2
OCS2
OCR3
OCT3
OCS3
SHA
COS
INF

Continuous
Binary
Nominal
Continuous
Binary
Nominal
Continuous
Binary
Nominal
Continuous
Binary
Continuous
Categorical

Categorical
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Coding

0, NONE; 1,
TENDAL DE
CEMENTO; 2,
SOLAR DRYER; 3,
LPG DRYER; 4,
FERMENTATION
BOX
0, NO;1, YES;-, does
not answer/does not
know

0, works alone; 1,
works with family
help; 2, hires labor;
3, both family help
and hired labor

Variable
DAN
SPN

Description
Nacional last cacao sale
Nacional last sale price (in US$ per
qq)
CCN-51 cacao yield (qq/ha/year)
CCN-51 Date of last cacao sale
CCN-51 Last sale price (in US$ per
qq)
Place of sale

Type
Continuous
Continuous

Binary
Binary

TSE

Other place of sale
Farmer has another economic
activity
Type of another economic activity

ATL

Access to loans

Binary

YIC
DAC
SPC
POS

OPS
SEC
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Coding

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Categorical

Categorical

0, farm’s gate; 1,
town middleman; 2,
exporter; 3, farmer’s
association; 4, both 1
and 2

0, none; 1, farming
(other crops); 2, labor
for neighbors; 3, crab
artisanal industry
(fishing or
processing) 4,
transportation
industry
(taxis/pickups); 5,
commerce/sales; 6,
construction worker;
7, arts; 8, services; 9,
teacher, government
or municipal
employee; 10; other
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